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Whenever the sixty-year cycle of the Chinese zodiac rolls around to the 
gengzi 庚子 year, one prepares for the worst.1 Year thirty-seven, that of 
the Metal Rat, is traditionally associated with disaster and crisis. What an 
exemplary gengzi year 2020 turned out to be. It began with apocalyptic 
wildfires in Australia and a global pandemic that ended up sickening some 
70 million people and killing close to 2 million, as well as triggering the 
deepest global economic recession since World War II. Tensions ran high 
in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, where the navy of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) conducted live-fire exercises close to Taiwan, as 
well as along contested regions of the Sino-Indian border. In Hong Kong, 
the introduction of the draconian National Security Law sounded the death 
knell for the promise of One Country, Two Systems. Continued reports and 
evidence of the mass detention of Uyghurs, separation of Uyghur families, 
and other human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China further 
strained relations between the PRC and much of the rest of the world. And, 
an education reform in Inner Mongolia, which has ended the tradition of 
Mongolian-language schooling, has raised fears for the fate of the region’s 
unique cultural heritage and questions as to whether state actions and 
policies in Tibet and Xinjiang might be replicated to some degree in Inner 
Mongolia as well.  
Going Viral
The COVID-19 pandemic, which appears to have originated in Wuhan, was 
central to the sense of crisis in 2020 both in China and beyond. Towards 
the end of December, doctors in Wuhan observed with alarm that they had 
seen over 250 patients presenting with severe acute respiratory symptoms 
similar to those witnessed in the 2003 SARS outbreak. After Wuhan 
Central Hospital had a sample of a patient’s lung fluid analysed, the lab 
informed them and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
that genomic sequencing indicated the presence of a new coronavirus 
2020 — A GENGZI 庚子 YEAR, by Benjamin Penny
One of the ways that years are enumerated in China is to use a cycle of sixty based on the 
‘Ten Heavenly Stems and Twelve Earthly Branches’ 天干地支. The twelve earthly branches 
are associated with the twelve-year cycle of animals that begins with the rat, before moving 
on to ox, tiger, and so on. The first of the ten heavenly stems, jia 甲, is paired with the first 
of these earthly branches, known as zi 子, the second, yi 乙, with the second, chou 丑, and 
so on until the first stem comes around again — only this time it is paired with the eleventh 
branch xu 戌. Thus year one is a jiazi year, year two is an yichou year, but year eleven is a jiaxu 
year. In one sense this is simply a way of identifying years. But it is also one element of the 
Chinese system of correlative cosmology by which different stems and branches (and their 
combinations) have symbolic or predictive meaning.
The year 2020 is a gengzi year, the thirty-seventh in the sexagenary cycle. As these 
things follow the lunar calendar, it runs from 25 January 2020 (Chinese New Year’s Eve) to  
11 February 2021. Each stem is either yin or yang. Geng is the seventh stem and is associated, 
in this scheme, with yang, and with metal — one of the five elemental phases or elements in 
Chinese cosmology, the others being wood, earth, fire, and water. Zi is the first branch and 
is associated with the rat. Thus gengzi years are the years of the yang metal rat.
The bad news is that gengzi years presage disaster. In the popular Chinese imagination 
these years are always calamitous. In 1840 — the first date usually mentioned — the First 
Opium War broke out, beginning China’s ‘Century of Humiliation’. The next one, 1900 
brought the Boxer Uprising and foreign military intervention, along with the occupation 
and looting of Beijing. Sixty years later, 1960 saw the high point of the great famine, a result 
of disastrous government policy, that resulted in tens of millions of excess deaths. 
Ten Heavenly Stems and 


































(a type of virus with animal origins). It would eventually be named SARS-
CoV-2 (to distinguish it from the 2003 SARS-CoV virus); the disease was 
eventually given the name COVID-19. Early on, the doctors understood 
that the new disease was transmissible, and highly so, through human-
to-human contact.
On 30 December 2019, Li Wenliang 李文亮, a young Wuhan hospital 
ophthalmologist, warned his colleagues about the mystery disease, 
advising them to wear protective clothing and equipment as a precaution 
against infection. Days later, Li was hauled into the local Public Security 
Bureau (PSB), where police accused him of ‘making false comments’ that 
had ‘severely disturbed the social order’ and of ‘spreading rumours’. 
They warned him that if he did not stop, he would suffer the full effects 
of the law. ‘Do you understand?’ 你听明白了吗?, they asked him, and told 
him to write down his answer. ‘I understand’ 明白, he wrote. The state 
broadcaster, CCTV, amplified the PSB’s message, saying that cyberspace 
was ‘not beyond the law’ and such acts would not be tolerated. Just weeks 
later, Li Wenliang told his followers on Weibo — with whom he shared 
the letter he had been given by police — that he had himself fallen sick 
and was in hospital. He was one of what was then more than 6,000 people 
in China to have developed symptoms. With mass movements of people 
An electron microscope 




across China in advance of the Chinese New Year holidays, and Wuhan 
a central travel hub, the disease quickly spread to Beijing, Shenzhen, 
and beyond. 
On 23 January, on the eve of the holiday, the government placed 
Wuhan, a city of more than eleven million, into lockdown. Soon, travel 
restrictions were imposed on all of Hubei province’s fifteen other cities, 
with over sixty million people forced to stay home and guarded barricades 
in front of apartment complexes or neighbourhoods a common sight. 
With a few exceptions, including the need to seek medical treatment, 
only one person per household was permitted to leave home, and only 
once every two days, for groceries and other provisions. This regime was 
replicated in a number of other cities around the country. 
Many citizens cheered up themselves and others with WeChat video 
get-togethers, funny memes or by DJing online so that people in isolation 
could dance together. Many neighbours helped one another out as best 
they could with food and other supplies. There were heartwarming 
stories of camaraderie and mutual support.
Every night in Wuhan, at 7 p.m., people leaned out of their windows 
to clap for the frontline medical workers who were lauded as the nation’s 
heroes. Yet as the US-based documentary filmmaker Nanfu Wang 王男栿, 
who made In the Same Breath about the crisis using footage sent to her 
by anonymous citizen journalists in the mainland, told The New Yorker: 
When I talked to nurses, they talked about the seven o’clock clapping. 
On the one hand, they appreciated it. But, at the same time, they said, 
what is the use of clapping if people are not holding the government 
accountable? What does the clapping do?’2
In Wuhan (and elsewhere), police patrolled with drones that shouted 
orders from the sky at people who were perceived to be lingering outside, 
or had removed their masks. Citizen journalists with smartphones, 
































as well as instances of police brutality or overreach by citizen vigilantes 
in enforcing the lockdown. As would be the case elsewhere in the world, 
there were women and children literally locked into abusive relationships, 
and other vulnerable people forcibly separated from friends and family, 
contributing to psychological stress with occasionally tragic consequences. 
Stories leaked out such as that of the disabled boy who reportedly died 
from a lack of food and water after his father and brother were taken 
into quarantine. 
The whistle-blower doctor Li Wenliang died of the disease at just 
thirty-three years old on 7 February. When the authorities, after some 
delay, publicly announced Li’s death, the Chinese Internet — where 
the term ‘whistle-blower’ 吹哨人 had been trending — erupted with 
widespread expressions of grief, frustration, and rage, and the demand 
‘We want freedom of speech’	 我要言论自由 before the censors stepped 
in. People in Wuhan shouted his name out their windows in anger and 
tribute. ‘Do you understand?’, ‘I understand’ and ‘I don’t understand’ 
became memes — a silent reproach duplicated in cyberspace and on 
masks and T-shirts alike. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) quickly 
claimed Li for a martyr and shifted the blame for his persecution on to 
local authorities. 
With hospitals in Wuhan swamped by cases and a rising death toll, 
the government ordered the construction of emergency dedicated field 
hospitals in Wuhan. The 1,000-bed Huoshenshan 火神山 Hospital took 
less than two weeks to construct, an extraordinary accomplishment, 
soon followed by a second, with 1,600 beds, and plans to convert several 
venues in the city, including an exhibition centre, into hospitals as well. 
China publicly shared the genetic sequence of Coronavirus SARS 
CoV-2 on 12 January; the following day, Thai officials confirmed a case in 
Thailand, the first one recorded outside the PRC. By 30 January, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) reported that 82 out of nearly 8,000 confirmed 
cases of COVID-19 had been reported across 18 other countries, but the 
organisation did not officially declare 
COVID-19 a pandemic until 11 March. 
Accused of overly harsh 
enforcement of the lockdown as well 
as covering up the outbreak by critics 
at home and abroad, the CCP clamped 
down on the remarkably detailed 
reporting being carried out by some 
Chinese media, including Caixin 财新 
and Caijing 财经, and began detaining 
citizen journalists in an attempt to 
control the narrative. Controlling the 
narrative was easier done in China 
itself, where the project of universal 
surveillance and control that some 
have dubbed ‘big data totalitarianism’, 
found an excuse in the pandemic to cast its net even wider. Censors 
diligently scrubbed from the Chinese Internet accounts that challenged 
the official version of events or lacked ‘positive energy’. The lockdowns 
were harsh, but effective. While people in the cities were confined to 
their homes through the erection of physical barriers to movement 
and human and technological surveillance, the lockdown was also 
effective in preventing the spread of the virus in rural areas, for reasons 
explained by Wuna Reilly in her chapter, ‘Beating the Virus in the Chinese 
Countryside’, pp.41–53. 
Not everyone was getting the message, however — at least not at 
first. In his forum, ‘The Language of Trust’, pp.95–99, Gerald Roche looks 
at the public health consequences of a language policy that relies on an 
artificially constructed national language, Putonghua, for official and 
even urgent communications in a country where many people speak 
dialects and minority languages. Among the unsung heroes of the front 

































line at the height of the epidemic in areas including Mongolia and Tibet 
were cartoonists, social influencers, and even schoolchildren, all of whom 
helped to translate and communicate the government’s notifications 
about social distancing, recognising symptoms, testing, and so on. 
Among the more widely praised frontline exemplars was a group 
of female medical professionals from Xi’an who volunteered to serve in 
Wuhan at the height of the pandemic. A photograph of the group, who 
had shaved their heads, purportedly to make it easier to don personal 
protective equipment (PPE), evoked women warriors ranging from 
Mulan to the crop-haired Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution. Yet, as 
Pan Wang writes in her chapter, ‘Women’s Bodies, Intimate Politics, and 
Feminist Consciousness Amid COVID-19’, pp.75–89, when another group 
of women medical professionals, from Gansu, was shown tearing up as 
they too had their hair razored off, feminists questioned why, if women 
were expected to make such a sacrifice, their male colleagues were 
allowed to keep their hair?
The political, social, and economic implications of the COVID-19 
medical crisis were not confined to China. A number of chapters and 
forum articles in the Yearbook examine these implications, from the 
pandemic’s impact on international relations to how it affected the lives of 
Hong Kong’s elderly working poor. 
As the pandemic spread across the globe, an ugly side-effect was a 
wave of racist violence and hate crimes against ethnic Chinese and others 
of East Asian appearance in Australia, Germany, and the US, among 
other places. Chinese students studying overseas were among those who 
suffered from such abuse, although that was far from their only source 
of crisis in 2020, as Yu Tao writes in ‘Chinese Students Abroad in the 
Time of Pandemic: An Australian View’, pp.291–303. In May, US Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo took racist rhetoric up a level with the repellent 
assertion that ‘China has a history of infecting the world’. In ‘The Future 
Repeats Itself: COVID-19 and its Historical Comorbidities’, pp.167–177, Ari 
Heinrich looks at the historical association of China with disease in the 
Western imagination and its political, ideological, and racial dimensions. 
Nowhere was this pathology on greater display than in the US, where 
the Trump administration reverted to using China as a scapegoat for 
its own failings in public health and the economy. In her chapter, ‘US–
China Relations: A Lingering Crisis’, pp.191–203, on long-term tensions in 
US–China relations, Nadège Rolland observes that the pandemic affected 
great power relationships ‘similarly to how the disease affects individuals: 
those with pre-existing conditions are the most vulnerable and the least 
likely to survive intact’. 
The United States’ long-standing and ambiguous relationship with 
Taiwan was one pre-existing condition of the US–China relationship that 
flared in 2020. In August, US Health and Human Services Secretary Alex 
Azar became the highest-level US official to visit Taiwan since 1979. He was 
there ostensibly to learn about Taiwan’s successful approach to managing 
the pandemic: the island, with a population of 23 million, had less than 
800 confirmed cases and only seven deaths at the time. (Taiwan was also 
one of the few places in the world with positive economic growth in 2020.) 
Azar made a point of conveying President Trump’s ‘strong support and 
friendship’ to President Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文, who had earlier in the year 
led her anti-reunification Democratic Progressive Party to a landslide 






































friendly Kuomintang. Given that, and the fact that Azar clearly failed to 
implement any of what he had learned after returning to the US, where 
there were more than 17 million cases and over 310,000 deaths by the 
end of December, the visit appeared overwhelmingly political in purpose. 
The US approved US$1.8 billion in arms sales to Taiwan in October alone, 
and President-Elect Joe Biden indicated that US support for the island will 
continue — ensuring an angry reaction from Beijing, which stepped up 
military exercises in the air and on the sea close to the island. When the 
Taiwanese Air Force challenged a People’s Liberation Army Air Force pilot 
for crossing the Taiwan Strait’s median line, the mainland pilot reportedly 
responded: ‘There is no median line.’ Wen-Ti Sung’s Forum looks at how 
Taiwan’s leaders are straddling the geopolitical median line that separates 
the two mutually antagonistic superpowers that are invested in the 
island’s future. 
Taiwan was also at the centre of an international controversy over its 
exclusion, at Beijing’s insistence, from the World Health Assembly, especially 
as it was keen to share what it had learned about controlling COVID-19. In 
July, Trump announced that the US would withdraw from the WHO by the 
following year, alleging misuse of funding and the organisation’s supposed 
cosiness with Beijing. (President-Elect Biden reversed the decision soon 
after he took office.) In any case, the WHO remained the world’s best hope 
for a thorough investigation with Chinese co-operation into the origins of 
the virus — an investigation it led in early 2021.  
Xinjiang — Crisis Continued
Even Mulan, everyone’s favourite Chinese woman warrior had a terrible 
2020. Cinemagoers in mainland China were unimpressed with Disney’s 
live-action remake of the popular animation, savaging the movie on 
the grounds of the wooden acting of its Chinese American star, Yifei Liu 
刘亦菲, its clichéd martial arts scenes and many cultural howlers, 
including turning the philosophical and medical notion of vital essence, 
qi 氣, into something like ‘the Force’ in Star Wars. In the US and elsewhere, 
the backlash was political. A #boycottmulan movement had begun the 
previous year after Liu voiced her support for the actions of the Hong 
Kong police during their brutal suppression of the 2019 protests in that 
city. The push to boycott grew after it was revealed that the filmmakers 
not only shot scenes in Xinjiang but also, in the credits, thanked the 
Public Security Bureau of Turpan and other organisations that have been 
implicated in widely documented human rights abuses against Uyghurs 
and other Muslim minorities there. 
In September 2020, Australian researchers for the Xinjiang Data 
Project, using satellite imagery and other sources, updated their estimate 
of the number of active detention camps in the region to over 380 and 
released a report claiming, among other things, that one in three mosques 
in Xinjiang have been demolished since 2017.3
Soon after the report of the Xinjiang Data Project was released, Xi 
Jinping 习近平 defended state actions in Xinjiang as ‘completely correct’. 
Claiming that happiness was on the rise in Xinjiang he summed up the 
A painting of Mulan at the 
Walt Disney World Resort
































CCP’s ongoing policy for the ‘New Age’ in the ‘autonomous region’ as 
‘reliance on law to govern Xinjiang, unity to stabilise Xinjiang, culture 
to assimilate Xinjiang, the people’s prosperity to rejuvenate Xinjiang’ 
依法治疆团结稳疆文化润疆富民兴疆.4 The character translated (somewhat 
inadequately here) as ‘assimilate’ and pronounced run, can mean, 
when used as a verb, ‘benefit’, ‘lubricate’, ‘moisten’ or ‘embellish’ — 
and indicates a push by the CCP to limit Uyghur cultural and religious 
expression and promote ‘ethnic unity’ more broadly.
In June, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a Beijing-sponsored 
resolution by a vote of twenty-three to sixteen, with eight abstentions, 
that would fundamentally alter long-established conventions on 
human rights, removing the obligation of states to protect the rights of 
individuals, labelling rights as negotiable, and describing the expression 
of international concern about human rights abuses as interference in 
a country’s internal affairs.5  
All Hail
The personality cult of Xi Jinping continued to burgeon in 2020. In 
February, QSTheory	 求是网 republished a breathless essay that exalted 
Xi, in a great number of ways and with many exclamation marks, for his 
‘superior political wisdom’ in the face of the ‘menacing coronavirus’. It 
praised his ‘highly responsible attitude towards the safety of the people’s 
lives and their physical health, and highly responsible attitude towards 
international society’, speaking of how (in the same sentence), with ‘broad 
feeling of love and concern for the people, and expert ability to get on 
top of complicated problems, cool-headedly respond to crisis, resolutely 
handle crisis, and scientifically prevent and control crisis’, Xi had led 
the Chinese people to victory in the ‘people’s war’ against COVID-19. It 
pronounced him the ‘backbone’ of the 1.4 billion Chinese people and the 
‘pill of reassurance’ or ‘the one who sets the mind at ease’ 定心丸, both at 
home and abroad, helping the world overcome its terror of the pandemic. 
While doing all that, He Who Sets the Mind at Ease further tightened 
political supervision and control over people’s lives in 2020. New 
regulations revealed in June demanded that party members — of whom 
there are currently some 91 million — not deviate from the party line even 
in private, off-hours conversation. Party members were also forbidden 
from reading or viewing any unauthorised books or videos or joining 
non-party-supervised WeChat groups including those formed by school 
alumni, hometown friends or fellow army veterans. Xi also launched 
a large-scale ‘rectification’ of members of China’s police and judiciary 
aimed at eliminating corruption and political ‘disloyalty’ — a campaign 
that will officially take off in 2021. 
The new authoritarianism of the Xi era has shut down much of the 
civil society that had developed in the previous reform years and silenced 
many independent thinkers. In one of the highest-profile instances of 
dissent in 2020, Cai Xia 蔡霞, a long-term professor at the Central Party 
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School, which trains high-ranking party officials, accused Xi of having 
turned the CCP into a party of ‘political zombies’ and plunging China 
into ‘neo-Stalinist’ rule. She is now in exile in the US. Another prominent 
dissident, the irrepressibly sardonic and erudite former professor of 
constitutional law at Tsinghua University, Xu Zhangrun 许章润, was in 
2020 banned from leaving Beijing, accepting media interviews, and 
receiving any kind of financial support including from friends, despite 
having his salary terminated. He was already banned from publication 
and teaching. Police also arrested Geng Xiaonan 耿潇男, a supporter 
of Xu’s and one of a fast-dwindling cohort of Xi critics still willing to 
speak out. 
Throughout all this, as Delia Lin writes in ‘The Construction of 
Political Superiority’, pp.13–21, the CCP has promoted the view that only 
the superiority of the Chinese political system saved China from an all-
out pandemic disaster. This triumphalist rhetoric resonated with many 
mainlanders who were proud of their country’s achievements in fighting 
the pandemic. Abroad, where so many places were experiencing tragic 
levels of mortality along with catastrophic failures of healthcare systems 
and political leadership, as well as severe economic hardship, it did not 
go down quite so well. After a restaurant owner placed a sign outside her 
restaurant in China’s north-east celebrating the spread of COVID-19 to the 
US and Japan, she was excoriated on Chinese social media and detained 
by the police. Abroad, news of the sign (and others like it) nonetheless 
fed suspicion of the CCP for its initial cover-up of the virus outbreak and 
the role that played in the pandemic’s global spread. Surveys of public 
attitudes towards the PRC showed precipitous drops in trust and approval 
in many parts of the world in 2020 compared with previous years. The 
CCP’s ruling Politburo, however, chose to frame 2020 in a positive light: 
This year has been an extraordinary year in the history of the new 
China. Facing severe challenges and major difficulties, we have 
maintained our strategic determination, accurately judged the 
situation, carefully planned and deployed, taken decisive actions, 
and put in hard work … China became the only major economy in 
the world to achieve positive growth … and the centripetal force and 
cohesion of the whole Party, the whole nation, and all the people have 
been further strengthened … 
This year is the closing year of the 13th Five-Year Plan. After 
five years of struggle, China’s economic strength, scientific and 
technological strength, comprehensive national power and people’s 
living standards have leapt to a new level. The task of poverty 
eradication in the new era has been completed as scheduled, 
achieving a moderately prosperous society is well in sight, and the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has taken a major new 
step forward.
Certainly, China’s economy weathered the COVID-19 pandemic better 
than most, as Jane Golley and James Laurenceson discuss in ‘The Chinese 
Economy: : Crisis, Control, Recovery, Refocus’, pp.103–116. Two decades 
ago, the PRC contributed around 4 percent of global gross domestic 
product (GDP); today, that figure is around 18 percent. The boast about 
scientific and technological accomplishment was not an empty one either. 
Among other achievements in 2020, the PRC sent a mission to the Moon 
to collect rock samples — the first such mission since the Russian one of 
1976 — and built a quantum computer called ‘Jiuzhang’ 九章 that claims 
to be 100 trillion times faster than current supercomputers! And President 
Xi Jinping did sound one of the grim year’s genuinely hopeful notes when 
he pledged the PRC to carbon neutrality by 2060 and ‘peak carbon’ by 
2030. In his chapter, ‘China’s Post-COVID-19 Stimulus: Dark Clouds, Green 
Lining’, pp.139–153, Jorrit Gosens reveals some of the stumbling blocks 


































Even as Chinese workers in Yiwu laboured overtime stitching Trump 
2020 flags and manufacturing MAGA hats, as Peter Hessler reported for 
The New Yorker, Trump and his administration officials continued to call 
for ‘containment’ and economic ‘decoupling’ from China.6 There was at 
the same time a move towards ‘detachment’ in Eastern Europe, with the 
Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, and Estonia looking like they would 
follow the US in barring Huawei from their 5G networks. The Council 
of the European Union stressed the ‘need to rebalance the economic 
relationship and achieve reciprocity’, while encouraging China to ‘assume 
greater responsibility in dealing with global challenges’. For numerous 
reasons, including Beijing’s expulsion of a number of foreign journalists 
(a response, in part, to Washington’s deportation of Chinese journalists 
and others), as well as the repression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang and 
continuing anger and suspicion over the initial cover-up of the pandemic, 
relations between China and much of the world grew strained in 2020. 
Even among countries whose governments remained relatively friendly 
with China, in Africa for example, there was popular outrage at reports 
of Chinese racism against Africans, from landlords expelling them from 
The largest plane in 
the world arrived in 
Germany on 27 April 
2020 from China 
bringing urgent 
medical supplies as 
part of efforts to help 
curb the spread of the 
coronavirus
Source: NATO North 
Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, Flickr
their homes in Guangzhou at the height of the pandemic to the ongoing 
appearance of blackface in entertainment programs.
Among Beijing’s efforts to court international goodwill were the 
shipments of ventilators, masks and other personal protective equipment 
(PPE) to countries in need. The speedy retooling of factories to produce 
PPE also served to highlight the versatility of Chinese industry and reveal 
to many countries their own dangerous lack of domestic capacity and 
preparedness. In ‘Mask Diplomacy: Shifting the COVID-19 Narrative?’, 
pp.27–31, Verónica Fraile del Álamo and Darren J. Lim look at how the 
reception of ‘mask diplomacy’ intersected with Italian domestic politics. 
By the end of the year, the PRC’s ‘vaccine diplomacy’ received its first 
strong endorsement when the United Arab Emirates pronounced the 
Sinopharm vaccine 86 percent effective.
The kind of Chinese diplomacy that attracted the most attention in 
2020, however, was that branded ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomacy. Characterised 
by a pumped up and defensive nationalism and involving officials tweeting 
abuse at critics of the PRC’s actions and inactions, it was tinged with 
triumphalism, xenophobia, and schadenfreude (evident, for example, in 
a tweet from a Chinese diplomat responding to racism-tinged remarks by 
a Venezuelan official: ‘Put on a mask and shut up’). 
The CCP had previously declared its intention to speed up ‘a profound 
adjustment in the international balance of power’; the wolf warriors 
were one indication of how that adjustment might work. Wolf-warrior 
diplomacy’s poster child was Zhao Lijian 赵立坚, Deputy Director of the 
Information Department at China’s Foreign Ministry. Zhao was the sender 
of the tweet towards the end of the year of a computer-generated image 
purporting to show an Australian soldier slitting the throat of an Afghan 
child after Australia released the results of a long investigation into war 
crimes committed by its special forces in Afghanistan.
Australia became a particular target of trade punishments in 2020 
after the Morrison government made an early and unilateral call for an 
































in Morrison’s words, ‘weapons inspector–like’ powers. By the end of 
the year, as Victor Ferguson and Darren J. Lim discuss in their chapter, 
‘Economic Power and Vulnerability in Sino-Australian Relations’, pp.259–
274, the relationship had entered a dizzying downward spiral, with no 
end in sight. A Chinese diplomat listed fourteen grievances including 
Australia’s ban of Huawei from 5G networks in 2018, ‘unfriendly or 
antagonistic’ reporting on China by independent media and criticism of 
China by Members of Parliament and think tanks, including with regard 
to human rights violations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. 
Beijing considers that what happens in Hong Kong and Xinjiang 
is no-one’s business but its own. Yet both remained a focus of not just 
Australian but also world attention and concern in 2020, especially 
following the passing of the National Security Law in Hong Kong on 
30 June. Antony Dapiran analyses the law and its implementation in 
‘Hong Kong’s National Security Law’, pp.59–63. By the end of the year, 
in developments that would have been unthinkable just ten years ago, 
student leaders, independent media activists and others were in prison, 
Hong Kong people no longer enjoyed their customary exercise of free 
speech and association and pro-democracy legislators resigned en masse 
— all signs that the new law had ended the rule of law that was among the 
territory’s greatest strengths and characteristics and the promise of One 
Country, Two Systems that had been the essential premise — and promise 
— of its Basic Law. 
Humour, including black humour and satire, is one way in which 
human beings cope with crisis. But with restrictions tightening on all parts 
of the media in Hong Kong, the territory was forced to farewell much-
loved Hong Kong comedic institution, Headliner 頭條新聞, that had long 
provided sharp satirical commentary on Hong Kong and Chinese politics. 
In the mainland, meanwhile, a young folk-singer with a whimsical sense 
of humour — and a serious message as well — whose videos, filmed in his 
grandmother’s courtyard in Hubei province, provided one of the year’s 
rare delights, as seen in ‘Humour in Crisis’, pp.123–127. Prayer is another 
form of release. Yu Sang reports on the response of Buddhist leaders and 
organisations in the PRC and beyond to the challenges of the pandemic. 
Then there is the wisdom of the I Ching 易經, which tells us: ‘At peace, 
the gentleman does not forget times of danger, surviving, does not forget 
death, and in times of order, does not forget chaos; and so the safety of 
both the person and the country may be preserved’ 是故,	君子安而不忘危,	
存而不忘亡,	治而不忘乱,	是以身安而国家可保也.
In addition to the chapters and forums mentioned above, Xu Cheng 
Chong looks at the fraught politics of 5G in Malaysia and Matthew Galway 
catches up with the Maoists-turned-mainstream politicians in Nepal. 
Beyongo Mukete Dynamic analyses the debt stresses related to Chinese 
loans in Africa, asking whether the loans are ‘choking’ the continent or 
‘uplifting’ it. Annie Luman Ren highlights the relevance of Daoist tales and 
myth in official and popular responses to the devastating floods around 
the Three Gorges Dam, which took hundreds of lives and swept away 
millions of people’s homes and livelihoods in central and south-western 
China in the northern summer. Andrew Chubb, meanwhile, shows how 
the Indian nationalism that arose in the wake of the Sino-Indian border 
conflict that erupted mid-year turned China’s customary narrative of 
historical grievance and victimisation on its head. 
Last Words
As always, we are interested in exploring the historical, cultural, and 
linguistic elements of the year’s theme. Benjamin Penny explains gengzi 
years, see p.xi. In ‘The Etymology of the Character of Wei 危’, pp.5–8, 
Jingjing Chen explores the rich etymology of the character wei	危, which 
appears in one of the most common contemporary Chinese expressions 
used to mean ‘crisis’, weiji 危机. The expression used on the cover, 多事	
之秋, is less common, but Yayun Zhu’s discussion of it on the following 
pages indicates why we have instead chosen this more poetic phrase, 
which refers to ‘an autumn in which much has occurred’. We hope that 
































TROUBLED TIMES, by Yayun Zhu
In 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming 
Dynasty in Decline, Ray Huang wrote that 
nothing of great importance happened in 
1587, the fifteenth year of the reign of the 
Ming emperor Wan Li 萬曆 (r. 1572–1620). 
Nevertheless, he contended, that year ‘must 
go down in history as a chronicle of failure’.7 
Things that happened in 1587 portended a 
deluge of crises that in a few decades would 
devour the mighty Ming empire. 
In contrast, 2020 was a year of great 
significance. Had Walter Benjamin’s ‘angel 
of history’ flown by, he would have witnessed a chain of catastrophic events which ‘keeps 
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet’.8 It was a troubled time, 
the sort that is best characterised by the expression duoshi zhi qiu 多事之秋 — literally ‘an 
eventful autumn’ — that appears on the cover of the Yearbook.
The use of the character qiu 秋 (autumn, but can also indicate a year, or time) in literature 
has long been associated with tropes of ‘sadness’ and ‘desolation’. The Song-dynasty writer 
Ouyang Xiu 欧阳修 (1007–72), in his Rhapsody on Autumn’s Sounds 秋声赋, compared 
autumn, a season that kills the growth of spring and summer, to the Officer of Executions. 
In exile in his later years, the great Tang poet Du Fu 杜甫 (712–770) used autumnal imagery 
to describe displacement and alienation. Yet it is the modern revolutionary heroine Qiu 
Jin 秋瑾 (literally Autumn Jade, 1875–1907) who lent the literary tradition of qiu a sense of 
tragedy and sacrifice with the poem she wrote before she was beheaded by officers of the 
Qing, China’s last dynasty: ‘Autumn wind, autumn rain — my sorrow knows no bounds’  
秋風秋雨愁煞人.The character used here for sorrow, chou 愁, is composed of the character 
for autumn 秋	over the signific for ‘heart’ 心.
While qiu evokes melancholic time, the phrase duoshi 多事 suggests a litany of precarious, 
unsettling events. From its early appearance in Records of the Grand Historian 史记 (finished 
Eventful autumn, troubled times
Source: A_Peach, Flickr
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China in the World (CIW) at The Australian National University (ANU). It has 
always been the approach of the Yearbook to view political and economic 
developments as part of a greater picture that encompasses society, 
personalities and culture, and one that is illuminated by considerations of 
language and history. Our ongoing reference to the China Story	中国的故事	
reflects the principle set out by CIW founding director, Emeritus Professor 
Geremie R. Barmé, that China’s story not only is the version portrayed by 
the CCP, but also includes the diverse perspectives of a multitude of others, 
around 94 BCE) — ‘the [Qin] empire was engulfed in many an affair, such that officials could 
not supervise them all’ 天下多事, 吏弗能纪 — it indicates a realm in trouble.9  
The first to put the two ideas together into what would become a set four-character 
expression was an earnest Confucian scholar-official born in Silla (modern-day Korea), Choe 
Chiwon 崔致远. He came to the Tang capital Chang’an in 868 at the age of twelve to study and 
later rose to high office in the Tang. He coined the expression in response to what he saw as 
a series of bad decisions by the court that presaged disaster. 
It later appeared in the writings of the tenth-century official and historian Sun Guangxian 
孙光宪, who lived in the dangerous and uncertain era known as the Five Dynasties. Sun 
advised: ‘So in the eventful autumn [troubled times], hide your traces and lie low, do not be 
the one to lead an uprising.’ 所以多事之秋, 灭迹匿端, 无为绿林之嚆矢也.10 
The term appears frequently in vernacular novels of of the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing 
(1644–1912) dynasties, including Outlaws of the Marsh 水浒传, The Investiture of the Gods  
封神演义, and The Travels of Lao Can 老残游记. It typically accompanies the question of how 
people negotiate a time of crisis.
When Chairman Mao used the phrase to describe the troubled times of 1956, however, 
he was mainly referring to events outside China that were shaking the foundation of 
international communism — the anti-Soviet resistance of the Hungarian Uprising and 
the Polish October. Official media in the People’s Republic of China rarely use the term 
to describe the country’s internal vicissitudes; the rhetoric is mainly reserved for the 
misfortunes of foreign rivals, preferring more uplifting expressions for domestic woes such 
as ‘hardships strengthen a nation’ 多难兴邦. 
In 2020, the Chinese Communist Party has used the phrase duoshi zhi qiu to describe 
calamities abroad while showcasing China’s successes. No sooner had the pandemic begun 
to abate in April than the Global Times used it to warn Taiwan against pursuing an active 
role on the world stage and to taunt Western democracies for their failures to contain the 
pandemic. The question remains: in an age of globalisation, in which China is tied to the rest 
of the world in so many ways, including economically, is it possible that the troubles of an 
autumn in one place can be kept from worrying another? 
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The characters at the centre of this 
Yearbook’s cover are 多事之秋. For more 
information on the etymology of this 
four-character phrase, see Information 
Box ‘Troubled Times’, pp.xxviii–xxix.  
The basic design of the cover refers 
to a traditionally bound Chinese book 
with ‘stitched binding’ 線裝. Block-printed 
individual leaves of text were folded into 
a concertina shape then stitched together 
between dark blue paper covers. Four 
stitches, as on the cover of this book, 
was standard. These individual paper-
bound volumes, known as fascicles, were 
then stacked together and encased in a 
protective covering called a tao 套 — a wrap-around, board-and-cloth case 
fastened using bone pegs and loops. This became the preferred printing 
format from the end of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) until the end of the 
imperial era in the nineteenth century when western bindings gradually 
took over. 
The large double-circle in the centre of the cover is a depiction of part 
of a fengshui master’s compass that makes use of the Chinese cycle of sixty 
that was used for counting hours, days, months, and years. This cycle is 
created from the Ten Heavenly Stems and Twelve Earthly Branches 天干
地支. The twelve earthly branches are sometimes represented by animals, 
which has become a well-known way of referring to year of one’s birth: ‘the 
year of the pig,’ ‘the year of the dragon,’ etc. For further explanation on the 
calendrical cycle, see Information Box ‘2020 — A Gengzi 庚子 Year’, p.xi.
Two animals appear on this Yearbook’s cover: a rat and a three-legged 
crow. The rat is the first of the twelve animals associated with the Earthly 
Branches. 2020 was the Year of the Rat and it was also aligned with ‘metal’ 
in the cycle of five elemental phases (the others are wood, earth, fire, and 
water). A metal rat year comes around once in every cycle of sixty and 
Cover of the China Story Yearbook: Crisis
Artwork: CRE8IVE, Canberra
has become associated with disaster and crisis. Each time one of these 
years has occurred since the latter days of the Qing Dynasty, it has brought 
with it widespread death and destruction in China. In 1840, the Opium 
War broke out; 1900 brought the Boxer Uprising; and 1960 saw the high 
point of the great famine. Sixty years later, 2020 was no exception with the 
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and its global ramifications.
The three legged-crow, 三足烏, in the sun is a motif found across 
East Asia in art and archaeology. The reason why a crow is depicted in 
the sun is disputed — one theory has it that it has something to do with 
sunspots — but we do know that the connexion goes as far back as the 
Neolithic. One later story — probably trying to account for this rather odd 
conjunction and suspiciously including a lesson in filial piety — alleges 
that the Chinese sun goddess Xihe 羲和 was the mother of ten ‘child-suns’ 
that took the form of three-legged crows. Each night, the child-suns slept 
in the lower branches of a mulberry tree and every morning Xihe bathed 
one of her children and let it rise into the sky and be the sun for a day. One 
day, however, all ten child-suns rose and scorched the earth. At the behest 
of the emperor, the child-suns’ father tried to persuade his children to 
only appear one at a time but they refused to listen. Thus, an archer was 
sent to shoot them down but one of the child-suns managed to escape the 
attack. It is said that this is the sun in the sky today. 
The crow’s three legs are generally attributed to three being a yang 
number in yin-yang theory, and yang is associated with the sun, light, and 
heat.11 Indeed, the Chinese characters that form the word yin-yang (in 
their simplified forms) include the glyphs for the moon 月, thus yin 阴, 
and the sun 日, thus yang 阳. The moon and the sun have always played 
a significant role in Chinese culture. A solar eclipse in imperial times 
presaged natural disasters, man-made misfortunes, and chaos caused by 
war, for example. The first solar eclipse of 2020 took place on 21 June, 
where its central path crossed southern China and Taiwan. A partial 
eclipse was visible in Wuhan — which appears to be the origin of the 
COVID-19 virus. The image of this partial eclipse, as seen in Wuhan, can 
be found on the cover flaps. Traditionally, a hare appears in the moon but 
for this image we have substituted the hare for a rat to reflect the Chinese 


































FORUM TITLESTANDING ON A 
PRECIPICE 
The Etymology of the Character Wei 危	










































IN THE EARLIEST FORM of Chinese writing — oracle bone inscriptions 
from the second millennium BCE 
— we find the graph      . It was used 
to denote an empty vessel that was 
easy to overturn and, by extension, 
connoted a lack of stability. In jade 
seals of the Warring States period 
(475–221 BCE), this graph evolved into 
a clearer compound ideograph,    . 
Scholars in the Song dynasty (960–1279 
CE) identified this as xian 仚 ‘a man’, 
ren 人 ‘on top of a mountain’, and 
shan 山 ‘in imminent danger of 
falling’. The character xian 仚 was 
also considered interchangeable with 
the character xian 仙, denoting a man 
climbing a mountain but which came 
to refer to an immortal being. 
The meaning of the graph 
continued to develop; by the Qin 
dynasty (221–206 BCE), 仚 had become 
the character for ‘crisis’, 危. Two 
radicals — semantic indicators of 
a Chinese character — helped 
transform the original graph. They 
were jie 卩, signifying possible 
dangers to people on the mountains, 
and chang 厂, indicating the height 
of the mountains and the objects on 
top of them. The graph of jie 卩, with 
etymological roots in the concept of 
kneeling, has two main meanings, 
both of which denote dangers related 
to military affairs. As a verb, jie 卩 
signifies ‘to moderate and to rule’; its 
secondary meaning is a noun, meaning 
‘military credentials’. Through the 
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introduction of the radical of jie 卩, 
the sense of ‘danger’, ‘precipitousness’, 
and ‘crisis’ for the basic meaning of 
wei was reinforced. 
The component chang literally 
means ‘rooftop’. With the introduction 
of chang, wei came to describe objects 
on high, including those on high 
mountains and in the sky. 
As a corollary, wei also came to 
describe objects such as buildings on 
top of mountains, including Buddhist 
or Daoist temples and shrines. Under 
the roof, the radical 卩 also has the 
meaning of worship and praying on 
one’s knees. Astrology developed in the 
late Warring States period and the Qin 
and Han dynasties, and, in a dictionary 
of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), 
we find that wei could also refer to the 
‘lunar lodge’ or constellation known 
in Western tradition as Aquarius, 
which was believed to be the celestial 
complement of the earthly state of Qi. 
During the reign of the first Qin 
emperor, a standardised system of 
written script was adopted throughout 
the empire and was continued over 
subsequent centuries. The character 
wei 危 became the standard. Its 
two basic meanings stabilised as 
well: being in danger and on high. 
Written     in the style of writing 
known as small-seal script, wei 危	
was often used interchangeably with 
the near-homophone wei 衛, meaning 
‘to defend’ or ‘to guard’ or, as a noun, 
‘military guards’. Its meaning now 
encompassed notions of physical 
sickness, warfare and political 
challenges, including challenges 
to high-ranking officials engaged 
in military affairs with political 
opponents or rival states, while also 
describing those objects on high.
The great Tang dynasty poet Li 
Bai 李白 (701–762 CE) used wei to 
describe a Buddhist temple on the 
summit of a mountain where he once 
spent the night: 
Here it is night: I stay at the  
Summit Temple. 
Here I can touch the starts with 
my hand.  
I dare not speak aloud in the 
silence.  
For fear of disturbing the dwellers 




The Summit Temple serves as a bridge 
or place of mediation between the 
earthly and heavenly worlds; wei here 
serves to link humans and deities. 
Wei appears in a number of 
political aphorisms, in which the word 
draws on the meanings of danger 
and height. In Confucius’s warning 
to the ruler of Lu 魯, given during 
the turbulent spring and autumn, he 
contrasted wei with an 安, meaning 
stable, safe, and secure: 
[T]he land is not fruitful nor 
society prosperous, the people 
are hungry and cold, education 
and nurture neglected, social 
morals and customs disordered, 
and the people scattered. This is 
what we mean when we say wei. 
地而不繁殖,	財物不蕃,	萬民複興寒, 
敎訓不行,	風俗淫褻, 人民流散, 曰危. 
Referring to both basic meanings of the 
word, a Han text, meanwhile, advised 
rulers to 
be lofty but not arrogant, so 
as to dwell on high without 
danger [wei]. Be frugal and 
circumspect, to achieve fullness 
without overspill. Dwell on 
high without danger [wei], and 
nobility shall be long maintained. 
在上不驕,	 高而不危, 制節謹度,	 滿
而不溢,	高而不危,	所以長守貴也.
Similar messages were repeated 
or rephrased in many subsequent 
political texts on social norms, 
administration and ceremonial rites. 
During the Three Kingdoms period 
that followed the Han — a time of 
division and wei — the great strategist 
Zhuge Liang 诸葛亮 (181–234 CE) 
famously described how his home 
state of Shu, in present-day Sichuan, 
had come under threat (see image on 
p.8). Zhuge combined wei with ji 急 
‘urgent’ to refer to existential danger: 
Shu was at war with Wei 魏 (a different 
wei), which was militarily stronger. 
The ruler of Shu, Zhuge Liang’s master, 
had just passed away. As Zhuge wrote: 
The late emperor was taken from 
us before he could finish his life’s 
work, the restoration of the Han. 
The [old Han] empire is divided in 
three, Yizhou [modern Sichuan] is 
war-worn and under duress, and 




Zhuge’s words resonated in 
the turbulence and division of 










































Tian Han 田漢	 (1898–1968), a 
revolutionary Chinese playwright and 
lyricist, composed the lyrics for ‘March 
of the Volunteers’ for the music of a 
film, the Japanese had invaded the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 
lyrics declared that ‘China faces her 
greatest peril’ 中華民族到了最危險的
時候, using the phrase weixian 危險 
(‘crisis’ plus ‘peril’). The ‘March of the 
Volunteers’ later became the national 
anthem of China. In the Korean War 
of the early 1950s, Mao Zedong 毛泽东 
framed China’s decision to aid North 
Korea in these terms: ‘With lips gone, 
teeth are exposed to cold. With the 
door smashed, the hall would be in 
danger [wei].’ 唇亡齒寒,	戶破堂危.	
These days, wei is used as a 
reminder not to forget the danger 
and difficulties of earlier times. In 
2017, President Xi Jinping 习近平 told 
the Politburo that, even when there 
is political and economic stability, 
people should be prepared for danger, 
quoting the ancient Book of Divination 
or I Ching 易經: 
When resting in safety, do not 
overlook the possibility of danger 
[wei] ; when all seems stable do not 
overlook that ruin may happen; 
when all is in a state of order, do 
not overlook that chaos may erupt. 
安而不忘危,	 存而不忘亡, 治而不	
忘亂. 
Today, wei is commonly combined 
with ji 機 ‘opportunity’ to refer to 
crisis 危機, or 危机 in simplified 
characters. Describing the global 
COVID-19 pandemic, weiji could be 
seen to express both crisis and hope. 
Stone carving of the 
First Memorial on the 
Northern Expedition 
前出師表, written 
by Zhuge Liang, 
calligraphy by Yue Fei 
岳飛	(1103–1142 CE)  


















































THE NOTION OF the ‘superiority of the political 
system’ 制度优越性 of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) is at the heart of the construction 
of national ‘confidence’ 自信 in the Xi Jinping 
习近平 era. Quoting President Xi Jinping’s speeches, 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) theoreticians 
attribute China’s success in containing the COVID-19 
pandemic and Western countries’ perceived failure 
to do so to both the ‘political advantages’ 政治优势 of 
CCP-led Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 中国
特色社会主义 and the futility of Western multi-party 
democracy. The depiction of the CCP’s authoritarian 
rule as intrinsically and altruistically virtuous and 
of Western multi-party democracy as a source of 
indifference, conflict, social division, and even 
catastrophe is not entirely new. But the pandemic 
has provided the CCP with an unprecedented 
opportunity to assert the PRC’s systemic superiority 
as an analytical tool in its ideological promotion and 









































Viewing the Pandemic Through the Lens of 
Political Superiority 
Party leaders and academics have long claimed the superiority of 
China’s particular form of socialism over capitalism, attributing China’s 
accomplishments to its unique political system and the leadership of 
the CCP, including the rapid economic development of the post-Mao 
Reform Era.1  Those outside observers who treat this as mere rhetoric 
are in danger of misunderstanding the advocates of economic reform as 
somehow automatically at odds with the socialist system. At the National 
People’s Congress in 2013, newly appointed member of the CCP Politburo 
Wang Yang 汪洋, widely acclaimed in the West as an avid proponent of 
reform, told the delegates of his home province of Anhui that the West was 
anxious about the rise of China — not because of its growing economic, 
technological, and military strength, but because of the superiority of the 
Chinese political system over Western models.2 
With China on its way to recovery from the pandemic while the US, 
the UK, and numerous European countries have struggled to get on top of 
the public health crisis, the CCP was quick to credit the Chinese experience 
Vice Premier of the Chinese State Council Wang Yang
Source: President of Russia, Kremlin website
of controlling the virus as indisputable proof of this superiority. The 
central government white paper on the pandemic, issued on 7 June, 
portrayed the process as a grand battle — a ‘people’s war’ 人民战争 under 
Xi Jinping’s ‘personal command’ 亲自指挥 — that showcased the strength 
and advantages of the CCP-led Chinese political system.3 
Soon after the publication of the white paper, the Central Party 
School’s bi-monthly political theory journal Qiushi 求是 published an 
article titled ‘Battling against the pandemic highlights the superiority of the 
political system of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’. The author was 
Qin Gang 秦刚, a research professor in the school’s Centre for Xi Jinping 
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.4  It was 
soon widely republished in national, provincial and local print, and online 
media, including the People’s Daily and Xinhuanet. The article places the 
Chinese political system and Western-style democracy side-by-side to 
make a comparative moral evaluation. It outlines five key ‘institutional 
advantages’ 制度优势 of the former over the latter: centralised, unified 
party leadership; the prioritisation of collective interests; adherence to ‘the 
principal status of the people’ 人民主体地位; powerful social mobilisation 
capabilities; and ‘governing the country in accordance with the law’ 
依法治国. The article claims that, as it represents the ‘people’, the CCP 
has no self-interest: everything it does is to realise and maintain the 
common interests of the majority of the people while caring for different 
needs and concerns. 
In contrast, political parties in the West, primarily represent interest 
groups. Fighting on their behalf, parties therefore attack and frustrate 
one another. Policy-making and legislation become acts of deal-making, 
which not only undermine the stability of policies and laws but also 
exacerbate social divisions. The article states that, during the pandemic, 
political parties in some Western countries focused on partisan bickering, 
shirking their broader responsibilities to society or spending too much 
time deliberating and consulting rather than making decisions — hence 









































democratic centralism 民主集中制 (in which the people’s congresses at 
the national and local levels may go through an election process but are 
subject to central leadership) enabled the CCP to mobilise its members and 
society at large and ‘concentrate its strength to accomplish big goals and 
difficult tasks’ 集中力量办大事办难事. Qin Gang also accused some ‘so-
called “human rights defenders” ’ in the West — presumably those critical 
of the Chinese state’s actions in Xinjiang and Hong Kong — of numb 
indifference to the lives of people in their own countries, including those 
damaged by the pandemic. 
Similar to his comparative evaluation of political parties, Qin Gang 
offers a particular interpretation of the values and principles underpinning 
the Western capitalist system and the Chinese socialist system: 
The socialist system emphasises the supremacy of the general interest. 
This is completely different from the capitalist system. The capitalist 
system is a social institution with individualism as its core principle, 
placing individual interests above national and collective interests. 
Individualism was originally a weapon used by the bourgeoisie to 
fight feudal tyranny. When the bourgeoisie ascended to the ruling 
class, individualism became national ideology and the basis for the 
capitalist institutional structure as well as the foundation of national 
and social life. Individualism always firmly places individuals at 
the centre of society and personal relationships. This ego-centric 
individualism not only leads to alienation between individuals but 
also generates selfishness. During the devastating outbreak of the 
pandemic, individualism causes the social members to care only 
about their own so-called ‘rights’ and ‘freedom’ and be unwilling to 
accept any restrictions on their behaviour. They lack the concept of 
the collective and the awareness of the overall situation and many 
Western countries have paid a high price for it.5 
Following this criticism of the selfish tendencies of individualism, Qin Gang 
praises the Chinese socialist system’s insistence on placing the interests 
of the nation, the people, and the collective above individual interests. He 
postulates that this not only fundamentally resolves conflicts of interest 
among individuals, but also helps motivate and mobilise the entire society. 
It is the ethical and ideological foundation of the governance mechanism 
described as ‘the whole nation playing a single game’ 全国一盘棋. This 
explains why, according to the article, the majority of Chinese people had an 
‘awareness of the overall situation’ 大局意识 and were thus able to restrain 
and even sacrifice themselves during the fight against the pandemic.
Numerous articles in print, online, and social media have repeated this 
crediting of China’s achievements in pandemic control to the superiority of 
its political system, while blaming the deteriorating situation in the US and 
other Western countries on weak and flawed Western-style democracy 
with its poor moral foundations. 
From Justification to Confidence-Building
The formulation of the Chinese phrase ‘Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics’ has undergone three official revisions over two decades. 
When Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 initially coined the term during the opening 
ceremony of the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982, it was called 有中国特
色的社会主义 (literally, socialism that has Chinese features).6 Deng’s use 
of 有, meaning ‘has’ or ‘with’, and the possessive particle 的 suggests 
he was calling for an adaptation of Maoist definitions of socialism to 
China’s contemporary needs and characteristics. Indeed, Deng’s speech 
emphasised that the CCP needed to integrate the ‘universal truth of 
Marxism’ with China’s specific reality while borrowing useful ideas from 
foreign countries.7  It is unknown whether Deng was referring to the then 









































the introduction of ‘socialism with Chinese features’ justified adhering to 
the ideology of socialism while introducing capitalist market mechanisms 
into the economy. 
Ten years later, in 1992, Jiang Zemin’s 江泽民 report to the Fourteenth 
Party Congress updated the term to 有中国特色社会主义 (literally, 
socialism having Chinese features).8 The possessive particle 的 was 
omitted, suggesting a fusion in which the Chinese version of socialism is 
seen as a unique political system rather than a part of, or variation on, the 
greater socialist family. 
Only in 2002, with Jiang’s report to the Sixteenth Party Congress, 
did the term evolve into its current form, 中国特色社会主义, in 
which the first character, 有, was also removed, further linguistically 
cementing the idea of a self-standing sinicised socialism.9 Fifteen years 
later, in 2017, during the Nineteenth Party Congress, Xi Jinping added 
‘the new era’ 新时代 to the term to frame it as a pathway to achieving 
the grand China Dream of national rejuvenation.10 In October 2019, 
for the first time in the history of the CCP, a plenary session of the 
Central Committee was held especially to discuss the advantages of 
China’s political system and governance, at the end of which it issued 
a ‘decision paper’.11 
During the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012, then general secretary 
Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 had introduced the confidence doctrine for Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics, calling for the Party to be confident in its chosen 
path 道路自信, guiding theories 理论自信, and political system 制度自信.12 
In his speech celebrating the ninety-fifth anniversary of the founding of 
the CCP in 2014, Xi Jinping added cultural confidence 文化自信.13  The Four 
Confidences 四个自信 — in the path, theory, system, and culture of Socialism 
with Chinese Characteristics — were enshrined in the CCP Constitution 
following the Nineteenth Party Congress in 2017.14 Xi’s addition of ‘cultural 
confidence’ added an element of cultural and traditional determinism to the 
political system. As Xi remarked to former Greek prime minister Antonis 
Samaras: ‘Your democracy is ancient Greek and Roman democracy. That is 
your tradition. We have our own tradition.’15 
In Xi’s new era, rejection of a Western-style democratic political 
model is not exercised through a Mao-style top-down condemnation of 
liberalism. Rather, it is done through a party-endorsed reconstruction 
— by academics, writers, journalists, artists, and social media users — 
of a historical view of the contemporary Chinese and Western political 
systems and their underlying values and cultures. In this reconstruction, 
commentators conflate modern liberal democracy, capitalism, colonialism, 
and even racism. Liberal democracy and Western capitalism are seen as 
products of Europe’s colonial expansion, while Chinese political ideas 
are portrayed as products of ancient, benign, and continuous civilisation 
(even if the term used for civilisation in modern Chinese, 文明, arrived in 
China in the late nineteenth century via a Japanese translation of a French 
philosophical text). 
Xi’s new era differs from Mao-style top-down condemnation of liberalism









































Calling for the central government to take decisive action against the 
Hong Kong protests in 2019, for example, columnist and documentary 
film director Yu Zhongning 于中宁 (who made the documentary Openness 
and Co-operation: Operations Management in the Information Age in 1995) 
writes that at the heart of decolonialisation is the subversion of the theory of 
Western superiority and the creation of China’s own ‘narrative logic’ 叙事
逻辑.16 Yu asserts that some Chinese intellectuals lack a ‘strategic vigilance’ 
against the ‘insidious, savagery, aggressive, predatory, and colonial nature 
of Western culture’ deriving from the ‘greedy and predatory nature 
of the white race’. Second, they wholly or partially accept that Western 
culture is superior. Third, while acknowledging that capitalism promotes 
professional ethics, the spirit of the rule of law and entrepreneurship, 
and although socialism itself is a great invention of Western culture, Yu 
contends that these valid elements are deviations from Western culture’s 
fundamentally cruel colonial values.17  
Journalist Zheng Ruolin 郑若麟, a fluent French speaker and author 
of The Chinese Are People Like You and Me (2014), as well as academics 
such as international relations specialist Zhang Weiwei 张维为, political 
scientist Jin Canrong 金灿荣 and physicist and economist Chen Ping 
陈平, are among the most vocal theorists of the reconstructed articulation 
of Chinese and Western cultures and institutions. Among them, Zhang 
is particularly prominent as the author of The China Wave: The Rise of a 
Civilizational State and host of the educational series China Now 《这就
是中国》, which has attracted hundreds of millions of viewers around 
the globe since Shanghai’s Oriental TV began broadcasting it in January 
2019. Through a combination of lectures, discussions, and questions and 
answers, Zhang analyses why the Chinese political model, based on a long-
standing civilisation, is superior to what he portrays as decaying Western-
style democracy based on a colonial history, looking at concepts such as 
democracy, rights, patriotism, universal values and freedom of speech. 
The People’s Daily praises the series for guiding ‘young viewers to think 
of the “theoretical strength” behind China’s seventy years of development’ 
under CCP rule. 18 
This reconstructed ‘narrative logic’ is reinforced by Chinese official 
and social media reports on China and the West to create a new national 
self-image and new perceptions of China’s ‘enemies’. Western countries’ 
criticism of racism and colonial legacies is weaponised to fit into a narrative 
of an immoral West that is despised by its own people. China’s stories, on 
the other hand, are reported as the source of envy and admiration of the 
West and the world. This is creating an increasing divide in information 
and knowledge both within and outside China. A recent online survey of the 
Chinese public’s views of China’s image and popularity around the world 
indicates that an overwhelmingly high percentage of the respondents 
(87 percent) chose answers that overestimated China’s image in North 
America and Western Europe, whereas the latest fourteen-country Pew 
Research Center survey reported to the contrary — that is, a record-high 
majority of these surveyed countries had, on average, an unfavourable 
opinion of China.19 
Conclusion
The CCP’s construction of the superiority of the PRC’s political system 
has evolved from a reactive, top-down propaganda approach to a party-
endorsed proactive, grassroots re-theorisation, and re-writing of the 
histories of China and the West. In this re-theorisation, Western-style 
democracy and its values are portrayed as being based on a colonial 
heritage, which means they are morally inferior and bound to deteriorate; 
the China model, led by the CCP, by contrast, holds the moral high ground 
as the heir to and guardian of a great civilisation. The way in which the 
pandemic has left so many Western liberal democracies, and especially 
the US, in tatters has been a gift to the proponents of the theory of the 
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THE ORIGINS OF COVID-19 in Wuhan and early missteps by 
authorities in containing the outbreak 
caused many people around the world 
to blame the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) for the global pandemic.1 
As soon as the outbreak was stabilised 
at home, Beijing began a strategic 
effort to shift the global narrative 
and restore its image by sending 
shipments of medical equipment and 
personnel, combined with a vigorous 
public diplomacy campaign.2 This 
campaign popularised the concept of 
‘mask diplomacy’ — a term originally 
employed to describe shipments of 
masks sent by Japan to China in the 
earliest days of the outbreak.3 
The strategic campaign enjoyed 
varied degrees of success, including 
within single countries over time. The 
case of Italy illustrates how domestic 
political factors played a key role in 
determining how well Beijing was able 
to rehabilitate its image. 
From the outset of the Italian 
outbreak (Europe’s first) in late 
February, it was evident the country was 
short of medical supplies. With Italy’s 
European neighbours freezing exports 
of medical equipment to maintain their 
own emergency stocks, China seized 
the opportunity to ship masks and 
respirators, and even send doctors to 
Italy, along with children’s drawings 
and messages of solidarity.4 
M A S K  D I P L O M A C Y : 
S H I F T I N G  T H E  COV I D - 1 9 
N A R R AT I V E ?
Verónica Fraile del Álamo  





























































These donations came from private 
companies, state-owned enterprises, 
and charitable entities like the Jack Ma 
马云 and Alibaba foundations. Local 
governments in China with twin-city 
agreements also provided medical 
equipment to their Italian counterparts. 
Italian Chinese communities donated 
and distributed masks within their cities, 
offering their help to the local police. 
Mask diplomacy also involved 
efforts to shape public discourse about 
China’s pandemic efforts at home and 
abroad. Even before the virus arrived 
in Europe, the social media accounts 
of China’s diplomatic missions were 
actively lauding the success of Chinese 
authorities in fighting COVID-19, and 
refuting rumours regarding its origin 
and accusations that China had failed 
to contain it. 
Once the virus arrived in 
Italy, the message shifted to one of 
friendship, solidarity, and multilateral 
co-operation to fight the pandemic.5 
Beijing sought to promote its COVID-19 
narrative in local Italian media. Many 
articles were published promoting 
the friendship and solidarity of the 
Chinese people with Italians.6 China’s 
ambassador also gave interviews 
to the country’s most important 
newspapers.7 On 5 April, he said: 
‘There is no geopolitics of masks, the 
aid from China to Italy is based on two 
considerations: the importance of a 
life, and our friendship.’8 
In the early months of the 
pandemic, China’s mask diplomacy 
enjoyed a major success in Italy. 
On 12 March, a Chinese Red Cross 
plane full of masks and medical 
equipment landed in Rome. Italian 
Foreign Affairs Minister Luigi di Maio 
livestreamed the flight’s arrival, giving 
it the title: ‘We are not alone.’9 This 
act reflected strongly positive popular 
sentiment towards China within 
Italy from politicians, the media, and 
the public.10 
The reasons were twofold. First, 
Rome was arguably the Western 
European capital with the closest ties 
to Beijing, being the first G7 country 
to sign a Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU), in March 2019.11 In the 
pandemic’s early weeks, di Maio 
attributed China’s solidarity to the 
friendship strengthened through the 
BRI.12 Second, in Italy, an increasingly 
Eurosceptic country, Beijing was able 
to play ‘good cop’ to the ‘bad cop’ of the 
European Union (EU), which had been 
missing in action at the very beginning 
of the pandemic’s spread in Italy. 
Di Maio praised China’s help while 
condemning the EU’s lack of solidarity. 
This rhetoric may well have been an 
attempt to get more bargaining power 
at the European table, where a battle 
of ‘north versus south’ was taking 
place over the pandemic support 
mechanisms for member states, 
especially financial backing. While 
this strategy did not yield the desired 
Eurobonds, the head of the European 
Commission formally apologised to 
Italy in early April.13 
China’s positive image in Italy did 
not last, however. The tipping point 
came in mid-April, when Alessandro 
Di Battista, a former parliamentarian 
from the anti-establishment Five Star 
Movement (M5S), the largest party in 
the ruling coalition, wrote an article 
in the left-wing, populist newspaper 
Il Fatto Quotidiano arguing that China 
would win World War III without 
firing a single shot. He stated that 
Rome should use the Sino-Italian 
relationship as leverage in negotiations 
with the EU.14 
The effusiveness of the article 
created a political opportunity for 
the Italian opposition to pressure 
the coalition government, which was 
struggling to contain the outbreak. 
The leading opposition figure, Matteo 
Salvini of the right-wing Lega (League) 
party, sharply escalated his criticism of 
China and of the Italian Government’s 
close ties with Beijing. Salvini and his 
party had long positioned themselves 
as China sceptics, including through 
their criticism of the BRI MoU.15 But 
Tonnes of medical supplies 
were flown into Italy as 
part of China’s efforts 
to help Italy contain the 
coronavirus outbreak 






























































in the early weeks of the pandemic 
they had been muted in the interests of 
national solidarity at such a challenging 
time. Di Battista’s article created the 
opportunity for the Lega party to revive 
and strengthen its hawkish China policy, 
while simultaneously criticising the 
government’s pandemic management. 
From mid-April onwards, the 
bilateral relationship with China 
became highly politicised, distinctly 
partisan and inextricably linked to 
the pandemic. Even as the pandemic’s 
first wave was brought under control, 
China-related issues — not just about 
COVID-19’s origins but also about Hong 
Kong, human rights, and the security 
trade-offs of Italy’s deepening ties 
with China — remained constantly in 
the news.16 The politicisation of these 
issues put the government on the 
defensive, and the need to neutralise 
the opposition’s critique was arguably 
a factor in subsequent policy positions 
less favourable to Beijing. These 
included di Maio himself saying that 
preserving Hong Kong’s autonomy 
was indispensable (having previously 
refused to comment on the issue), a 
tougher stance on the involvement of 
Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE in 
Italy’s 5G network, and the Minister for 
European Affairs, Vincenzo Amendola, 
declaring that the BRI MoU with China 
was a mistake.17 
While di Maio’s complaints 
about the lack of EU solidarity and his 
praise of China were not excessively 
criticised in the beginning, a strongly 
positive discourse surrounding 
China became increasingly difficult 
to defend. In addition to the partisan 
critiques, domestic and international 
media reported on a pro-China 
disinformation campaign conducted 
through Twitter, alerting the public 
Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio
Source: Giffoni_ Experience, Flickr
to the more ominous aspects of closer 
ties with China. Moreover, the public 
became more aware of publishing 
channels created under bilateral 
agreements signed at the same time as 
the BRI MoU, which provided a vehicle 
for Chinese state media to publish 
on Italian platforms — a seemingly 
benign act at the time that appeared 
more problematic with the benefit 
of hindsight.18 
Italy’s closer relationship with 
China may have made it more amenable, 
at least at first, to China’s mask 
diplomacy than most other EU states. 
However, this channel of influence came 
at a price, because a relationship that 
was prominent in the public mind was 
also exposed to the risk of politicisation.
The Italian case, therefore, 
offers an interesting insight into the 
dynamics of China’s growing influence. 
Beijing’s objective was to shift the 
public narrative around COVID-19. 
It leveraged an existing relationship 
to achieve this: mask diplomacy built 
on existing goodwill to shape Italian 
public opinion. Surveys conducted 
in June and July still showed Italians 
saw China in a comparatively more 
positive light than citizens of other 
European countries.19 
However, the very prominence of 
the bilateral relationship with China, 
especially M5S’s centrality to the MoU, 
also left it open to politicisation as a 
partisan issue. As 2020 progressed, 
domestic political dynamics, including 
internal pressure on M5S from within 
the ruling coalition and opposition 
criticism, as well as external pressure 
to express more solidarity with the EU 
as the collective pandemic response 
gathered momentum, saw the Italian 
Government create a little distance 
from Beijing. These political dynamics 
could remain a firm constraint on 
Beijing’s future efforts to influence 
Italy. Mask diplomacy may represent a 
relatively novel form of humanitarian 
assistance, but Italy’s experience 
suggests that it cannot simply smooth 
over all political frictions and is just as 
vulnerable as other forms of diplomacy 








































IN 2020, the usually polite and conservative diplomats from the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
attracted attention around the world 
for breaking form. ‘Wolf warrior 
diplomacy’ is a term used to describe 
the newly assertive and combative 
style of Chinese diplomats, in action 
as well as rhetoric. It is not the only 
diplomacy-related term that China 
became famous for this year; there 
was also ‘mask diplomacy’ (the 
shipment of medical goods to build 
goodwill) and ‘hostage diplomacy’ 
(the detention of foreign citizens in 
China to gain leverage over another 
country). Previous years brought 
us ‘chequebook diplomacy’ (aid 
and investment to gain diplomatic 
recognition vis-à-vis Taiwan) and 
‘panda diplomacy’ (sending pandas to 
build goodwill).
Wolf Warrior 战狼 was a popular 
Chinese film released in 2015. It was 
followed by a sequel, Wolf Warrior 2, 
which became the highest-grossing 
film in Chinese box office history. They 
were both aggressively nationalistic 
films, comparable with Hollywood’s 
Rambo, portraying the Chinese hero 
as someone who saves his compatriots 
and others from international 
‘bad guys’, including American 
mercenaries. The tagline of both films 
T H E  R I S E  A N D  FA L L  O F 









































was ‘Whoever attacks China will be 
killed no matter how far away’ 犯我	
中华者, 虽远必诛. Wolf Warrior 2 ends 
with this message on screen: ‘Citizens 
of the People’s Republic of China. 
When you encounter danger in a 
foreign land, do not give up! Please 
remember, at your back stands a 
strong motherland.’
Wolf warrior diplomacy conjures 
up images of diplomats as ‘wolf 
warriors’ — not afraid to pull punches. 
Chinese officials themselves reject this 
term, with the Global Times saying 
China, which makes ‘a reasonable but 
powerful counter-attack only when 
being attacked’ is more like Kung Fu 
Panda, while wolf warrior diplomacy 
is more of a ‘US trait’.1 However it 
is characterised, the way Chinese 
diplomats operate reflects the attitude 
to diplomacy and foreign affairs of the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). The discretionary 
power of even the top foreign policy 
bureaucrats and diplomats is relatively 
limited in the Chinese system. 
Deng Xiaoping’s 邓小平 mantra 
for international relations was 
‘observe calmly, secure our position, 
cope with affairs calmly, hide our 
capacities and bide our time, be good 
at maintaining a low profile, and 
never claim leadership’. Jiang Zemin 
江泽民 and Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 (General 
Secretary of the CCP 1989–2002 and 
2002–2012, respectively) mostly 
followed Deng’s ‘low-profile’ strategy 
in the international sphere, focusing 
on economics and domestic affairs. 
Hu described his foreign affairs 
policy as ‘peaceful development’ 和平
发展, emphasising that China ‘never 
engages in aggression or expansion, 
never seeks hegemony, and remains a 
staunch force for upholding regional 
and world peace and stability’.
Wolf Warrior 2 is the highest-grossing Chinese film ever 
released 
Source: DualAudio 300mb, Flickr
Under President Xi Jinping 
习近平, Deng’s strategy of ‘hiding our 
capacities and biding our time’ 韬光
养晦 has given way to ‘striving for 
achievements’ 奋发有为 and ‘major 
country diplomacy with Chinese 
characteristics’ 中国特色大国外交. An 
increasingly powerful China, having 
risen in status and confidence, is ready 
to take centre stage in international 
affairs and proactively and firmly 
advocate for its interests, in the 
manner of a ‘major country’.
From China’s perspective, this 
implies that Chinese officials should 
be able to act like US ones, even taking 
cues from President Donald Trump 
and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. 
Chinese diplomats are no longer 
hesitant to be assertive with Western 
diplomats and audiences. 
Their new-found combativeness 
is most evident on Twitter, a platform 
banned in China but used by many 
Chinese diplomats to communicate 
with people outside the ‘Great Firewall’ 
— a name given to China’s multifaceted 
system of Internet censorship by 
Geremie R. Barmé and Sang Ye in an 
article they wrote for Wired magazine 
in 1997. Hua Chunying 华春莹, 
Director of the PRC’s Foreign Ministry 
Information Department since July 
2019, joined Twitter in February 2020. 
In July, she fired off:
Is it Navarro or #RonVara who’s 
claiming that #TikTok data goes 
right to Chinese military & the 
CPC? Any evidence? No? Just a 
new entry on his list of shameless 
lies. The #US boasts of its strong 
values, yet it fears a fun app 
popular with youngsters. When 
did it become so fragile?
If Hua’s style fits the stereotype of ‘wolf 
warrior’, she was ahead of the curve; 
in 2015, as the department’s deputy 
director, she batted away a US plea to 
release detained human rights lawyer 
Pu Zhiqiang 浦志强 by saying: ‘Some 
people in the United States have hearts 
that are too big and hands that are 
too long; they always want to be the 
world’s policeman or judge.’ 
Perhaps the most famous ‘wolf 
warrior diplomat’ on Twitter is another 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhao 
Lijian 赵立坚. Back in July 2019, while 
he was a minister counsellor of the 
Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, he 
engaged in a heated online dispute 
with Susan Rice, former US national 








































I am based in Islamabad. Truth 
hurts. I am simply telling the 
truth. I stayed in Washington DC 
10 years ago. To label someone 
who speak[s] the truth that you 
don’t want to hear a racist, is 
disgraceful & disgusting. 
He was promoted to a deputy director 
position in the Foreign Ministry shortly 
after. In 2020, he shared a conspiracy 
theory from a known conspiracy 
website that COVID-19 had in fact 
originated in the US. He also shared 
a controversial image featuring an 
Australian soldier. The Australian 
Prime Minister reacted strongly to this 
tweet by holding an emergency press 
conference to condemn Zhao.
‘Wolf warrior’ rhetoric is popular 
inside China among the extreme 
nationalist voices often found online. 
These typically young voices have long 
called for Chinese officials to be less 
‘submissive’ in the international arena, 
even joking that diplomats should be 
given calcium tablets so they can grow 
some backbone. 
Unsurprisingly, the same rhetoric 
has not played well outside China, 
contributing to negative impressions 
of the PRC and weakening China’s soft 
power appeal. An internal report by 
the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations, a think tank 
affiliated with the Ministry of State 
Security, warned of anti-China hostility 
due to the coronavirus outbreak. 
A Pew survey conducted from June to 
August 2020 found that unfavourable 
views of China reached historic highs 
in 2020 in advanced economies such 
as Australia, some European countries, 
and Japan. In Australia, 81 percent 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian 
Source: @MFA_China, Twitter
now ‘have an unfavourable opinion of 
China’, compared with 40 percent just 
a year earlier. 
In a year of crisis, in which 
many Chinese people were shaken 
by government cover-ups and the 
persecution of whistle-blowers in 
the early stages of the pandemic, the 
Party may have purposefully sought 
to channel people’s anger towards 
external targets. Yet, by the second 
half of 2020, the ‘wolf warriors’ had 
largely retreated from the diplomatic 
sphere, perhaps heeding the advice of 
an older generation of diplomats who 
have indirectly if pointedly criticised 
these combative tactics. Fu Ying 
傅莹, a former vice foreign minister 
and ambassador to Australia, wrote 
in April that diplomats ‘should adhere 
to the spirit of humility, inclusiveness, 
and learning from others’.2 
Shi Yinhong 时殷弘, an international 
relations professor in China, said of 
China’s diplomacy efforts this year, 
‘they are being done too hastily, too 
soon and too loudly in tone’.3 The 
Chinese Ambassador to the US also 
called the conspiracy theory promoted 
by Zhao ‘crazy’. But near the end 
of the year, ‘wolf warriors’ seemed 
to have enjoyed a resurgence, as 
demonstrated by Zhao’s tweet of the 
controversial image.
The antagonistic antics of the 
‘wolf warriors’ do not accord with 
Xi’s rhetoric of ‘win-win co-operation’ 
and his much-promoted ‘community 
with a shared future for mankind’. 
Instead, they give us a taste of China’s 
rising ambitions on the international 
stage and perhaps also reveal the 
increasingly contradictory goals of 















































BEATING THE VIRUS IN THE CHINESE
COUNTRYSIDE
Wuna Reilly
Source: Michael Chopard, Flickr
FOR POLICYMAKERS IN THE People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), the location and timing of the 
COVID-19 outbreak were disastrous. Wuhan, 
the sprawling capital of Hubei province, with 
11 million residents, is inland China’s largest land 
and air transportation hub and a major shipping 
port on the Yangtze River.1 In 2013, Wuhan’s railway 
passenger traffic of 120 million surpassed that of 
Beijing, making it China’s largest railway transfer 
station.2 The city has thus become a main hub for 
China’s high-speed rail network, sitting on the busy 















































Even worse than the location was the timing. The virus began to spread 
in Wuhan on the cusp of China’s Lunar New Year holiday, when hundreds 
of millions of migrant workers leave cities like Wuhan and travel long 
distances on trains and buses to their rural homes for some well-deserved 
rest with their families. 
On 23 January, the day before New Year’s Eve, Wuhan was officially 
locked down — halting all travel in and out of the city. Yet this decisive 
move may have come too late. In the preceding weeks, some 5 million 
people left Wuhan for the New Year holiday, many of them migrant 
workers returning to their rural villages.3 Travel was, as usual, intense: 
on 23 January alone, some 251 long-distance trains departed or passed 
through Wuhan between midnight and 10 am.4 
Travellers departing Wuhan sat on trains and buses alongside 
many of China’s 135 million migrants who work ‘temporarily’ in 
cities along China’s crowded eastern seaboard during the year.5 
This year, from 9 to 24 January, 
China’s railways carried 1.143 
billion passengers, many of whom 
were migrant workers returning 
home for the holidays.6 Millions 
of people thus passed through 
Wuhan or travelled alongside 
Wuhan residents before returning 
home, potentially spreading the 
virus throughout the country’s 
populous agricultural regions.7 
Remarkably, the provinces 
surrounding Hubei did not 
experience a virus outbreak.8 
From the 23 January lockdown 
of Wuhan until its reopening on 
8 April, China had a total of 81,865 
Crowded railway station during the Spring 
Festival travel rush
Source: 二泉印月, Flickr 
COVID-19 infections. Of these cases, 67,803 (83 percent) were in Hubei, 
with Wuhan accounting for 50,008 cases, representing 61 percent of 
total cases across China.9 
The low number of cases recorded in provinces adjacent to Hubei 
was particularly surprising. For instance, as of 8 April, Hunan had only 
1,019 cases10 in a total population of 69 million, 60 percent of whom live in 
rural areas.11 Henan province is even larger — with 96 million residents, 
67 percent of them rural — and yet it saw only 1,276 cases during the 
same period.12 
In short, even though massive numbers of rural migrants flowed 
rapidly in and out of Wuhan during this critical period, the adjacent rural 
regions did not experience large-scale infections. What prevented this 
potential disaster? 
State Control or Good Governance?
To date, most studies of China’s control of the virus have focused on 
governance capacity or state control. Chinese scholars have generally 
credited China’s effective containment to the state’s capacity to make rapid 
policy decisions in the face of uncertainty, which proved impressive after 
the initial delays in Wuhan.13 Others have praised China’s ‘responsibility 
system’, which allocates authority to different functional and regional 
entities, for facilitating the rapid mobilisation of China’s vast governance 
system.14 After a ‘chaotic’ start, as Ciqi Mei 梅赐琪 explains, a ‘policy mix 
of traditional measures’ aligned with China’s ‘policy style’ of ‘a centralised 
leadership, bureaucratic mobilisation, and memories of the right policy 
mix of previous crises’ proved effective.15 
While acknowledging these governance tactics, Western analysts 
have instead tended to highlight political or state control, pointing 
to Beijing’s willingness to employ coercive tactics, surveillance and 














































Financing and organising the logistics around food and medical supplies, 
for instance, also required institutional capacity. Others have turned 
to cultural explanations, suggesting that factors common to East Asian 
societies such as a strong sense of civic responsibility and caution help 
explain China’s success.17 
In most of these studies, the focus has been on urban China. Yet unlike 
South Korea and Japan, which have small rural populations in percentage 
terms (Japan, 8 percent; South Korea, 19 percent),18 more than 55 percent 
of China’s population are rural residents,19 many of whom travel annually 
between urban jobs and family farms. In one of the few studies addressing 
rural migrants, social anthropologist Xiang Biao 项飙 argues, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, that the mobility of China’s migrant workers might 
have helped curtail the epidemic, as outmigration may have reduced 
urban infection rates and demands on urban medical resources.20 Yet if 
their destination region had limited medical facilities, as is the case in most 
of rural China, a massive population movement into the countryside could 
have risked spreading the virus into areas with limited coping capacity.
A more useful way to understand the experience of rural China 
amid the COVID-19 crisis is to consider the role of established social and 
institutional structures in helping both the Chinese state and Chinese 
society control the spread of the virus while minimising the economic 
impact of public health measures. 
One of the most valuable, though widely overlooked, institutional 
structures has been the system of collective landownership in rural China. 
Almost half of China’s landmass is governed by a collectively owned land 
regime.21 Neither fully private nor fully state owned, most rural land is still 
owned by members of rural collectives — namely, China’s rural residents. 
By virtue of their membership within a collective — usually a village 
‘group’ (VG) 村小组 — individuals who hold a ‘rural collective residence 
permit’ 农村集体户口 gain the right to use or rent out their allocated plot 
of farmland but cannot sell it off.
During the crisis, two features of China’s distinctive rural land regime 
proved particularly useful. In the first few months of the outbreak, the 
role of VG leaders was critical. VG leaders helped implement public health 
measures at the local level, while VG members policed the group’s territorial 
boundaries, ensuring limited social movement while maintaining social 
distancing practices. The group-based territorial structures, encompassing 
family homes, farms, and collective spaces, enabled most rural residents 
to maintain a largely normal existence while still limiting their social 
interactions.
The second key factor was the nature of land rights for rural 
residents. Rural households maintained their access to housing and 
agricultural land with minimal expense requirements, enabling them to 
meet their family’s basic needs without relying on government support. 
The central government could thus direct more of its financial resources 
towards controlling the virus, supporting urban residents, and restoring 
employment and economic growth. The rural land system thus played a 
crucial role in enabling China’s virus response. 
Chinese village near Jingzhou City, Hubei














































Groups, Territory, and Staying Home in Rural 
China 
Two of the most important policy measures used to control the spread 
of the virus were social distancing and shelter-in-place orders. In rural 
China, with a highly dispersed population and limited resources provided 
by the state, implementing these measures was far more difficult than in 
the cities.
In provinces such as Hunan, rural township populations range from 
5,000 to 40,000 people, with most around 20,000.22 Yet only townships with 
a population of more than 20,000 are awarded their own police station, 
which are generally staffed with between five and fifteen officers, at most.23 
Below the township level, governance capacity is even lower. Villages, 
which tend to have at least several hundred residents, rely on a few local 
residents who serve on village committees 村委会	for local governance. As 
Rural groups are generally acquaintance communities which know their local territory very well
Source: Achim Höfling, Flickr
widely noted in Chinese media at the time, these local officials had neither 
adequate training nor adequate resources to implement the governance 
measures required for effective virus control.24 
Furthermore, due to the public ownership of rural land, the 
boundaries of Chinese farms are not clearly delineated. Years ago, when 
driving through the central United States, I remember being struck by the 
ubiquitous fences separating the endless fields of corn. In contrast, most 
Chinese villages and fields are not fenced off. Therefore, rural officials 
could not establish anything like the system of barriers used in Chinese 
cities to limit movement. Most Chinese urban residential developments 
小区 have external walls and/or can easily construct fences or barriers, with 
guards at all entrances, to effectively enclose an entire neighbourhood. 
While local people could block a rural village’s main roads, they would 
have been unable to build barriers enclosing the entire village, particularly 
if it was surrounded by fields or hills. 
Given the limited governance capacity and difficulties of 
establishing territorial barriers in rural China, how did rural cadres 
manage to ensure rural residents stayed at home and maintained 
social distancing requirements for the crucial first two months after 
the Wuhan outbreak? 
Again, VGs were a key factor. There are 2.385 million VGs in China.25 
For most of rural China, the VG is the entity that holds the collective rights 
to the group’s allocated land. This land is then further subdivided among 
all of the VG members, providing each family’s allocated land for farming 
and living. While these VGs do not have any formal administrative or 
economic functions within China’s governance structure, three of their 
features were particularly salient for enforcing shelter-in-place orders 
and ensuring rural residents maintained social distancing requirements. 
First, each VG is essentially an extended ‘acquaintance community’ 
— the phrase developed by the influential sociologist Fei Xiaotong 
费孝通 (1910–2005) to describe the dense interpersonal networks that 














































VG leaders to contact all members of their VG. A member of the village 
committee, for instance, could be responsible for contacting the leaders 
of all VGs to ask whether anyone in their group had been to Wuhan. 
The VG leaders are not only residents, but also have extended family 
members within the group. These leaders would likely be familiar with 
all families within their VG, and so could contact them quickly and 
easily, while requesting that they take (or avoid) certain actions and help 
monitor the implementation of key measures by all group members. 
The diary of one village committee leader provides an insightful 
example of how VG-level epidemic control proved effective.27 The village 
leader first contacted all VG leaders, asking each to tell the families in their 
group who had family members recently returned from a city to isolate 
themselves at home. Thermometers were distributed to each VG and then 
to households with members who had recently returned from a city. Each 
VG leader was asked to ensure that these households were doing daily 
temperature checks and providing these results to village officials. This 
proved effective and efficient. If village officials or doctors had to visit 
each home daily to conduct temperature checks, this not only would have 
been time and resource intensive, but also would have risked spreading 
the virus further. 
Second, the territorial basis of VGs ensures that all group members 
are well aware of where their collective territory ends, even without 
any formal geographical markers. This meant that VG members could 
— and did — easily and collectively monitor any non-group members 
attempting to enter their territory. This explains why, during the 
lockdown period, simple boundary markers such as a red cloth, a pile of 
dirt or a handwritten sign were sufficient to indicate the dividing lines 
between different groups’ territories.28 Since each group has a common 
interest in maintaining the well-being of all its members, they co-
operated in limiting entry by people from other groups while effectively 
supervising their own members’ movements. 
Finally, because each group’s territory includes farming land, 
land for their homes, and shared zones for leisure, group members 
could carry on with their lives while still maintaining social distancing 
between households. Having this common territory meant that group 
members could continue to farm, spend time outside, engage in 
local trading activities and even play Chinese chess 象棋, while still 
maintaining the key policy measures of sheltering in place and social 
distancing from non-household members.
Access to Land, Fiscal Relief and the COVID-19 
Crisis
China’s collective rural land system also played a crucial buffering role 
during the lockdown period, enabling rural households to maintain their 
basic housing and food requirements without relying on financial support 
from the government. As a result, the central government did not have to 
expand its fiscal expenditure to support rural residents or unemployed 
migrant workers returning to the countryside. Instead, it was able to 
direct its scarce resources towards containing the epidemic in urban 
communities.
The income structure of most Chinese rural households features four 
main sources: wage income, operational income, income from property 
and income from government direct transfers. A large portion of wage 
income comes from informal economic activities, while operational 
income generally derives from cultivating farmland. For the average rural 
resident in 2019, wages provided about 41 percent of their total income, 
while income from land production provided 36 percent.29 The mobility 
restrictions under shelter-in-place orders hit hardest for rural households 
that rely heavily on wage income earned by working in cities.30 However, 
these measures had limited impact on rural households’ farming income, 














































First, households do not need to pay anything to maintain their access 
to land. Since rural land is not taxed and farmers cannot take out loans 
using their homes or farms as collateral, they are not in danger of losing 
these due to income loss. Second, since farmers’ land is generally quite close 
to their residential land, mobility restrictions did not stop them farming. 
Third, although each family’s plot may be modest in scale, it is generally 
adequate to ensure food security for all household members, including 
urban returnees. Finally, there are no taxes on the sale of grain products, 
so farmers can retain all the profits from selling their grain. Although the 
wage income of rural households declined sharply during the COVID-19 
crisis, these features of the rural land system made it financially easier for 
farmers to remain safely at home for an extended period.
For many city-based migrant workers who lost their jobs or suffered 
reduced incomes during the crisis, they at least retained the option of 
returning to their family farms, where they could meet their basic needs. 
For many, this might have been their final or only resort. For instance, rural 
women migrants working in an urban beauty salon usually work during 
the day and at night sleep on the salon’s beds to save on rent. When such 
businesses closed, their workers lost their housing as well as their jobs. 
Most migrant workers in small businesses were not covered by any urban 
welfare support during the crisis. Women who were fortunate enough to 









their access to land.31 These women could return to their family farms in 
the countryside, and so at least maintain secure shelter and sustenance 
throughout the crisis. 
Migrant workers who were able to remain in the city during the 
crisis might still have chosen to return home for several reasons. First, 
rural living expenses are modest compared with those in the city. Second, 
while rural incomes are low, life on the farm is often less stressful and 
less demanding than in the city. If they were fortunate, some returned 
migrant workers might have been able to find employment nearby or 
earn income through local construction tasks.32 This capacity for self-
reliance was invaluable for the individuals involved and for the Chinese 
government as well.
For some wealthy countries, providing financial support helped 
businesses to keep their workers on the books while ensuring that 
recipients could and would abide by stay-at-home orders. But it has been 
very costly. Australia’s ‘JobKeeper’ payments, for instance, were designed 
to help 6 million people retain their jobs over the first six months of the 
COVID-19 crisis but came with a hefty price tag: AU$130 billion.33 If China 
had adopted a similar approach for just the most vulnerable migrant 
workers, the costs would also have been considerable. Based on an 
average per capita monthly income for migrant workers of 3,721 yuan, the 
52 million migrant workers who returned home during the crisis would 
have suffered nearly 200 billion yuan (AU$41.3 billion) in lost income over 
just two months.34 
For developed countries, the economic downturn has eroded 
fiscal revenue, while unemployment increases have driven up welfare 
expenditures. In Australia, the government faced massive additional 
expenditure in response to the crisis.35 Even as the government’s budget 
deficit has grown, it has faced pressure to maintain consistent levels of 














































and burgeoning expenses rendered the Australian government reluctant 
to fund some economic recovery measures that would have been socially 
desirable, such as building more public housing.37 
The Chinese government faced the same fiscal problems of reduced 
revenue and increased expenditure during the crisis.38 With so many 
migrant workers losing their urban jobs, the pressure to provide financial 
support to rural households would have been high.39 If the Chinese 
government had provided 2,000 yuan per month (the minimum living 
requirements for a household of five people) over the two-month national 
shutdown for 600 million rural residents, this would have required at 
least 480 billion yuan (AU$99.2 billion). These non-payments represented 
a massive saving for China’s federal budget. 
Instead of providing financial support to unemployed migrant workers 
through their employers to help retain jobs or providing welfare payments 
to low-income rural households to cover their minimum living expenses, 
the Chinese central government focused its financial support on fighting the 
epidemic, providing tax relief for urban businesses and making payment 
transfers to local authorities. China’s total funds for virus prevention and 
control reached 110.48 billion yuan by 4 March.40 In the first half of 2020, 
the central government’s transfer payments to local governments reached 
6.28 trillion yuan, an increase of 1.26 trillion yuan over the same period 
the previous year. These funds were primarily used to protect the urban 
population: paying for staff wages at local public institutions, issuing social 
security payments for urban residents and helping meet the operational 
expenses of local governments.41 At the same time, the central government’s 
financial support to rural residents remained small and largely rhetorical. 
The government implemented a direct payment program for only 20,000 
impoverished rural households. Instead, most official statements from 
the central government offered only vague pledges to ‘guide’, ‘discover’, 
‘promote’, ‘support’, ‘place’, ‘attract’, and ‘encourage’ rural residents who 
faced considerable economic difficulties.42 
By August, the situation in China was certainly looking better, with the 
virus largely under control, job growth turning positive and government 
budget revenue and tax revenue beginning to grow again.43 However, the 
burden that rural communities took on during the crisis in support of the 
state’s effort has tended to be taken for granted by the Chinese government 
and overlooked by many outside observers. 
Conclusion
Generally speaking, effective governance rests on strong social and 
institutional foundations. Amid China’s COVID-19 crisis, two features of 
the rural collectively owned land regime proved crucial. First, village 
group–based territorial structures and strong community ties motivated 
local residents to police their own territorial boundaries. Furthermore, 
having family homes, farms, and collective spaces within the group’s 
territory helped rural families meet their housing and nutritional needs. 
As a result, the central government was able to direct its scarce resources 
towards urban communities and businesses while rural communities 
sustained key public health measures during the crisis. 
The experiences in containing COVID-19 in rural China show that 
some of China’s distinctive social and institutional factors were effectively 
utilised to support key public health measures. However, while the rural 
land system proved invaluable in this case, it remains inadequate as a 
long-term solution for meeting the complex and changing welfare needs 
of rural households and rural-to-urban migrant workers, especially 
women. To date, the Chinese government’s fiscal policies have tended to 
favour urban residents and prioritise urban businesses and government 
agencies. With the Chinese economy now on the road to recovery, the 
government should expand its fiscal support for rural business, rural 





































DOWN AND OUT IN 
HONG KONG 
Hong Kong’s National Security Law 
· ANTONY DAPIRAN
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THREE FUNDAMENTAL legal documents define today’s Hong 
Kong. The first is the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration of 1984. The second 
is the Basic Law (1990), Hong Kong’s 
post-1997 constitution. And, as of July 
2020, there is the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Safeguarding 
National Security in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region 中華
人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家	
安全法 (National Security Law).
The National Security Law creates 
four new criminal offences: secession, 
subversion, terrorism, and colluding 
with foreign forces. Each of these 
offences is broadly defined and carries 
a sentence of up to life imprisonment. 
H O N G  KO N G ’ S  N AT I O N A L 
S E C U R I T Y  L AW 
Antony Dapiran 
In addition, the law covers anyone 
inciting, aiding or abetting commission 
of the above offences.
Just like the first two documents, 
the National Security Law was drafted 
not by Hong Kong’s own legislature 
but by an external body, the National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee 
(NPCSC) of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), and imposed on Hong 
Kong. The drafting was conducted in 
secret. The full text was only revealed 
to the Hong Kong people — including, 
by all accounts, Chief Executive Carrie 
Lam herself and other members of her 
government—at the moment it came 
into force, at eleven o’clock at night, 
one hour before the twenty-third 
anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover 










































The law wrought a dramatic 
overnight change in Hong Kong. In 
the hours leading up to that moment, 
activists in the territory’s pro-
democracy protest movement raced to 
delete incriminating social media posts 
or to delete their accounts entirely. 
Protesters purged the contents of their 
chat groups and shut them down. Pro-
democracy political parties (including 
the leading youth party Demosistō) 
and activist non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (such as the 
political research group Network 
DIPLO) announced that they would 
dissolve. ‘Yellow economic circle’ (pro-
democracy) cafés and restaurants 
raced to tear down their Lennon Walls 
— the protest artwork and colourful 
Post-It notes bearing pro-democracy 
and anti-government messages ripped 
away, leaving stark bare walls.
If some thought this was an 
overreaction, believing that — as 
the government had promised — 
the law would target only a ‘very 
small minority’ of extremists and 
fundamental freedoms would be 
maintained, the worst fears of others 
were quickly confirmed the next day. 
At a protest on the morning of 1 July, 
Hong Kong police unfurled a new 
warning banner:
You are displaying flags or 
banners/chanting slogans/or 
conducting yourselves with 
an intent such as secession or 
subversion, which may constitute 
offences under the HKSAR 
National Security Law. You may 
be arrested and prosecuted.
The first arrests under the new law 
quickly followed — of a man found 
to be in possession of a flag bearing 
the slogan ‘Hong Kong independence’ 
and of two young women handing out 
stickers with various protest slogans. 
That same day, a young man flying a 
flag from the back of his motorcycle 
bearing the popular 2019 protest 
slogan ‘Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution 
of Our Times’ 光復香港, 時代革命, 
who appeared to have inadvertently 
crashed into a line of police officers 
blocking the road, was arrested and 
later charged with terrorism.
In the weeks and months that 
followed, the Hong Kong government 
cited the law as the basis for a variety 
of measures that made seismic 
changes to Hong Kong. Public libraries 
pulled ‘suspect’ books from their 
shelves; the protest slogan ‘Liberate 
Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times!’ 
was banned; and primary elections 
held by the pan-democrat camp were 
alleged to be illegal and amounted 
to subversion. Further arrests were 
made under the new law, including 
of teenagers accused of promoting 
secession on their Facebook pages. 
A number of Hong Kong dissidents, 
including former legislator and 
Demosistō founder Nathan Law 羅冠聰 
and former Democratic Party legislator 
Ted Hui Chi-fung 許智峯, went into 
exile overseas. The mainland Coast 
Guard apprehended a dozen young 
Hong Kongers attempting to flee to 
Taiwan by boat and they disappeared 
into mainland custody. They were 
ultimately tried in a mainland court 
and given jail sentences of up to three 
years for illegal border crossing.
Close examination of the 
law’s definitions makes it clear 
that it specifically targets dissent. 
It turns ordinary criminal acts 
(criminal damage, arson, assault) 
into terrorism if committed during a 
protest; civil disobedience (blocking 
roads or government buildings) 
into criminal subversion; political 
expression (including chanting 
slogans such as ‘Free Hong Kong!’ or 
publishing material that promotes 
self-determination) into acts inciting 
secession; and expressions of support 
for protesters (donating funds and 
equipment or transporting protesters 
to and from protests) into aiding and 
abetting terrorism. 
‘Disregard and threats would never keep us silent’ (left); ‘Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times!’ (right)










































The law also has extraterritorial 
effect: it applies to any breach of its 
provisions by anyone, anywhere in 
the world. This has prompted concern 
among overseas activists and scholars 
critical of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) worldwide that, not only is it no 
longer safe for them to set foot in Hong 
Kong, but also authorities may use the 
law to issue international warrants 
for their arrest. Hong Kong citizens 
overseas may worry that they risk a 
fate similar to that of the Causeway 
Bay Books booksellers, at least one 
of whom was kidnapped in 2015 and 
forcibly repatriated to mainland 
China to face trial. This motivated 
many Western nations, including 
Australia, to suspend their extradition 
agreements with Hong Kong. 
But much more than just creating 
four new criminal offences, the 
National Security Law implements 
structural institutional change in 
Hong Kong that is both deep and 
fundamental. The law established a 
new Hong Kong government agency, 
the Committee for Safeguarding 
National Security 維護國家安全委員會, 
which comprises the chief executive, 
key ministers and representatives 
from the uniformed services (police, 
immigration, and customs and excise). 
This will be the single most powerful 
agency in the Hong Kong government, 
An advert on a Hong Kong public light bus reads ‘National Security Law: Preserve One Country, Two Systems, 
Restore Stability’
Source: Giryyf 233, Wikimedia
with power to formulate policy and 
intervene in the work of all other arms 
of government, the education system 
and broader society.
The law empowers Beijing to 
appoint a national security advisor to 
the committee, marking the first time 
that a Beijing-appointed commissar is 
inserted directly into the ranks of a Hong 
Kong government agency. Luo Huining 
駱惠寧, the director of Hong Kong’s 
Central Government Liaison Office 
中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區聯絡
辦公室, which makes him Beijing’s 
top representative in Hong Kong, was 
appointed the inaugural national 
security advisor, effectively making 
him the ‘party secretary’ for Hong 
Kong. The National Security Law thus 
effectively replicates in Hong Kong 
the same party-government structure 
that exists throughout the rest of 
China, integrating Hong Kong into the 
mainland’s Party-State.
The law makes deep interventions 
into other branches of the Hong Kong 
government, including creating a new 
special prosecutor’s office for national 
security offences in the Department of 
Justice and a department for national 
security in the Hong Kong Police Force. 
The National Security Law effectively 
sets up a parallel judiciary, requiring 
national security cases to be heard 
only by judges drawn from a panel 
hand-picked by the chief executive, an 
arrangement that punches a hole in 
Hong Kong’s long tradition of judicial 
independence and the separation of 
powers, which are fundamental to the 
common law system — a legacy of the 
British colonial era.
Most alarmingly, the law 
empowers mainland government 
departments with responsibility 
for national security to establish 
a presence in Hong Kong through 
the Office for Safeguarding National 
Security of the Central People’s 
Government in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region 中央人民政府
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署. 
This opens the door for PRC Ministry 
of State Security agents — China’s 
secret police — to operate legally in 
Hong Kong, creating a parallel (and 
non-accountable) system alongside 
Hong Kong’s police and courts for 
investigating and punishing national 
security–related offences.
Hong Kong’s much-vaunted 
rule of law, which has always been 
an important part of its appeal to 
international business and finance, is 
seriously undermined by the National 










































the power of final adjudication from 
Hong Kong courts: certain serious 
national security cases will be tried on 
the mainland. Ironically, the protest 
movement the law is designed to 
crush began last year with opposition 
to an extradition law. The power to 
interpret the law is also taken out of 
the hands of Hong Kong courts and 
vested in the NPCSC; it cannot be 
challenged on constitutional or human 
rights grounds. Finally, the National 
Security Law is all-powerful: in the 
case of discrepancies between it and 
any Hong Kong law (the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance, for example), it overrules 
Hong Kong law.
Chris Patten, the last British 
governor of Hong Kong, famously 
described Hong Kong’s political 
system as one of ‘liberty without 
democracy’. Hong Kong existed in 
a state of disequilibrium, enjoying 
a high level of rights and freedoms but 
suffering a low level of representative 
democracy. Hong Kong’s various 
protest movements have sought to 
right this imbalance by increasing 
the level of democracy. They have 
always faced competing attempts 
by the government to address that 
disequilibrium by reducing their 
rights and freedoms. The National 
Security Law, it would seem, is the 
ultimate attempt to do just that.
There has long existed 
a particular idea of Hong Kong as 
a bastion of freedom in Asia or, in the 
common Chinese expression, a place 
to bi Qin 避秦 (‘flee the Qin’), meaning 
to be safe from tyranny. Hong Kong 
had been a space where people could 
publish freely, make whatever artwork 
and screen whatever movies they 
desired, criticise governments near 
and far, and organise and fundraise 
for any cause. In Hong Kong, Chinese 
voices could speak freely and global 
voices could freely address Chinese 
audiences beyond the constraints 
present elsewhere in China. With the 
National Security Law, that unique 
space now seems lost. The loss will be 
felt not just by the Hong Kong people, 
















































SCENES OF THE elderly working poor breaking down cardboard, 
stacking it on trolleys and pushing it 
along densely packed streets to be sold 
at recycling centres are a common 
sight in Hong Kong. During the Lunar 
New Year celebrations, the cardboard 
accumulates in dishevelled piles in 
alleyways because the recycling centres 
are closed for the holiday; the unpaid 
labour contributing to the city’s waste 
management infrastructure becomes 
obvious from the sheer amount of 
disarrayed cardboard and discarded 
waste that remains uncollected during 
this period. 
Daily life for those engaged in 
cleaning the streets of refuse, bundling 
empty cardboard boxes discarded 
by many businesses and salvaging 
abandoned materials for reuse and 
resale in informal street markets is a 
visible struggle in a place where vast 
disparities in wealth persist. The annual 
Hong Kong Poverty Situation Report 
2018,1 published by the government 
in December 2019, noted that the 
number of elderly poor aged sixty-five 
and over rose to 516,600 persons, with 
the poverty rate remaining steady 
from the previous year at 44.4 percent 
(within the range of 43.5 percent to 
45.1 percent since 2009). Among poor 
households in Hong Kong overall, 39.4 
percent are elderly households; and 
among the general elderly population, 
53.1 percent are women. Thus, the 
activity of collecting cardboard 
is commonly undertaken by 
elderly women. 
WA S T E  A N D  T H E  E L D E R LY 
W O R K I N G  P O O R  I N  H O N G 
KO N G  















































The government provides a wide 
range of social security services for 
the elderly with various eligibility 
requirements. Direct cash assistance 
includes the Comprehensive Social 
Security Scheme and Old Age Living 
Allowance, and non-cash assistance 
includes subsidised public housing, 
healthcare vouchers, discounted 
public transportation, district and 
neighbourhood elderly community 
centres, and residential care homes. 
There are also local charities that 
run social outreach programs and 
provide additional free services. Some 
restaurants provide free or discounted 
meals for the elderly poor. The report 
found that, among the elderly poor 
counted in the survey, 86.2 percent 
or 445,300 persons were receiving 
some social security benefits from 
the government. The Old Age Living 
Allowance of HK$1,435 (AU$250) per 
month is, however, popularly referred 
to as ‘fruit money’ because such a 
minimal amount will only purchase 
some fruit or snacks. The poverty line 
in Hong Kong is HK$4,000 per month 
(AU$695) for a one-person household 
and HK$10,000 per month (AU$1,735) 
for a two-person household. The 
elderly poor seek out charities and 
community centres that provide free 
meals and groceries to supplement 
their food requirements due to the 
inadequacy of government cash 
assistance to cover all their needs. 
The socially marginalised and 
economically vulnerable have always 
struggled to survive in densely 
populated Hong Kong, with its chronic 
housing shortages and prohibitive 
cost of living. According to the Hong 
Kong Housing Authority, as of 2020, 
the current waiting time for subsidised 
public housing is 5.6 years for general 
applicants and 3.3 years for single 
elderly applicants. The elderly working 
poor must be resourceful and adaptive 
to make a living, and healthy enough 
to deal with the physical challenges 
of work. The creation of informal 
street markets where they sell second-
hand, discarded and outdated goods 
is an example of how marginalised 
communities find a means to 
redistribute resources. 
In one of Hong Kong’s poorest 
districts, Sham Shui Po in Kowloon, 
regular and itinerant hawkers set up 
each evening to sell second-hand goods 
to locals in the area, most of whom 
are also working poor, homeless or 
refugees awaiting approval of their 
asylum claims. On the weekends, 
migrant workers from the Philippines 
and Indonesia come to the area on their 
day off to shop for both new and used 
goods. Before the COVID-19 pandemic 
restricted international travel, African 
merchants who came to this district for 
the wholesale clothing suppliers would 
also be seen at the informal markets 
buying second-hand goods for resale 
back in Africa. However, hawking 
on the streets is not without risk and 
is an unreliable source of income. 
Hawkers can be fined by officers of 
the Food and Environmental Hygiene 
Department who regularly patrol the 
streets of this neighbourhood in the 
evenings to enforce public hygiene 
codes and obstruction and nuisance 
ordinances. In these cases, the goods 
are confiscated and disposed of. 
Waste took on new visibility 
and purpose during the protests of 
2019–2020. Global and local media 
attention focused on what became, 
throughout much of 2019, daily 
clashes between protesters and 
the police across Hong Kong. The 
dramatic and historic protests also 
generated an epic amount of rubbish. 
Accumulated debris included pieces 
of broken pavement, disposable 
facemasks, ripped gloves, empty 
water bottles, contorted umbrellas, 
shattered glass, uprooted signposts, 
plastic food packaging, burnt rubbish, 
and discharged tear-gas canisters. 
Protesters, meanwhile, appropriated 
bright orange drums used as garbage 
bins from the sidewalks, multicoloured 
neighbourhood recycling receptacles, 
and large green wheeled dumpsters 
to build blockades and barriers, and 
even burnt them as a deterrent. The 
dumpsters had the added benefit of 
easy mobility and could be used as 
moving shields against projectiles 
such as tear-gas canisters and 
rubber bullets. When these bins and 
dumpsters became fewer in number 
due to their destruction and removal 
as the months of protests continued, 
businesses put out their rubbish in 
black garbage bags tied to signposts 
















































along the street or in piles on the 
sidewalks and in back alleys. Protesters 
often shifted these bags on to the road 
and burned them to serve as blockades 
when dumpsters were not available. 
The waste generated by a city of 
7.5 million residents was thus used 
as a resource in the protests. In turn, 
the amount of waste generated by 
the tactical measures of both police 
and protesters, and simply by crowds 
of people, added to this rubbish and 
took on new political significance. Its 
prolific visibility was an undeniable 
representation of political, economic, 
and social crisis in a city where the 
sight of the elderly poor collecting 
and neatly sorting cardboard had 
become so commonplace as to render 
waste ‘invisible’ in public space. The 
international media that reported on 
the protests sometimes mentioned 
how careful the protesters were to 
clean up the streets but were generally 
uninterested in reporting the details 
of the tedious clean-up process that 
followed each clash with police. Each 
morning, bands of contracted street 
sweepers and local residents cleaned 
up the litter-filled landscape, joined by 
demonstrators eager to show solidarity 
with people in the community. In 
some instances, the elderly poor also 
participated by salvaging what they 
could find in the aftermath, but most 
of what was left behind had little or 
no value. 
The new National Security Law 
may have put a stop to the protests, but 
the problem of waste — and poverty — 
remains. According to the Hong Kong 
Environmental Protection Department, 
as of 2020, the government has already 
closed thirteen landfill sites, which 
collectively occupy 300 hectares, due 
Metal pushcarts collecting 
cardboard are a common sight in 
Hong Kong
Source: Pxhere.com
to lack of capacity; only three in the 
New Territories are in active use, 
despite also operating at capacity. 
Waste management has always 
been a challenge for Hong Kong, 
which covers 1,106 square kilometres, 
even before the protests of 2019 
and COVID-19 in 2020 disrupted 
tourism. The Hong Kong service 
industry is dependent on tourism and, 
according to the government Tourism 
Commission, total visitor numbers 
reached a high of 65.15 million in 
2018. In 2020 the city faced multiple 
related crises: an environmental 
catastrophe due to mounting levels 
of rubbish, the COVID-19 pandemic 
and uncertainty over its future under 
the new National Security Law. (See 
Forum, ‘Hong Kong’s National Security 
Law’, pp.59–64). 
The convergence of crises has 
exacerbated existing social inequities. 
The downturn in tourism has severely 
affected the working poor, who are 
heavily concentrated in the restaurant, 
catering and accommodation sectors. 
The elderly working poor continue to 
struggle to eke out a livelihood in a time 
of social and economic disruption, and 
amid a public health emergency that 
has presented them with the additional 
challenges of maintaining social 
distance in crowded quarters, ensuring 
adequate sanitisation measures 
and accessing cleaning products 
and facemasks. The increasingly 
financialised global economy, with 
its attendant wealth inequalities, has 
compounded labour precarity for 
the working classes in Hong Kong as 
elsewhere. 
Asian societies are facing a ‘silver 
tsunami’, with Hong Kong seniors 
having the longest life expectancy in 
the world. These elderly people sorting 
through society’s waste are survivors 
of some of the most dramatic events 
of the twentieth century, including 
war, revolution, and the end of British 
colonisation. Managing waste has 
long been a livelihood for the poor, 
whether they are employed to carry 
it away from public view or they sift 
through it to reclaim whatever value 
remains in its use or exchange. The 
elderly working poor have learned 
to be resilient in the midst of crises 
and have found a means for survival 
among society’s discards. But that is 
not a solution to poverty alleviation 




























































WOMEN’S BODIES, INTIMATE POLITICS, AND
FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS AMID COVID-19
Pan Wang
Source: Gauthier Delecroix - 郭天, Flickr
IN SOCIAL AND GENDER RELATIONS, the COVID-19 
pandemic has proven to be a kaleidoscope revealing 
light and darkness, strength and vulnerability, as 
well as beauty and ugliness, in China as elsewhere. 
The crisis has brought attention to pre-existing 
inequalities and prompted a rise in feminist 
consciousness in China — even if ‘feminism’ 女权	
itself is deemed a ‘sensitive word’ by the censors.



























































‘My Body, Whose Choice?’
In April 2020, conservative protesters in the United States borrowed the 
feminist slogan ‘My body, my choice’ to urge their states (including Texas 
and Virginia) to lift their coronavirus restrictions and to encourage people 
to refuse to wear face masks.1 The rhetorical weapon was originally created 
to advocate for women’s abortion rights, yet, ironically, it was adapted to 
oppose government-mandated stay-at-home orders. At the same time, 
‘anti-vaxxers’ held signs claiming vaccines ‘violate bodily autonomy’. 
A number of women in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), meanwhile, 
were making — or being motivated to make — rather different choices.
In early February, China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency posted a video 
on Twitter featuring a group of female medical professionals from Xi’an 
who voluntarily had their heads shaved before heading to the coronavirus 
frontline in Wuhan, which was then the epicentre of the pandemic.2 In the 
video, these women — dressed in navy-blue uniform jackets — raise their 
fists and give the thumbs up after their haircuts; even face masks cannot 
hide their smiles. They look happy, calm, and strongly determined, showing 
not the slightest hesitation. This calls to mind the legendary woman warrior 
Hua Mulan, who cut her hair short and disguised herself as a man to fight 
in the army of the Northern Wei dynasty (386–534 CE). These images also 
call to mind the ‘little red guards’ 小红卫兵 who cut their hair short to fight 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).
Also in February, China Central Television (CCTV) produced 
a documentary featuring the nurse Zhao Yu 赵瑜 working in the emergency 
ward at a military hospital in Wuhan while nine months pregnant. 
Overruling the objections of her family and peers, Zhao said, ‘I believe all 
the difficulties can be conquered when my child accompanies me fighting 
in this battle.’3 CCTV described her as a ‘great mother and respectable angel 
in a white gown’ 她是伟大的母亲, 更是让人敬佩的白衣天使.4 The media 
also reported stories of other pregnant women who insisted on working 
to fight the coronavirus. Some of the women were medical staff taking 
the temperature of commuters on public roads; some were working at 
local clinics; and some were administrators in charge of sourcing medical 
supplies. One nurse returned to work in a Wuhan hospital just ten days 
after surgery following a miscarriage. These women continued to work 
despite fainting spells and internal bleeding.5 
Wuhan was home to another story of female sacrifice on the 
COVID-19 frontline. According to the Changjiang Daily, seven nurses 
from the Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital who were new mothers 
breastfeeding their babies — with the youngest baby aged four months 
— voluntarily decided to stop breastfeeding and return to work when 
their hospital began admitting patients infected with coronavirus.6 Some 
mothers had to pump their breast milk by hand to alleviate the pain 
caused by engorgement while at work. Moreover, they were only able to 
watch their babies remotely via smartphones because they needed to stay 
on duty at the hospital. Many had not seen their babies for more than 
ten days at the time of the report. The media hailed them as ‘the most 
beautiful mothers’ 最美的妈妈.
The crown of ‘most beautiful’ was also awarded to nurses whose 
skin had been damaged by the continuous wearing of surgical masks, 
goggles, and other personal protective equipment, as well as exposure 
to disinfectant. The damage included deep lines on their faces, blisters, 
A scene from the 
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and patches of bleached skin. A poster made by the Chinese Communist 
Party organ the People’s Daily called these marks the ‘most beautiful 
“epidemic battle makeup” of counter-marchers’ 逆行者最美的‘战疫妆’.7 It 
was also reported in praiseworthy terms that many medical workers wore 
adult diapers during their shifts as there was no time to go to the toilet. 
Shortages in menstrual hygiene products made this a particular challenge 
for women — something the propaganda did not mention.8
The women who shaved their heads understood that this would 
‘de-feminise’ them in a society otherwise obsessed with narrowly defined 
ideas of feminine beauty and youthfulness (for example, the ‘A4 waist 
challenge’ that has prompted thousands of Chinese women to share photos 
on social media revealing how skinny they are by holding a piece of A4 
paper vertically in front of them);9 they were also aware of the consequences 
of stopping breastfeeding or working during pregnancy and were conscious 
of the damage to their skin. However, they had chosen, in the words of 
the Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily, to ‘sail against the current’ 
逆流而上. In her 2016 book Women Warriors and Wartime Spies of China, 
Louise Edwards describes the actions of such ‘women warriors’ and ‘self-
sacrificing daughters’ of the nation as giving lie to the notion of women as 
inherently ‘vulnerable’ or weak.10 In official media accounts, their ‘derring-
do’ is testament to their heroism, altruism, sense of unity, resilience, and 
patriotism; just like men, they are capable of ‘sacrificing the “small family” 
Nurses were hailed as the ‘most 
beautiful mothers’ by Chinese media 
Source: Pxhere
for the “big family” ’ 舍小家, 顾大家. These ‘women worriers’, whose heroic 
choices are written into their bodies, have been held up as role models to 
boost public morale and help China through the health crisis. 
Despite these heroic efforts, women are disadvantaged in China’s 
health and medical industry. According to a report released by China’s 
online recruitment website Zhipin.com in March, the gender pay gap 
between men and women was 38.4 percent in medical care in 2019 — 
among the top four gender wage gaps across fifteen sectors — meaning 
women healthcare workers earned only 60 percent of their male 
counterparts’ wages.11 This gap has persisted despite the government’s 
wage increase for frontline health workers during the coronavirus crisis.12 
Fighting for Justice and Closing the Gender Gap 
At the same time, there was a public, if sporadic and fragmented, 
backlash to these stories of heroines. This is evidence of a rising ‘feminist 
consciousness’ that extends beyond activist circles to a growing awareness 
of gender inequality and a trend towards resistance and pushing for 
recognition of women’s contribution, rights, and interests. This echoes the 
calls made by people around the world for gender equality and efforts 
to improve the situation of women during the pandemic. For example, 
hundreds of women in Asian countries including India and the Philippines 
made sacrifices to help their local communities prevent the spread of the 
virus; many were involved in programs that aimed to empower women 
during the pandemic; and female political leaders such as New Zealand’s 
Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 adopted inclusive approaches to 
handling the crisis and received widespread praise.13 
Riding on this wave, in China, many people expressed their gratitude 
to these ‘woman warriors’ while questioning the way their sacrifices 



























































President Xi Jinping’s 习近平 favourite slogans, meaning to ‘give people 
confidence and hope, encourage people to love their country, society 
and life, as well as to pursue nice things’,14 which is essential to the 
state’s strategy of control.)15 One netizen commented: ‘The sacrifice and 
contribution of these women nurses and doctors is plain for all to see. 
Do not attempt to use their bodies as heavy-handed “propaganda”, they 
shouldn’t be morally kidnapped like this.’16 
Other netizens questioned whether the nurses had genuinely chosen 
to shave off their hair; a video released by Gansudaily.com on Weibo 
showed women from Gansu province shedding tears during and after 
their haircut. Some commentators pointed out that men serving on the 
coronavirus frontline did not have to shave their heads; why couldn’t 
women simply have short hair like their male counterparts? These debates 
led to the removal of some of the ‘propaganda’ from the Internet, such as 
the video clip of the pregnant nurse by CCTV and the one by Gansu Daily. 
One of the heroines of the crisis was undoubtedly Ai Fen 艾芬, 
a Chinese doctor and director of the emergency department at Wuhan 
Central Hospital. She was known as the ‘whistle-giver’17 发哨子的人 of the 
novel coronavirus. Ai was among the first healthcare workers to encounter 
the outbreak of the virus and alerted her colleagues. However, she was 
reprimanded by her hospital for ‘spreading rumours’ and ‘harming 
stability’.18 Her interview with People magazine posted on social media 
was also deleted within three hours of its publication on 10 March. In her 
words: ‘If I had known what was to happen, I would not have cared about 
the reprimand. I would have fucking talked about it to whoever, wherever 
I could.’19 To evade censors, Internet users have posted in foreign languages 
and used other means such as emojis, Pinyin, Morse code, Klingon, and 
oracle bone scripts to repost the article. Unlike the model ‘sacrificing 
daughters’ in official accounts, Ai is a ‘hidden’ hero who dares to tell the 
truth by ‘sailing against the current’ of the bureaucracy.
The ‘Shadow Pandemic’ and ‘Coronavirus Divorce’ 
With the escalation of the coronavirus outbreak around the globe, many 
countries have imposed lockdowns of cities and other social restrictions 
to contain the virus. This, however, has led to the emergence of a ‘shadow 
pandemic’: a rising number of women have reported falling victim to 
domestic violence, with a significant surge from the pre-crisis period, 
including in Argentina, Australia, Cyprus, France, and Singapore.20 In 
Hong Kong, many women were reportedly overwhelmed by their ‘natural 
duty’ of household chores and this sometimes led to ‘pushes and shoves’.21 
In mainland China, national-level statistics on domestic violence during 
COVID-19 are not available, however, media reports similarly suggest that 
domestic violence has increased sharply during this period. 
Meanwhile, divorce proceedings have in many countries throughout 
the year. For example, in Italy, lawyers reported a 30 percent rise in the 
number of couples inquiring about and initiating divorce proceedings 
from the beginning of that country’s lockdown in early March through 
to May.22 In Australia, the national information and mediation group, 
The Separation Guide, reported that the number of couples considering 
separation had increased 314 percent compared with the pre-lockdown 
period.23 In Japan, ‘coronavirus divorce’ has become a trending term during 
the pandemic and divorce rates have reportedly increased, with 35 percent 
of marriages ending in separation (at the time of reporting).24 In Saudi 
Arabia during the lockdown, the divorce rate had increased by 30 percent 
in February from the same period last year.25 In China, national divorce 
statistics are not yet available as official data are released yearly. However, 
various media reports suggest that inquiries about separation and divorce 
rates have been climbing, especially since the lockdown period. 
In one case, a woman from Lingshi county, in northern China’s 
Shanxi province, committed suicide on 9 March after writing on Weibo 
a few hours earlier: ‘I always felt domestic violence was far away from me, 



























































spirit is completely broken.’26 This incident suggests that the pressures of 
lockdown and isolation have resulted in an increase in domestic violence, 
which has extended to women who may not have experienced it in the past.
According to Wan Fei 万飞, a retired police officer and founder of 
the Under the Blue Sky Association for the Protection of Women’s and 
Children’s Rights 蓝天下妇女儿童维权协会, an anti–domestic violence 
organisation from Jingzhou in Hubei province, 90 percent of domestic 
violence incidents reported in January and February 2020 were related 
to the COVID-19 epidemic.27 He said the domestic violence calls received 
by the local police bureau in Jingzhou’s Jianli county 监利县 doubled 
in January and had more than tripled from 47 to 162 cases in February 
compared with the same period last year. Men were the perpetrators in 
97.4 percent of the cases and women were the victims in 94.7 percent.28 
The cause of the increase in violence can be attributed to people’s fear and 
anxiety about the extended quarantine, financial stress on households, as 
well as weakened support systems for survivors of domestic violence.29 
The divorce rate in Wuhan reportedly doubled after the lockdown 
was lifted.30 There were also record highs in divorce filings in other places, 
including Xi’an, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Dazhou in Sichuan province and 
Miluo in Hunan province.31 Some of this was due to couples who had 
intended to file for divorce before COVID-19 hit, but put it off because of 
the lockdown.32 Other factors reportedly included disagreements over the 
Lockdown in Chongqing
Source: Gauthier DELECROIX - 
郭天, Flickr
sharing of responsibility for childcare and housework, disagreements 
about mask wearing or simply having to spend so much time in each 
other’s company. 
One could easily blame COVID-19 for both the ‘shadow pandemic’ 
and the increasing divorce rates. I believe, however, that the pandemic 
has simply drawn public attention to pre-existing — but now magnified 
— domestic violence, while also magnifying existing problems 
within marriages.
Statistics released by All China Women’s Federation in 2015 showed 
that 30 percent of married women in China’s 270 million households 
had experienced domestic violence (in comparison, on average, one in 
six women has experienced physical or sexual violence by an intimate 
partner in Australia and one in four of that in the United States);33 while 
70 percent of male perpetrators abused both their wives and their children 
physically.34 Of the 157,000 women who committed suicide each year, on 
average, 60 percent had experienced domestic violence.35 The statistics 
also showed that one Chinese woman suffers domestic violence every 
7.4 seconds. On average, a woman will suffer thirty-five incidents of 
domestic violence before reporting it to the police.36 
The statistics suggest three things. First, many women do not enjoy 
equal status with men within their household, despite the Chinese 
government’s efforts to promote gender equality through legislative 
reforms and various social policies and measures. Such inequality is 
enhanced by the growing incidence of ‘mistress keeping’ 包二奶 by Chinese 
men, along with the growth of private investigation services specialising 
in tackling this issue.37 Second, in the absence of clear and widespread 
government and media messaging to the contrary, many women see 
domestic violence as normal marital behaviour, believing doctrines such 
as ‘Do not wash your dirty linen in public’ 家丑不可外扬 and ‘Couples 
fight at the head of the bed and compromise at the end of it’ 夫妻床头打
架床尾和. Many also see domestic violence as punishment for something 



























































anti–domestic violence law, enacted in March 2016, has been compromised 
by prevalent judicial mediation aimed at ‘saving the marital relationship’ 
and ‘maintaining social harmony’.38 
Data released by China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) reveal that, 
in 1978, 285,000 couples registered for a divorce; in 2012, the figure was 
more than 3.1 million, and it was 4.15 million in 2019.39 According to Zhou 
Qiang, 周强, president of the Supreme People’s Court, in seven cases out of 
ten, it is the woman who initiates a divorce.40 
The National People’s Congress passed the long-awaited Civil Code 
民法典 on 28 May 2020.41 Among other provisions concerning property 
rights, inheritance, contracts, and so on, the new law, to take effect on 
1 January 2021, introduced a thirty-day ‘cooling-off period for divorce’ 
离婚冷静期 to encourage couples to reconsider — reinforcing its 
mediation-oriented approach to conjugal disputes. This clause stirred 
an open discussion online about the state’s interference in private 
relationships and raised concerns about the protection of women’s rights. 
Fortunately, the ‘cooling-off period’ does not apply where there has been a 
history of domestic violence or extramarital affairs. However, as one needs 
to provide evidence to file for divorce on the grounds of domestic violence, 
this makes it very difficult for women to win their divorce case. This was 
evident in the case of ‘Liu’ (full name not provided), a woman from Henan 
province whose divorce request was denied by the local court despite her 
presenting medical documents to prove her injuries, which included her 
being paralysed when trying to jump from a second-storey window to 
escape her abusive husband. Liu was told by local police that her paralysis 
was a result of her ‘attempted suicide’ rather than domestic violence.42
A policy enacted by the local government of Jinan, Shandong province, 
in response to the coronavirus outbreak sparked a similar controversy. On 
8 February, after schools were closed during lockdown, education officials 
in Jinan suggested that in families with small children where both parents 
were employed, women should take the initiative to apply for leave to 
care for the children.43 Many people called the policy sexist and accused 
the government of reinforcing existing 
patriarchal norms and gender inequities 
in the job market — that is, in employment 
opportunities, recruitment processes, and the 
unequal payment between men and women. 
One netizen commented on Weibo: ‘Is it your 
business who takes care of the kids at home? 
Why does it have to be women? Every family 
can make their own arrangements.’ Another 
noted: ‘We’re not refusing to look after the 
children at home because we’re feminists. 
We just need the government and society 
to treat men and women equally, and not 
to use this kind of gender-biased language.’44 Others pointed out that the 
policy was also biased against men who preferred to be the one to look 
after the children.
The call for a traditional division of domestic labour is consistent with 
gender education campaigns in recent years under President Xi. These 
campaigns reinforce the idea of ‘traditional family values’ as being crucial 
for familial harmony and social stability and thus achieving the China Dream 
itself.45 They are behind training programs aimed at cultivating feminine 
virtues and fostering masculinity, such as the New Era Women’s School 镇
江新时代女子学堂 run by a college in Zhenjiang, in southern China. The 
school teaches female students how to behave ‘like a woman’ through 
studying Chinese history and cultural etiquette such as the correct way of 
pouring tea, using ‘the right amount of make-up’ and sitting ‘with [their] 
bellies held in and legs together’.46 At the same time, boys are encouraged 
to join boot camps teaching them how to act like ‘a real man’: confident, 
diligent and equipped to ‘pick up the steel gun’ to safeguard the nation.47 
Military-style programs are designed to tackle the supposed ‘masculinity 
crisis’ that first emerged in the 1980s in which young men have become 
‘feminised’, lack confidence and are without ambition; and continued 





























































in the new millennium that saw more and more boys model their looks 
and behaviour on the popular teenage bands made up of ‘little fresh meat’ 
小鲜肉 — young, good-looking males who are well-groomed and with 
feminine facial features. 
Seeing Female Workers, Respecting Women’s 
Choices, and Empowering Women
From the end of February, the hashtag #SeeingFemaleWorkers 看见女
性劳动者 went viral on Weibo (with 630 million reads and 901,000 users 
joining the discussion until 22 July), calling for the recognition of women’s 
contribution during the pandemic.48 One netizen who used the hashtag 
commented: ‘Women really have held up this fight against the epidemic.’ 
Another wrote: ‘I didn’t have a sense of it before, but I’m starting to admire 
female comrades more and more!’49 The hashtag led to a wider call for 
recognition of women’s contribution to society, including that of women 
teachers, police, drivers, and other professionals.
The struggle for women’s rights was reignited on another front in 
2020 by a comment on Douyin (the Chinese TikTok) about the ‘child-free 
lifestyle’ of revered dancer Yang Liping 杨丽萍 (who is known as the 
‘Peacock Princess’ after one of her most famous dances).50 A female netizen 
accused the 61-year-old artist of having ‘failed as a woman’ because she 
had never had children. The Douyin video had received more than 11,000 
likes by 8 June. On Weibo, where it also circulated, the majority opinion 
was in support of Yang. One person wrote: ‘A sow has the happiness of 
a sow, a peacock has the happiness of a peacock. The problem of the sow 
is that it very stupidly insists that its [kind of] happiness suits the peacock 
as well.’ Another asserted that reproductive choices were ‘an individual 
right’.51 Chinese celebrities including actress Li Ruotong 李若彤, singer 
and actress Qi Wei 戚薇, and actress Chen Shu 陈数 weighed in, urging 
people not to define or judge women based on their reproductive choices. 
Following the attack on Yang, 41-year-old Chinese actress Qin Lan 秦岚 
was asked about her marriage plans in an 
interview; she responded: ‘Some people 
even say that it’s women’s obligation to 
bear children. To them I want to say, it’s 
none of your business if I use my uterus or 
not.’52    This stirred another wave of debate 
on the Internet.
The conversation about women’s 
choices around marriage and childbearing 
will likely continue as more and more 
women in China choose to postpone 
marriage and not have children. Statistics 
from the MCA show the country’s 
marriage rates have been in decline for 
five consecutive years, from 9.9 per 1,000 
persons in 2013 to 7.3 per 1,000 persons in 2018. People are also marrying 
later, with the highest number of marriage registrations before 2012 
among those aged between twenty and twenty-four years, while in 2018 
those aged between twenty-five and twenty-nine made up the majority.53 
Data from the National Bureau of Statistics show that China’s birth rate 
has been in decline as well, dropping year on year to reach 0.48 per 100 
people in 2019 — the lowest since 1949.54 
China’s video-streaming show Sisters Who Make Waves 乘风破浪的
姐姐 debuted in June on Mango TV, sparking discussion about women 
and ageing. The show features thirty ‘middle-aged’ female celebrities 
(with an average age of thirty-five-plus), such as fifty-two-year-old singer 
Yi Nengjing 伊能静, forty-eight-year-old actress Ning Jing 宁静, and thirty-
seven-year-old actress Huang Shengyi 黄圣依, showcasing their talent on 
stage and competing for limited spots to form an idol group. While some 
viewers believe this show has empowered ‘old girls’ and broken the 
link between women’s value/beauty and being ‘young, slim and sweet’, 
others have argued that the show fails to address the real issues faced 





























































by women and tells women that they must be ‘young and beautiful to 
make a new start’.55 Whether the show empowers or stereotypes women 
remains controversial. 
Another noteworthy action centred on Chinese women was the #‘Rice 
Bunny’ 米兔 campaign,56 which was part of the global #MeToo movement 
that started in 2018. Although censored by the government, the movement 
has raised awareness of the protection of women’s rights and inspired 
many Chinese women to speak out against sexual assault. This movement 
has had some success in China — marked by the country’s first successful 
prosecution for sexual harassment in July 2020. This resulted in a Chinese 
court’s decision to order Liu, the sexual offender and director-general of 
a non-profit organisation in Sichuan province, to apologise to ‘Xiao Li’ 
(a pseudonym), who is a prosecutor and a social worker57 — a success for 
collective efforts in advancing Chinese women’s rights. 
Overall, between the domestic crisis engendered by the pandemic, 
the divorce provisions of the new civil law and the debate around having 
children, 2020 was a year that exposed both ongoing struggles and new 
challenges for Chinese women. These include unequal social and gender 
relations that have been institutionalised in a nation in which no woman 
has ever taken the top position in the Party or state, few have served in 
the Politburo and none in the powerful Politburo Standing Committee. 
There are also fewer employment opportunities (especially good jobs) 
Chinese reality 
television show: 
Sisters Who Make 
Waves 
Source: Mango Tv
for women and the gender pay gap between men and women continues 
in the job market.58 And yet, under President Xi, overt feminist activism 
has never been tolerated, and terms such as ‘feminism’ and ‘me too’ are 
considered ‘sensitive’ and subject to censorship. Rising consciousness is 




































The Language of Trust 



































BY MID-FEBRUARY 2020, Yulha’s family was running low on 
perishable food.1 Her village, in 
the mountainous Tibetan region of 
Rnga ba prefecture, western Sichuan 
province, had already been in 
lockdown for a month. Every morning, 
her family woke the young woman to 
check social media and tell them the 
latest statistics: How many infected? 
How many dead? 
We are all now familiar with some 
variant of this anxious routine, but 
what made Yulha’s experience special 
was the reason her family relied on 
her for the news. They are among the 
approximately 10,000 Tibetans who 
speak the Khroskyabs language and 
there was almost no information about 
the epidemic in their language. And so 
Yulha, whose Chinese was the best in 
the family, had to translate for them. 
News of the epidemic and crucial 
public health information, spread 
through Tibet via a network of informal, 
community-based translators like 
Yulha, in person and on social media.2 
There were no official translations of 
even vital public health information 
available in minority languages 
like Khroskyabs. Policymakers 
and administrators recognise only 
a single Tibetan language, based on 
the written standard.3 
In fact, most of the languages of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are 
invisible to, or considered irrelevant 
by, its policymakers.4 Although the 
constitution guarantees everyone the 
freedom to use their native language, 




































has not kept pace with the expansion 
of linguistic knowledge. Instead of 
monitoring the number of languages 
that people in China actually speak, the 
Party-State keeps meticulous records 
on the number of people who speak 
the national language, Putonghua, and 
sets targets to drive this number up. 
This national language did not 
exist at the start of the twentieth 
century. Linguist David Moser has 
described Putonghua as ‘an artificially 
constructed hybrid form, a linguistic 
patchwork of compromises based 
upon expediency, history, and 
politics’.8 Although based in part 
on the Mandarin of north-eastern 
China, Putonghua had a total of zero 
speakers at the start of the previous 
century. It only came to be spoken by 
in practice, the government relies 
on an informal policy of recognising 
only one language for each of China’s 
‘nationalities’ (including the Han 
majority and the country’s fifty-five 
‘minority nationalities’); in contrast, 
linguists identify between 129 and 293 
languages in total.5 So, beyond the fifty-
six formally recognised languages, 
most languages in China are demoted 
to the status of dialects. 
Linguists in China were once 
actively discouraged from identifying 
languages beyond those officially 
recognised by the state.6 This started to 
change in the 1990s, with the launch of 
a publication series titled New Found 
Minority Languages in China, edited 
by Sun Hongkai 孙宏开, one of China’s 
leading linguists.7 However, policy 
Propaganda on a wall in a kindergarten in Shanghai promotes speaking Standard Modern Chinese 
(Putonghua): ‘Let’s all speak Putonghua and standardise speech and spelling’ 
Source: Wikimedia
a majority of the Chinese population 
(53 percent) as recently as 2007.9 By 
2015, this number had been raised 
to 70 percent, and a target was set to 
reach 80 percent by 2020.10 
This increase in numbers has 
been supported by the special place 
given to Putonghua in China’s laws: it 
is the only language that is specifically 
named in national-level law and the 
only language that anyone in China 
is legally obliged to use or learn.11 In 
contrast, the use of minority languages 
is ‘desirable rather than mandatory’,12 
and languages such as Khroskyabs, 
which are considered dialects, are 
mostly excluded from the rights and 
obligations of China’s language laws. 
The Party sees the promotion of 
Putonghua as the solution to a wide 
variety of ills in China. For example, 
it was a key element in the drive to 
eliminate poverty by 2020. In 2018, 
the Ministry of Education, the Poverty 
Relief Office of the State Council and 
the State Language Commission jointly 
released a three-year ‘action plan’ 
to increase Putonghua proficiency 
among China’s poorest citizens.13 
This was because Putonghua is seen 
as the key to participation in both 
education and the economy, with 
integration and prosperity supposedly 
going hand-in-hand. 
The promotion of Putonghua 
has also been a central focus in the 
‘re-education’ camps of Xinjiang, where 
up to a million people, mostly Uyghurs, 
have been detained. A Uyghur woman 
who taught in one of the re-education 
camps described these ‘educational’ 
facilities to researcher Ruth Ingram 
in 2020: ‘students’ chained hand and 
foot, ‘classrooms’ with closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) cameras and meals 
of watery gruel.14 The promotion of 
Putonghua inside the camps occurs 
in tandem with the suppression of 
mother-tongue education outside — 
two aspects of a broader program of 
political repression. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has 
revealed crucial shortcomings in 
the Party’s approach of promoting 
Putonghua as a magic bullet, whether 
for poverty alleviation or national unity. 
In Hubei province, for example, officials 
realised that unless they used local 
dialects, they could not ensure clear and 
effective communication on important 
public health issues. They mobilised 



































ensure that information was available 
and comprehensible to everyone in 
languages they understood.15 
Such efforts were constrained, 
however, by the state’s refusal to 
recognise the majority of languages 
spoken in the country. Most of the 
public health translation work carried 
out during the pandemic was done 
unofficially, at the grassroots level 
by people like Yulha. Meanwhile, on 
social media, a range of ‘influencers’, 
including ‘cartoonists, poets, singers, 
calligraphers, [and] writers’, made 
public health information available to 
their audiences in the language they 
understood best. In Inner Mongolia, 
some influencers were so effective 
in spreading the message about the 
pandemic that state media co-opted 
and reused their content.16 
Tibetan alphabet 
Source: Sina
In a crisis like the COVID-19 
pandemic, there are serious 
implications of the state’s failure 
to adequately recognise linguistic 
diversity and provide public health 
information in the languages that 
people know and use. These include 
people being misinformed about 
what is happening and unclear about 
instructions to protect their health, 
thereby putting themselves and their 
communities at risk. 
Even more important than the 
clarity and accuracy of information is 
the issue of trust. People tend to trust 
information they receive from a source 
they consider reliable, which often 
requires it to be in a language that is 
most familiar.17 That sense of trust in 
turn influences how any individual 
acts on information they receive. 
In a pandemic, that, too, can have 
significant consequences not only for 
the individual’s own health, but also 
for that of the broader population.
In Tibet, the experience of the 
SARS epidemic suggests that Tibetans 
did not trust information they 
received in the language of the state. 
Anthropologist Beth Meriam describes 
how Tibetans in Qinghai province 
responded with a mixture of distrust 
and cynicism to the state’s efforts to 
control the disease and spread public 
health information. Instead, they 
reached out for what was familiar and 
comforting: their faith, their language, 
and their community.18 When 
rumours spread that the Dalai Lama 
was conducting an empowerment 
ritual to protect Tibetans from the 
disease, locals waited at the designated 
time with doors and windows open 
to receive his blessings. In the end, 
the epidemic served to further drive 
a wedge between local Tibetans and 
the state, undermining rather than 
building trust. 
Likewise, during the COVID-19 
pandemic, Tibetans — like people all 
across China — reached for languages 
they understood, which comforted 
them and that they trusted. Because 
Putonghua is the language of state 
and party propaganda, and is used 
in places like Tibet and Xinjiang as 
a tool of repression, it fails to be the 
































































THE CHINESE ECONOMY: CRISIS,
CONTROL, RECOVERY, REFOCUS
Jane Golley and James Laurenceson
Source: ChiralJon, Flickr
HEADING INTO 2020, the economy of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was weighed down by 
familiar challenges: adverse demographics, 
a heavy debt burden, falling productivity growth 
and more. Still, China was again set to outperform 
in the global economy. On 20 January, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected 
China’s economic growth in 2020 would sit at 
6 percent — a fraction less than the year before 
but more than triple the pace expected in 
advanced economies. It was also just within the 
New Normal rate of gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth of between 6 and 7 percent that has been 
the official target set by President Xi Jinping 习
近平 and Premier Li Keqiang 李克强 since 2014.1 
China’s outlook was also buoyed by the signing on 
15 January of a ‘phase one agreement’ on trade with 
the United States, which was viewed optimistically 
as a circuitbreaker for the tit-for-tat escalation in 






























































Yet by mid January, the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) 
was well under way in Wuhan. It was 23 January when the metropolis of 
11 million residents was locked down, with The New York Times observing 
that day that the virus had ‘cast a pall over growth prospects for the 
world’s second largest economy’.2 A ‘new abnormal’ era — albeit with 
some familiar echoes from the past — had begun.
Domestic Developments: Crash, Rebound
Early assessments of the damage inflicted on China’s economy by the 
pandemic were complicated by the fact that production had already 
begun shutting down for the annual Spring Festival break, originally 
scheduled for 24–30 January, but extended to 2 February ‘to strengthen 
the prevention and control of the novel coronavirus outbreak’.3 By the 
time work at offices and factories was officially allowed to restart, many 
restrictions on travel remained in place throughout the country — 
reportedly affecting around 500 million people.4 Real-time indicators of 
economic activity such as road congestion and electricity consumption, 
remained at a fraction of normal levels.5 On 29 February, the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) published its manufacturing Purchasing 
Managers’ Index (PMI) — a measure of factory activity. With 50.0 being 
the dividing line between month-on-month expansion and contraction, 
and also the value that was recorded in January, February’s reading of 
35.7 showed the fastest rate of collapse on record. The official index 
covering the services sector was even worse, falling from 54.1 to 29.6.6 
As the central authorities became increasingly impatient to get the 
economy moving again, local media reported that lower-level officials 
were meeting ‘back-to-work targets’ by instructing firms to power up 
idle equipment and turn on factory lights at night in an attempt to game 
performance measures by boosting electricity consumption.7 In the 
middle of March, the NBS announced that the official unemployment 
rate had jumped to 6.2 percent — the highest on record.8 But even this 
did not capture the millions of migrant workers who had not returned to 
the cities following the Spring Festival break, so the real unemployment 
rate was undoubtedly much higher. 
On 20 April, the NBS issued grim confirmation that the economy 
had shrunk by 9.8 percent in the first quarter compared with the last 
quarter of 2019, or 6.8 percent in year-on-year terms.9 In the first quarter 
of 2009, in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, the PRC’s year-on-
year growth rate slumped, but to a still-positive 6.4 percent, down from 
9.5 percent six months earlier. The effects of COVID-19 seemed to have 
taken the meaning of economic crisis to a new level.
From April, however, the economy picked up. By the time the IMF 
released its World Economic Outlook report in October, its forecast for 
China’s 2020 GDP growth had increased to 1.9 percent (compared with a 
June forecast of 0.8 percent). By contrast, the forecast for India had been 
downgraded to a contraction of –10.3 percent (more than double the 
already devastating –4.5 percent predicted in June); and the projection 
Map of the projected real GDP growth rate in 2020 of countries in the International Monetary Fund’s World 
Economic Outlook (April 2020). Green colour indicates improvements and red indicates deteriorations; the 































































for the US was –4.4 percent. Indeed, by October, China was the world’s 
only major economy projected to record positive growth in the year.10 
This feat was confirmed — according to official data at least — with the 
NBS reporting in January 2021 that China’s economy had expanded by 
2.3 percent in 2020.
How did China manage to perform so well while the global economy 
was crumbling? Emergency government interventions played a big role 
initially. The most prominent of these was the RMB 3.6 trillion (US$500 
billion) fiscal stimulus announced in May — the equivalent of 4.5 percent 
of Chinese GDP — taking the country’s budget deficit to 3.6 percent of 
GDP, above the longstanding ceiling of 3 percent.11 The stimulus followed 
the familiar playbook of primarily targeting investment in infrastructure 
(as discussed in Chapter 5, ‘China’s Post-COVID-19 Stimulus: Dark Clouds, 
Green Lining’, pp.139–153) and property development, while Chinese 
households by and large received no direct support. This was evident in 
China’s second quarter GDP growth rate of 3.2 percent (year-on-year), 
to which investment added 5 percent while consumption subtracted 
2.3 percent.12 
Premier Li’s declared 




Supporting a more organic economic recovery from April was the fact 
that China managed to get the public health crisis under control, allowing 
restaurants and retail outlets to join factories in reopening their doors. 
But a stalled agenda for economic reform undermined the sustainability 
of China’s continued growth. The Asia Society’s China Dashboard, which 
tracks the progress of economic reforms across ten domains, revealed that, 
during the first six months of 2020, only two of these domains (land and 
state-owned enterprises) showed minor improvements, with downgraded 
assessments for competition, the financial system, innovation and labour, 
and stagnation for the remaining four: cross-border investment, the 
environment, fiscal affairs, and trade.13
Labour was hit the hardest, with evidence that all labour indicators 
— including unemployment rates, migrant wages, and job creation — 
‘deteriorated and are now in unchartered territory as policies failed to 
support workers during the pandemic’. One of the only vaguely positive 
signs in the mix was Premier Li’s declaration in June that street vendors 
represented the ‘livelihood of China’, and he encouraged them to ‘come 
alive, survive, and develop’. Shortly thereafter, at least twenty-seven 
cities, including Shanghai (but not Beijing), began to bring back street 
vending, contrasting starkly with past crackdowns on street stalls in the 
name of ‘urban beautification’.14
All this was despite the fact that, in April and May, Beijing announced 
two sets of guidelines, on ‘making market mechanisms more important’ 
and ‘speeding up the improvement of the socialist market economic 
system in a new era’.15 These guidelines implicitly recognised that the 
ambitious reform agenda to which the Third Plenum of the Central 
Committee back in 2013 had committed (see the China Story Yearbook 
2014: Shared Destiny, Chapter 1, ‘Great Expectations’, pp.21–37) had not 






























































The Party Leads All 
The Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
in October 2017 endorsed the writing into the Chinese Constitution of 
President Xi’s Four Confidences — in the path, theory, system, and culture 
of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (see Chapter 1, ‘The Construction 
of Political Superiority’, pp.13–21). He reiterated this formula in various 
speeches throughout 2020, as well as emphasising the centrality of the 
power of the Party, which was encapsulated in his now well-worn phrase: 
‘Party, government, army, society, and education — east and west, south, 
north and centre, the party leads all.’ 
This expression was first used by Mao Zedong in 1962, during 
a conference that ‘saw a broad pushback against Mao and his radical 
leftist policies’ following the Great Chinese Famine (1959–1961) that left 
tens of millions of people dead.16 Xi, like Mao, reportedly facing internal 
criticism, strengthened both his control over the Party and the Party’s 
control over most aspects of Chinese politics, economics, and society 
throughout 2020. In September, the Party ordered the United Front 
Work Department to work more closely with business to strengthen the 
government’s leadership role in the private sector, by ‘strengthening 
ideological guidance’ and ‘creating a core group of private sector leaders 
who can be relied on in critical times’.17 Neil Thomas from the Paulson 
Institute reminds us that, in Xi’s China, while ideology is framed as 
supporting ‘comprehensively deepening reform’, this reform is not 
always market-oriented. Rather, it can also be directed at enhanced 
‘governance’ with the ultimate goal being for the PRC ‘to escape the 
middle-income trap and achieve comprehensive national power’.18 
While some entrepreneurs may have found Xi’s commitment to doing 
‘better in promoting the healthy development of the private economy’ 
reassuring, especially after previous, less encouraging signals, it is 
unlikely they were comforted by his intention to ‘unify members of the 
private sector around the Party’.19 (See the China Story Yearbook: China 
Dreams, Forum, ‘Xi Jinping’s War 
on “Black and Evil” ’, pp.37–41.) 
A case in point is China’s richest 
man, Jack Ma 马云, who was worth 
US$61.1 billion in mid-November 
2020 according to Forbes’s 
‘real-time billionaire’ list.20 Ma, 
a longstanding member of the 
Communist Party, co-founder and 
former executive chairman of 
Alibaba and owner of its affiliate 
Ant Group, the world’s highest-
valued fintech company, was also 
ranked by Forbes as the twenty-first most powerful person in the world 
in 2018 (only two PRC citizens outranked him: President Xi at number 
one and Premier Li at number fifteen).21 In late October, Ant Group was 
poised for what was expected to be the world’s largest-ever initial public 
offering (IPO): a hotly anticipated dual listing in Hong Kong and Shanghai 
valued at US$30 billion. But then reports broke that Xi had personally 
halted the IPO. The immediate cause appeared to be a speech given by Ma 
in October in which he criticised global financial regulations. There was 
also speculation that Ma had pushed the limits of his personal power too 
far in recent times; Xi was ready to rein him in.
In times of crisis, the mechanisms the Chinese government has 
at hand for stimulating economic growth may be superior to those 
of liberal democracies, where there is no omnipotent central power 
that can make decisions without consultation. It is certainly easy to 
imagine that the events of 2020 confirmed for the CCP one of their basic 
tenets of faith, the ‘superiority of the socialist system’. Yet by clutching 
too tightly to the notion of a state-controlled economic system while 
clamping down on wealthy entrepreneurs and failing to provide for 
China’s richest man, Jack Ma






























































the country’s least privileged workers (numbering in the hundreds of 
millions), they may be sacrificing the sustained economic growth and 
social stability that Xi and his party crave in the longer term. 
The Global Economy: Conflict and Co-operation
The Sino-American ‘phase one agreement’ on trade may have paused 
the escalation of tariffs, but the relationship between the world’s two 
superpowers deteriorated in 2020 (as discussed in Chapter 7 of this 
volume). In April, Orville Schell wrote in a Foreign Policy article titled ‘The 
ugly end of Chimerica’: ‘The best hope is that the US and China remain 
in the foothills of a Cold War, and don’t ascend to its heights.’22 While not 
everyone accepts that a new Cold War has begun, in 2020, both the US 
and China increasingly pursued their conflicting geopolitical objectives 
by using economic tools to punish or reward: the US focusing its efforts 
on China; China focusing its own ‘geoeconomic’ proclivities elsewhere. 
Chinese companies and individuals continued to suffer under 
trade restrictions, with President Trump seeming to pick his targets at 
random, from WeChat and TikTok to the possible delisting of Alibaba. He 
introduced new restrictions on Chinese researchers and students in the 
US and imposed sanctions on fourteen PRC officials for their connection 
to the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong. Perhaps no company felt 
the heat more keenly than Huawei, when in August, the US government 
announced that any foreign companies using US technology to supply 
Huawei with the semiconductor chips required for its smartphones 
and 5G equipment would have to apply for a special licence. Fortune 
magazine observed that, should these licences be denied, it would 
amount to a ‘death sentence’ for the tech giant.23
Overwhelmingly, however, Trump’s tariffs on Chinese goods were 
being paid by American consumers, adding between several hundred 
and one thousand dollars to average annual household expenses.24 
Retaliation by Beijing also saw the average tariff rate on US imports 
climb to 25.9 percent by the beginning of 2020, up from 8.0 percent two 
years earlier; at the same time, China was cutting tariffs on imports 
from other countries.25 
The ‘phase one agreement’ struggled to deliver the volume of 
additional US exports Trump promised it would. In October, Chad 
Bown from the Peterson Institute for International Economics found 
that, through the first three quarters of 2020, China had reached only 
53 percent of its target purchases of US exports for the full year; Chinese 
imports of US goods were ‘lower than they were before Trump started 
his trade war’ in 2018.26 That same month, Reuters reported that some 
3,500 US companies, including Tesla, Ford, Target, and Home Depot, were 
suing the Trump administration over the US$300 billion tariffs imposed 
on Chinese imports — a revealing sign of the internal damage Trump 
inflicted via his ‘punishments’ of China.27 
Geopolitical tensions and the economic damage caused by the 
pandemic had a more mixed impact on capital flows. In the first half 
of 2020, direct and venture capital investment between the US and 
China fell to its lowest point since 2011.28 Yet by October, the Financial 
Times was reporting that Beijing and Wall Street were ‘deepening 
ties despite geopolitical rivalry’, with US portfolio investment capital 
TikTok would face a complete 
ban if it did not sell to a US 
company by 14 November






























































pouring into Chinese government bonds, which paid much higher 
yields than American ones: 3.18 percent compared with 0.8 percent. As 
Cornell University’s Eswar Prasad explained: ‘Economic imperatives are 
certainly overriding political concerns. Ultimately, private capital and 
private financial institutions are going to respond more to economic 
incentives irrespective of what political masters say.’29 
Australia, meanwhile, was bracing itself from February for the 
knock-on economic effects of the pandemic on its most significant 
trading partner. On 27 February, Bloomberg published a feature with 
the headline ‘The world’s most China-reliant economy reels from 
virus shock waves’, adding that developments had ‘fuelled questions 
over whether the nation is too reliant on the Asian behemoth’.30 Some 
security and strategic analysts were quick to answer in the affirmative.31 
Economists, on the other hand, pointed to data suggesting that Australia’s 
trade exposure to China might turn out to be a strength rather than 
a weakness32 — or even a ‘blessing in disguise’.33 
The political relationship between Australia and China took 
a battering in 2020, with Australia targeted by Beijing for a series of 
‘geoeconomic punishments’34 (see Chapter 9, ‘Economic Power and 
Vulnerability in Sino-Australian Relations’, pp.259–274). Yet Australian 
trade with China showed resilience in aggregate. China accounted 
for 38.2 percent of Australia’s goods exports in 2019.35 By the end of 
2020, this share had risen to 40.0 percent, while the total value was 
Australian beef sold in a Chinese supermarket
Source: myzaker.com
down by only 2.1 percent on the same period a year earlier, which had 
represented a record high. Goods exports to all other countries were 
down by 9.9 percent.36 
This paints a slightly different picture than that commonly 
presented by media reports. These understandably focused on the 
ever-growing list of Australian export sectors and companies that were 
coming under pressure from China, with Beijing’s ‘plausible denial’ 
that the restrictions were not imposed for political reasons becoming 
increasing implausible. By year’s end, Australian wine, lobster, sugar, 
coal, timber, wool, barley, and copper ore were in the firing line, and 
the export value at risk was projected at AU$20 billion. While the 
macroeconomic consequences of a shock of this scale were limited 
— hence feeding into a picture of resilience in aggregate — there is 
no doubt these individual sectors suffered significantly and some 
individual firms suffered enormously. 
Beijing’s actions towards Australia sat uncomfortably alongside Xi’s 
claims that China would be a responsible, inclusive and co-operative global 
power in the face of the ‘indisputable reality’ of economic globalisation or, 
as he put it in his statement to the UN General Assembly in September 2020: 
We should see each other as members of the same big family, pursue 
win-win co-operation, rise above ideological disputes, and not fall 
into the trap of ‘clash of civilizations’ … . We should pursue open and 
inclusive development, remain committed to building an open world 
economy, and uphold the multilateral trading regime with the World 
Trade Organization as the cornerstone.37
Nonetheless, in some areas, Xi lived up to his word. In November, fifteen 
countries in the Asia-Pacific — including China, Japan, Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and Australia — signed the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a major trade agreement 






























































a geopolitical (or geoeconomic) victory for China, signalling its capacity to 
step into the void left by Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership back in 2017. A Peterson Institute for International Economics 
working paper concluded that lower trade costs, especially among China, 
Japan, and Korea, would ‘accelerate the decoupling of the East Asian and 
US economies’.38 
China further courted parts of the world that may have felt 
abandoned by Trump’s ‘America first’ policies both before and during 
the pandemic. It did this through the provision of foreign aid including 
donations of critical medical equipment. Critics have noted that there 
were problems with substandard equipment and the aid tended to flow 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
Photo: Wikimedia
to ‘friendly’ countries like Italy and Serbia, while neglecting supporters 
of Taiwan such as Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay.39 Yet its relief efforts 
across the globe were undeniably substantial, including 
A $20 million donation to the World Health Organization (WHO), 
sending doctors to Iran and Italy, building a Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(PCR) laboratory in Iraq to increase the country’s coronavirus testing 
capacity, donating test kits to the Philippines and sending protective 
equipment to Pakistan and France.40 
Beijing also agreed to participate in the G20’s Debt Service Suspension 
Initiative, delaying loan repayments to 77 low-income countries, alongside 
promising to build hospitals and send medical experts to countries across 
Africa — although the picture there was complicated. (See Forum, ‘Chinese 
Loans to Africa: Trap or Treasure?’, pp.243–246.) 
Xi’s Solutions: Self-Reliance and Dual Circulation
With the global economy collapsing around them and tensions with the 
US continuing to run hot, Chinese leaders became increasingly vocal 
about a pair of solutions with strong echoes of the past: ‘self-reliance’ 自力	
更生 and ‘dual circulation’ 双循环. Both concepts explicitly recognise new 
limits to the global interdependence that has propelled China to its current 
position as a global economic power — and to ‘Chimerica’ in particular.
‘Self-reliance’ is a term familiar from the Maoist era of command 
economic planning and is set to become so in the Xi era as well. As Xi 
stated during his tour of southern China in October, ‘we need to take the 
road of self-reliance on a higher level’.41 During this tour, and in speeches 
throughout the year, Xi emphasised the need for a greater reliance on 
domestic demand and for technological self-sufficiency to underpin ‘high-






























































These are two of the key prongs of Xi’s Dual Circulation Strategy, 
which came into focus in May, when he declared that China would 
‘fully develop the advantages of [the country’s] super-large market 
and the potential for domestic demand to establish a new development 
pattern featuring domestic and international dual circulations 
[双循环] that complement each other’.42 The Fourteenth Five-Year 
Plan (2021–2025), due for release in early 2021, should provide more 
detail. Dual circulation does not signal a fundamental shift in China’s 
development strategy. Rather, it builds on the ‘rebalancing’ strategy 
first introduced by then president Hu Jintao back in 2007, which 
(largely unsuccessfully) sought to reduce China’s reliance on export-
led growth and to boost domestic consumption.43 
The stakes are arguably far higher than they were previously, with 
Sino-American strategic rivalry unlikely to diminish under a Joe Biden 
presidency. Even past vocal advocates for greater economic engagement 
with the world, such as Yao Yang 姚洋	of Peking University, recognise 
that increasing ‘internal circulation’ is a necessary, if costly, response 
to the US administration’s determination to ‘punish China’s high-tech 
companies and other entities’.44 While acknowledging that ‘US moves 
to isolate China from the global technology supply chains have dealt 
a blow to the Chinese economy’, Yao insists, ‘this will not stop China’s rise’. 
The COVID-19 crisis may finally be easing but the debates it 
brought into sharper focus — about the role of state control versus 
market forces and individual freedom, international decoupling versus 
interdependence, and the best path to sustained economic growth — 
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IN FEBRUARY, at the height of the COVID-19 crisis in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), a young folk 
singer from Gansu province, Zhang 
Gasong 张尕怂, made a video that 
went viral. Singing and strumming his 
snakeskin-covered sanxian 三弦 (three-
stringed lute) with his bank card, an 
irrepressible, impish smile on his face, 
he sings in local dialect of all the things 
he would have done had he known his 
village would be put under lockdown, 
like stocking up on alcohol and fooling 
around with his girlfriend more. He 
would not have given his mah-jong set 
to a friend or spent 500 yuan getting 
his hair permed. The video ends with 
his grandmother approaching off 
screen and him breaking off the song 
to ask, with a sheepish grin, whether 
she liked it. The gentle humour and 
(apparently unscripted) surprise 
ending of ‘If I’d Known How Long 
I’d Be Stuck at Home’ 早知道在家呆	
这么久, filmed in Zhang’s rustic 
courtyard, was a humorous antidote 
to the nation’s anxieties. In June, the 
Beijing Daily 北京日报 interviewed 
Zhang about his music and sense of 
humour and the joy he had brought 
to so many people in lockdown with 
the song (as well as about the time 
he dislocated his jaw from laughing 
too hard).1 
Much of the humour that 
circulated on social media during the 
initial stages of the pandemic was, 
like the song, politically harmless, 

































acting as a circuit-breaker for tension, 
anger, and grief. People in lockdown 
in Wuhan posted videos of themselves 
fishing in their goldfish tanks, turning 
over boxed chocolates with cotton 
buds as though grilling snacks at 
a night market and showing hand 
puppets pretending to catch and eat 
passing cars.2 Jokes circulated in the 
form of memes, such as one purporting 
to explain social distancing and 
asymptomatic transmission: ‘If A has 
the coronavirus, and gives it to B, and B 
gives it to another B …’ — an elaborate 
setup for the punchline ‘Don’t be the 
2B’, which is rude northern slang 
loosely translatable as ‘moron’. 
The Beijing Daily interview did 
not mention another video by Zhang 
that also went viral before the censors 
got to it. ‘The Wuhan New Coronavirus 
Song’ 武汉新冠状病毒肺炎之歌, sung 
in the same courtyard with the same 
cheeky smile, offered a darker take 
on the crisis, noting that it was not 
funny that old people unable to buy 
masks were using orange peel instead, 
castigating the Red Cross for skimming 
off donations and keeping reporters 
away, and suggesting: ‘First wash your 
brain, then your hands and face’ 洗完
脑子勤洗手再洗把脸.3 
China’s long tradition of political 
satire stretches back to the Book of 
Odes 詩經 (compiled between 1000 
and 600 BCE), which contains verses 
such as one mocking the nobility for 
exploiting the labour of others: ‘You 
neither sow nor reap, so how do you 
fill so many bins with grain?’ 
The Republican-era writer and 
translator Lin Yutang 林語堂 (1895–
1976), who was the first to transliterate 
the English word ‘humour’ as youmo 
幽默 in the 1920s, once said that the 
goal of a journal to which both he and 
the great satirist Lu Xun 鲁迅 were 
contributors, Threads of Discourse 
語絲, was to ‘smash the “face” of 
“scholarly dignity” ’ and foster ‘healthy 
belligerence’.4  In ‘Funny, But Not 
Vulgar’ (1944), George Orwell wrote: 
‘A thing is funny when — in some 
way that is not actually offensive or 
China’s great satirist, Lu Xun 
Source: ryanhicks49, Flickr
frightening — it upsets the established 
order. Every joke is a tiny revolution.’ 
Humour, he wrote, was ‘dignity sitting 
on a tin-tack’; whatever ‘destroys 
dignity … is funny’.5 
President Xi Jinping 习近平 
and the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) generally take 
their dignity very seriously. After 
netizens light-heartedly compared a 
2013 photograph of Xi walking with 
then US president Barack Obama with 
an illustration of a plump Winnie 
the Pooh strolling with lanky Tigger, 
China’s censors scrubbed the Internet 
of all references to the fictional bear. 
After the American TV cartoon South 
Park satirised the ban, censors cleansed 
the Internet of any mention of South 
Park as well. The CCP’s war on humour 
extended to an official directive in 2014 
banning the use of puns and character 
play (both venerable forms of Chinese 
humour) in broadcasting and other 
media. In 2018, officials shuttered a 
jokes app called Neihan duanzi 内涵
段子 that had hundreds of millions of 
mainly working-class male followers, 
accusing it of ‘vulgarity’. 
Hu Yong 胡泳, a professor at Peking 
University’s School of Journalism and 
Communication and commentator 
on new media, has called humour ‘a 
natural form of encryption’.6 In March, 
as central authorities continued to 
shift responsibility for the outbreak of 
COVID-19 on to local officials, Li Jiabao 
李佳宝, the visionary, Shenyang-
born artist and ‘technologist’, filmed 
herself performing a sassy ‘Toss Pan 
Dance’ 甩锅舞 — a play on the Chinese 
slang ‘toss the pan (or wok)’, which 
means blame shifting or buck passing. 
Posting it on YouTube at the end of 
March, noting that it was a perfect 
form of exercise for quarantine, Li 
invited viewers to ‘inform, criticise, 
and warn’ others about problems of 
evaded responsibility while creating 
their own interpretations. The video 
was reposted on Chinese social media 
but a search on Weibo in August for 
Li Jiabao and ‘Toss Pan Dance’ (in 
Chinese) turned up nothing.
On the 101st anniversary of the 
1919 May Fourth Movement, Bilibili, a 
popular streaming platform, released 
a rather different sort of video. Titled 
‘Next Wave’, it was narrated by the 
fifty-two-year-old television actor He 
Bing 何冰, who lectures in earnest, 
pontifical tones to his elders that, in 
essence, the kids are all right. Over 
a pacey montage of young people 
travelling the world, skydiving, and 
































can buy, he tells Chinese youth that 
they are fortunate to have the ‘right 
to choose’ from life’s smorgasbord. 
He credits them with the fact that ‘the 
world likes Chinese people even more 
than ever’. 
The video landed on a nation 
still struggling with the effects of the 
pandemic on society and the economy, 
and in a world that demonstrably 
was ‘liking’ China less and less (see 
Chapter 6, ‘The Future Repeats 
Itself: COVID-19 and Its Historical 
Comorbidities’, pp.167–177). Although 
He Bing’s narration proclaimed satire 
a ‘tool of the weak’, the video brought 
satirists out in force. A video titled 
‘Waves of Garlic Chives’ 韭浪 parodied 
Bilibili itself for turning every kind 
of human experience into capital, via 
influencers and online marketeers. 
‘You may honestly believe that you’re 
lucky to be living in the present age,’ 
goes the narration, ‘but Capital knows 
that it is far more fortunate to make 
your acquaintance.’7 
In Hong Kong, political satire and 
humour grounded in the Cantonese 
dialect have long been a part of local 
culture — and one traditionally 
given free range. Humour enlivened 
the slogans and signs of the protest 
movement of 2019 and informed the 
response to the security law of 2020 by 
protesters, who, forbidden to express 
anything ‘subversive’, held up pieces 
of blank paper. 
The public broadcaster Radio 
Television Hong Kong (RTHK) 
furloughed the political comedy skit 
show Headliner 頭條新聞	 ahead of 
the law’s implementation. In annual 
surveys conducted by the University 
of Hong Kong, Headliner typically 
ranked among the top twenty most 
popular programs in Hong Kong. 
Writer-performer Tsang Chi-ho 曾志豪 
has called it a ‘pressure valve for Hong 
Kongers disillusioned with the political 
system’.8 But in March, after the 
show satirised police as having more 
personal protective equipment than 
medical staff, Police Commissioner 
Chris Tang alleged that continuing 
to broadcast the show would ‘lead to 
a loss of confidence in the force’ (a 
statement, considering the record of 
police brutality in 2019, itself ripe for 
satire). That appeared to be the last 
straw for a broadcaster increasingly 
under pressure to toe the official line. 
Hong Kong journalist Lee Yee 
李怡, writing about the end of 
Headliner, noted that those who wield 
power ‘fail to appreciate that satire 
is an outlet, a kind of social release 
valve that gives people a way of 
coping with their frustrations’.9 After 
the introduction of the security law 
prompted ‘yellow’ (pro-democracy) 
restaurants and other businesses in 
Hong Kong to take down now illegal 
images and slogans supporting the 
protests, some began putting up copies 
of Mao-era propaganda posters with 
slogans like ‘Revolution is no crime! 
To rebel is justified!’. As Lee Yee also 
observed, while the authorities are 
able to ‘ban a TV show or forbid 
satirical sketches, they can’t shut 
down the way the people of our city 
are really thinking and feeling’.10 Or, 
to borrow lyrics from another Zhang 
Gasong song: ‘People must all tell the 
truth. If you lie and deceive, wait for a 
brick to come your way’.11





















































AS THE CORONAVIRUS spread around the world in 2020, 
countries with significant Buddhist 
populations including Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar 
recorded not only very low infection 
rates, but also very few deaths. One 
reason seems to have been the fact 
that so much of the population is 
dispersed through the countryside 
rather than concentrated in big 
cities, making transmission less 
likely. However, some Buddhists have 
credited it to a faith that strongly 
inclines people towards caring for 
others and social co-operation for the 
common good. Working collectively 
for mutual benefit, many people in 
these communities united to cope 
with the crisis, strictly obeying rules 
such as mask wearing and social 
distancing. Transmission was also 
likely to be reduced by traditional 
Buddhist greetings like the Thai wai 
— pressing one’s palms together in 
front of the chest — which are more 
hygienic than handshakes.1 
In the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), although Buddhist temples 
were closed to the public as part of the 
society-wide lockdown, their clerics 
were active online, with the state’s 
blessing or at least the approval of the 
Buddhist Association of China (BAC), 
T H E  P O W E R  O F 
CO M PA S S I O N :  T H E 
B U D D H I S T  A P P R O A C H  TO 





















































a multilevel organisation under the 
State Administration of Religious 
Affairs. The BAC issued a number of 
directives on how Buddhist leaders 
should deal with the pandemic, 
including donating funds to 
organisations such as the Chinese 
Red Cross and offering prayers, but 
also guiding believers to steer clear 
of superstition.2 Many local Buddhist 
associations (such as the Buddhist 
Association of Shanghai and the 
Buddhist Association of Tianjin) and 
temples (including Tianning Temple 
天宁禅寺 in Changzhou, Jiangsu 
province, and Lingyin Temple 
灵隐寺 in Hangzhou, Zhejiang 
province), as well as individuals (such 
as Master Baohan 宝菡法师 from the 
Temple of Great Compassion 大悲禅
院 in Tianjin), have been recognised 
for making significant contributions 
to the cause. By mid-February, the 
BAC and the Buddhist temples in 
Beijing directly under it had raised 
more than 5 million yuan. With the 
help of other Buddhist organisations 
like the Lingshan Charity Foundation 
灵山慈善基金会, which looked after 
buying and distributing the goods, 
these funds were used to purchase 
masks, protective suits, ventilators, 
and other items needed in Hubei 
province, the epicentre of the 
epidemic in China at the time.3 
On 8 August, the independent 
Hong Kong Buddhist Association 
— the territory’s largest Buddhist 
organisation, whose charity work 
includes running nursing homes 
A slogan on the door of a temple in China: ‘The pandemic is an order, and to prevent and control it is a responsibility’ 
Source: Chinese National Religious Affairs Administration website
— asked all its members to pray in 
unison, for the pandemic in Hong 
Kong and elsewhere to be brought 
under control.4 It had also donated 
50,000 masks to grassroots employees 
in Hong Kong, including those in 
schools and nursing homes, at the 
beginning of 2020.5
Outside China, many Buddhist 
societies and individuals, such 
as Foo Hai Ch’an Monastery 福海	
禪寺 in Singapore, the International 
Buddhist Temple 國際佛教觀音寺 in 
Canada and the Chicago Chapter of 
Dharma Drum Mountain 法鼓山 — an 
international Buddhist organisation 
with its headquarters in Taiwan — as 
well as Master Chuanyin 傳印法師 
from the Seng Guan Temple 信願寺 in 
the Philippines, offered their support 
in various ways, including raising 
funds for medical and other charities. 
The power of meditation to promote 
health and calm anxiety emerged as a 
central focus of many Buddhist groups, 
with many temples and meditation 
centres providing resources such as 
virtual saṅgha (Buddhist communities 
of monks, nuns, and laypeople)6  and 
special guided online meditations for 
resilience and well-being.7
Two Taiwan-based Buddhist 
organisations were particularly 
active. One was the Tzu Chi 慈濟 
Foundation, whose activities include 
international fundraising and the 
provision of medical aid. Not long 
after a bushfire relief event organised 
in the wake of Australia’s own 
catastrophic start to 2020,8 the Tzu 
Chi Foundation’s Australian branch 
established COVID-19 Emergency 
Relief Assistance to help people who 
needed financial support but were not 
eligible for government assistance.9 
The other was the international Fo 
Guang Shan 佛光山, whose activities 
include medical clinics and child 
welfare services. At the beginning of 
the year, the organisation’s founder, 
Master Hsing Yun 星雲大師, offered 
a prayer for relief of suffering from 
COVID-19 and called on believers to 
recite the Heart Sutra 心經 together 
in an attempt to stop the epidemic.10 
The Nan Tien Temple 南天寺 — one 
of Fo Guang Shan’s branch temples, 
in Wollongong, Australia — held 
a prayer meeting on 1 February 
focused on bringing the pandemic to 
an early end.11
Buddhist theology emphasises 
the idea of ‘compassion’ 慈悲 or 悲 




















































in the Buddhist saying ‘great 
kindness without discrimination; 
great compassion based on sameness 
in essence’ 無緣大慈, 同體大悲. It 
is also fundamental to the spirit 
of a bodhisattva — a being who is 
motivated by ‘great compassion’ 
to achieve enlightenment and who 
postpones his or her enlightenment to 
save all other beings from suffering.12 
Buddhist activities to confront the 
coronavirus typically cited this idea. 
As the pandemic spread, the Buddhist 
Association of Hunan Province asked 
all Buddhist monks in the province 
to cultivate a bodhisattva’s spirit 
of compassion, feeling the pain of 
those who had suffered ‘as if it had 
happened to themselves’. Buddhists 
across Hunan province donated 
money and supplies totalling 500,000 
yuan in response to this call.13
In an article published on 
14 April, as the global number of 
COVID-19 cases climbed to nearly 
2 million, the Dalai Lama, Tibetan 
Buddhism’s spiritual leader, said: 
‘This crisis shows us that we are not 
separate from one another — even 
when we are living apart. Therefore, 
we all have a responsibility to 
exercise compassion and help.’14 He 
and other Tibetans living in exile in 
Dharamshala contributed money, 
protective equipment and food to 
pandemic relief efforts in India. 
Coinciding with this statement was 
a report that the Chinese state had used 
the coronavirus pandemic as a cover 
to further interfere in the private and 
devotional lives of Tibetans. While 
the Dalai Lama’s words received 
global coverage, in Tibet, people 
were reportedly detained simply for 
sending prayers on social media.15 
Across China, it is highly unlikely 
that the Dalai Lama’s message made 
it through the online censors’ ‘Great 
Firewall’. Yet compassion was central 
to believers’ approach to the crisis, in 
Tibet or elsewhere.
What do Buddhists expect to 
achieve with compassion in the 
context of a pandemic? As well as 
feeling sympathy for others in need 
and wanting to help them — core 
elements in the lay interpretation of 
compassion — Buddhist compassion 
evinces universal and unconditional 
kindness and pity, based on the idea 
that all living beings are the same in 
essence and share the same suffering. 
This can be traced to the Four Noble 
Truths (Sanskrit: catvāri ārya-satyāni), 
the Buddha’s first and most basic 
teaching.16 In Buddhist philosophy, all 
things in the phenomenal world are 
interconnected and interdependent. 
All sentient beings are equal and all 
suffer. Mental and physical suffering is 
due to ignorance of this and attachment 
to the view that things are permanent. 
Suffering can be eradicated by 
reaching enlightenment, which in turn 
entails compassion: the desire to free 
others from suffering.17 It works the 
other way around as well: by saving 
others from suffering, believers help 
themselves to attain enlightenment.
Two important Mahāyāna texts 
translated into Chinese — the Great 
Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom 
大智度論 (the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-
śāstra) and the Treatise on the Scripture 
of Adorning the Great Vehicle 大乘莊嚴
經論 (the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra) — 
explain the meaning of ‘great kindness 
and great compassion’ 大慈大悲 as 
bringing happiness to all sentient 
beings, and liberating all sentient 
beings from suffering or sharing the 
suffering of others 大慈與一切眾生樂, 
大悲拔一切眾生苦.18 
Miguel Ángel Moratinos, the High 
Representative for the United Nations 
Alliance of Civilisations, declared that 
the world should ‘draw inspiration 
from Buddha’s teachings’ to confront 
the COVID-19 pandemic. We should 
‘show kindness and compassion to the 





















































most vulnerable and truly leave no one 
behind as we face these turbulent and 
difficult times together’.19
Buddhist activities such as prayer 
and meditation have not ended the 
pandemic, but the charitable and 
compassionate contributions made by 
Buddhists the world over have been 
significant. They have also provided 
people with ways to alleviate their 
anxieties in confronting the COVID-19 
crisis, which has been accompanied 
by a worrying rise in mental health 
problems worldwide.20
Nan Tien Temple, Wollongong























































DARK CLOUDS, GREEN LINING1
Jorrit Gosens
Source: Hahaheditor12667, Wikimedia
THE BUDGETARY RESPONSE to the COVID-19 crisis 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — delayed 
until the end of May due to the postponement of 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) — sparked 
intense speculation about how it would deal with 
environmental issues and energy transitions. 
Following the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), the central government spent a massive 
sum of money on infrastructure projects, which 
consumed extraordinary amounts of steel and 
concrete, leading to strong increases in emissions 
of greenhouse gases. The construction boom also 
precipitated one of the worst episodes of local air 
pollution, the ‘airpocalypse’ that plagued the Beijing–
Tianjin–Hebei region in particular between 2011 
and 2014. In contrast, the new round of stimulus had 
the potential to accelerate China’s transition to clean 
energy, if investment was targeted at renewables, 




















































As it turned out, the 2020 stimulus package did not provide support for 
a massive new construction program, but neither did it provide support 
for clean energy industries. In recent years, there has been a slowing of 
China’s push for renewables. Investment in coal-fired power plants has 
continued on a large scale, and further accelerated in 2020. 
On 22 September, months after the worst of the COVID-crisis had 
passed in China, President Xi Jinping 习近平 announced to the UN 
General Assembly that China would aim to have carbon emissions 
peak before 2030, and reduced to zero by 2060.2 This ambitious plan 
makes keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees a much more realistic 
proposition. The suggested trajectory to get to zero by 2060, however, 
appears to put most of the hard work on hold until after 2030. 
The Initial Crisis Response: Priorities in a Time 
of Uncertainty
The NPC’s annual Government Work Report — roughly analogous to the 
State of the Union in the United States — was presented in 2020, as usual, 
at the opening of the Two Meetings: the NPC and the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC). For the first time since 1990, when 
an economic growth target was first announced, the latest Government 
Smog over Beijing’s 
Forbidden City 
Source: Brian Jeffery Beggerly, 
Flickr
Work Report did not set a 
target for gross domestic 
product (GDP). This means 
the politically weightier 
6.5 percent annual 
average growth target 
from the Thirteenth Five-
Year Plan period, which 
ended in 2020, was also 
abandoned. 
Premier Li Keqiang 
李克强, who delivered 
the report, explained that there was too much uncertainty about the 
pandemic’s effect on global economic activity and trade, making it all 
but impossible to set a reasonable growth target.3 But in China, growth 
targets are not so much forecasts as directives. The central government 
might therefore have worried that setting a target — for example, for 
6 percent growth — would have pushed provincial officials to aim for 
that target with little regard for long-term financial viability or the 
environmental consequences.
Li described the immediate priority as stabilising employment 
and protecting people’s livelihoods. He announced additional 
expenditure of 1 trillion RMB (about AU$200 billion), made available 
by raising the central government’s budget deficit from 2.8 percent to 
3.6 percent of GDP (see Table 1). Another trillion RMB would be raised 
through issuance of specific pandemic bonds. Local governments 
were instructed to use these 2 trillion RMB to support households 
and small businesses through employment protection and tax 
relief measures.4 
The budget reserved 600 billion RMB for construction projects 
— unchanged from 2019. The central government did increase its 
contribution to the national railway construction fund by 100 billion 
Premier of the State Council of China Li Keqiang 




















































yuan, to a total of 900 billion RMB. This limited increase in railway 
construction will not result in great increases to emissions, and 
investment in high-speed rail will reduce emissions over the lifetime of 
the project by providing a low-carbon alternative to short-haul flights. 
Support for households and small businesses cannot be said to have 
either positive or negative effects on the environment. Combined with 
spending on low-carbon transport, such support should help repair 
some of the economic damage caused by the pandemic without putting 
environmental goals at risk. So far, so good, but other elements of the 
recovery plan indicated that the central government prioritised the 
economy over the environment in the immediate crisis response.
The Government Work Report normally sets a national target for 
energy consumption, but that target was also omitted this year. The 
central government had previously committed to reducing energy 
intensity — the amount of energy used per unit of economic output — by 
15 percent between 2015 and 2020. By the end of 2019, energy intensity 
had fallen by 13.2 percent.5 By causing a contraction in services and 
other sectors with low energy intensity, however, the pandemic will 
make it hard to achieve the 15 percent target. The Government Work 
Table 1: China’s COVID-19 stimulus measures6 
Note: All values in RMB; 1 RMB was equivalent to AU$0.20 at the time of writing
China’s COVID-19 stimulus measures 
Item 2019 2020 Additional spending on stimulus
Central government budget deficit 2.8% 3.5% 1 trillion
Pandemic bonds -- 1 trillion 1 trillion
Construction project investment fund 600 billion 600 billion None
Railway construction fund 800 billion 900 billion 100 billion
Quota for ‘special bonds’ issued by local governments 2.15 trillion 3.75 trillion 1.6 trillion
Bank lending, status for the first six months 9.7 trillion 12.1 trillion 2.4 trillion
Report also neglected to set numeric targets for emissions of sulphur and 
nitrous oxides and other pollutants, asking only that they be reduced, 
whereas in 2019, for example, it called for them to fall by 3 percent. 
Although the stimulus budget does not earmark central government 
funds for large-scale construction, it gives lower-level governments more 
scope to spend, and there are indications that provincial governments 
may do so with little regard for the environmental consequences. Local 
governments in 2020 were permitted to issue an additional 1.6 trillion 
RMB in ‘special bonds’ 地方政府专项债券 compared with 2019 (see 
Table 1). These bonds must be repaid from the projects they finance, 
rather than general government budgets. They primarily fund 
infrastructure projects such as roads and railways, water conservation 
projects, and industrial parks, where tolls or other usage fees can 
go towards repayment.7 The central government has also eased the 
conditions for lending by financial institutions, generating a 2.4 trillion 
RMB boost to loans in the first six months of the year.8 Following the 
GFC, about half of such loans were used to finance infrastructure 
projects.9 Assuming the same share of increases in loans this year will 
be used similarly, combined with the money raised by the special bonds, 
this would mean that 2.8 trillion RMB will be invested in infrastructure 
projects. Though substantial, this is only slightly more than half the 






















































The State Council has, however, made it clear that it does not 
wish the stimulus to go towards ‘traditional’ infrastructure such as 
highways, bridges, and airports — projects that use large amounts of 
steel and concrete and support high-carbon modes of transport. In a 
meeting on 4 March, the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest 
leadership body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), stated that ‘new 
infrastructure construction’ 新型基础设施建设 was the preferred way 
of promoting economic growth following the pandemic.11 The very 
brief statement ‘to accelerate the construction of new infrastructure 
such as 5G networks and data centres’ immediately buoyed the stocks 
of relevant companies.12
The New Infrastructure concept also covers other technologies 
for digital transformation, such as artificial intelligence and the 
Industrial Internet of Things. Such investment would result in 
economic growth, but with far fewer emissions for every RMB spent 
than from traditional stimulus spending on bridges and highways. The 
concept further covers low-carbon energy technologies such as high-
speed rail and light rail transit, charging infrastructure for electric 
vehicles, and ultra-high-voltage (UHV) transmission lines to transfer 
renewable energy to China’s coastal provinces, which would reduce 
emissions with every RMB spent.13
Yet the central government did not specify that provincial and 
local governments had to spend their stimulus funds on these sorts of 
projects, unlike in the post-2008 stimulus budget, which clearly divided 
the funds into categories of projects for funding. One explanation may 
be that the central government is contributing proportionately far 
less this time. The post-2008 package was drawn roughly half and half 
from central and provincial budgets.14 The current package is nearly 
entirely funded by provincial and local governments (Table 1), which 
are likely to expect a greater say in how it’s spent. 
A Chinese Green New Deal? 
In other parts of the world, governments are using their recovery 
spending to accelerate transitions to clean energy and digital 
transformation. The European Union’s ‘Next Generation EU’ recovery 
package allocates hundreds of billions of Euros to renewables, clean 
hydrogen, and sustainable transport.15 Germany plans to spend 
more than one-third of its €130 billion stimulus package on ‘future 
technologies’, such as renewable energy, hydrogen, electric cars, and 
artificial intelligence.16 The Chinese central government, which wants to 
make the PRC competitive in these sectors, could have chosen to direct 
spending towards these industries. 
The state has extended purchase tax exemptions by two years 
for ‘new energy vehicles’ 新能源汽车 (electric vehicles and fuel-cell 
vehicles), but only as part of a measure seeking to prop up vehicle 
demand more generally.17 There are clear national-level roadmaps 
for expanding the charging infrastructure for electric vehicles,18 with 
90 billion RMB budgeted towards charging piles from 2020 to 2025.19 
The stimulus measures did not add to these investments, however, nor 
did the government decide to spend the six-year investment budget 
over the next two years, for example, in order to help with short-term 
economic recovery. 
The European Union, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
several other countries have recently published national hydrogen 
strategies. In China, there is interest in this, but policymakers remain 
undecided, mostly about the best financial support measures for such 
a strategy. Until now, it has mostly been local governments that have 
promoted the use of hydrogen, with a limited number of small pilot 
projects. Local governments and industry are unlikely to invest more 
in manufacturing fuel cells, fuel-cell vehicles, and hydrogen generation 




















































to be dragging its feet on a national and long-term support scheme. 
During the design phase of the pandemic recovery package, the national 
hydrogen strategy remained in the stage of discussion drafts only.20
Renewable energy options such as photovoltaics (PV) and wind 
power, meanwhile, did not rate a mention in the central government’s 
stimulus package. In 2009, the government introduced a feed-in tariff 
— a fee paid for each kilowatt hour of electricity that goes back into 
the grid — for producers of wind power and, in 2011, for producers of 
solar power (Figure 1). These were quite generous subsidies, especially 
after the cost of wind turbines and PV panels started to fall rapidly. 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has since 
reduced the feed-in tariff rates, at increasingly regular intervals 
(Figure 1). As elsewhere, the goal is ‘grid parity’, meaning that wind and 
solar would be as cheap as, or cheaper than, coal-fired power generation. 
The rapid reduction in subsidies has put financial pressure on 
developers of wind and PV farms, resulting in reduced growth in new 
wind-power plants and a rapid decline in new solar-power plants 
(Figure 2). Despite the disruption to construction of new solar farms 
because of the COVID-19 crisis and appeals from developers, the NDRC 
Figure 1: Chinese feed-in tariffs (RMB/kWh) for wind and solar PV, and the tariff for coal-fired power 
Note: The coal-fired power tariff is the weighted average of provincial-level tariffs. The tariffs for wind and PV vary because 
China provides more generous subsidies for areas with poorer wind or solar resources.22
followed through with its planned annual tariff reductions at the end 
of May, even slashing subsidies for household-scale PV by more than 
half.21 Many provincial governments have put additional wind-power 
construction on ice, as wind projects connected to the grid after the end 
of this year will not receive national-level subsidies, even if they had 
previously been approved to receive them.24 
The haste with which the government has reduced subsidies for 
wind and solar power reflects not just falling technology costs. Subsidies 
are paid through the Renewable Energy Development Fund 可再生	
能源发展基金, which is financed by a surcharge on each kilowatt hour 
of electricity sold. After subsidy payments exceeded the fund’s earnings 
from surcharges, the central government was forced to make up the 
shortfall. By the end of 2019, the renewable energy fund was heavily 




















































overdrawn — by some estimates, to the tune of a hefty 200–300 billion 
RMB.25 The new rules effectively put the financial onus on the owners 
of renewable energy projects, with subsidy payouts intended to make 
up the shortfall.26 Nervous investors are scrambling to sell renewable 
energy assets, fearing that subsidy payments will be delayed or 
never paid at all.27
Coal-Fired Power Gathering Steam
In late 2014, the central government decided it would hand the power to 
make decisions about the development of coal-fired power to provincial 
governments. This caused an immediate spike in new coal-fired power 
plants in 2015 (Figure 3). The NDRC introduced a ‘traffic light’ system 
shortly thereafter, with provinces given a red, yellow or green rating, telling 
them to stop, slow or continue as planned with construction of new coal-
fired power plants. The central government wants to limit construction 
in provinces where new power plants are considered to be superfluous. 
Worker holding up a piece of coal in front of a coal firing power plant in the Netherlands
Source: Adrem68, Wikimedia
The restrictions are primarily targeted at areas where existing capacity 
can already satisfy electricity demand, and where any new power plants 
will simply lead to lower levels of utilisation and therefore profitability.28 
The worry is that, once new plants are built, they will have to be kept 
running at levels high enough to recoup the investment in them. The 
‘traffic light’ system therefore aimed to prevent unnecessary emissions 
and the construction of new plants that would have to be closed only a few 
years after opening. 
The COVID-19 crisis appears to have made both the central and 
the provincial-level governments rethink this sensible policy. Large 
coal-fired power projects provide a quick boost in investment and job 
creation, and may help counter the economic slowdown, even if they 
have poor long-term financial prospects and put environmental targets 
at risk. After the NDRC relaxed restrictions on investment in coal-fired 
power projects in February, local authorities approved the construction 
of forty-eight gigawatts of coal-fired power plants by the end of May.29 
In comparison, only ten gigawatts were approved in 2019. China now 
has a total of ninety-eight gigawatts of coal-fired power plants under 
construction — similar to the entire operational capacity of those in 
Germany and Japan combined.30
Figure 3: Chinese newly installed capacity and average capacity factor of coal-fired power 
Note: Annual additions of coal-fired power (GW) except for 2020, where increases for the first six months are presented. 




















































The Path Towards Zero Carbon by 2060
China’s central government did not opt to make its 2020 stimulus package 
about high-carbon-emission construction projects, as it did in 2009. While 
that has averted a potentially massive increase in emissions, China’s 
stimulus investment did not amount to a Chinese Green New Deal either. 
When Xi Jinping’s announced a net-zero by 2060 target at the UN 
General Assembly on 22 September, this came as a surprise to most 
observers, who had seen deteriorating policy support for renewable 
energy in China in recent years. The announcement included a further 
pledge to have carbon emissions peak before 2030. Earlier pledges, 
including China’s ‘Nationally Determined Contribution’ (NDC) under the 
Paris agreement, were to have emissions peak ‘around 2030’.
It is difficult to overstate the relevance of China joining the club 
of countries with such net-zero pledges. The country consumes half 
the world’s coal, and emits 28 per cent of global carbon emissions. 
Chinese energy transitions therefore strongly determine global energy 
transitions. Although the accumulated global net-zero pledges still 
Figure 4: Historic and projected global carbon emissions 
Note: Existing net-zero pledges (by all other countries) and the Chinese net-zero pledge put the world closer to net-zero 
by 2050, a requirement to keep global warming ‘well below 2 degrees’. Source: IEA World Energy outlook 2020
fall short of an emissions trajectory compatible with limiting global 
warming to 1.5 degrees, China’s pledge puts the world much closer to 
such an outcome (Figure 4).
There are, however, many different trajectories to get to net-zero 
by 2060. A large consortium of Chinese research institutes presented 
possible scenarios in October, concluding that the goal would require 
renewable energy production to grow about 4.5 fold by 2050, compared 
to today. Simultaneously, this scenario leaves most of that growth to 
occur after 2030, with renewables growing at a pace comparable to what 
has been seen in the last few years until then. 
Carbon emissions, too, could keep growing slightly until just before 
2030, after which they would have to come down more rapidly (Figure 5). 
This trajectory, and the pledge to have emissions peak before 2030, are 
in fact not that drastically different from business-as-usual. Chinese GDP 
growth is forecast to weaken, and combined with historical reductions 
in emission intensity of GDP, this would lead to emissions plateauing at 
levels only slightly above current emissions. Bringing them down from 
that level requires enhanced policy support. 
Figure 5: Historic and projected carbon emissions for key countries 
Note: China’s emission path is a suggested trajectory to net-zero by 2060 from a consortium of influential research 




















































The Fourteenth Five-Year Plan will guide economic and energy 
sector development through to 2025. This plan, which will be formally 
announced in early 2021, needs to lock in sustainable lower emissions 
development pathways if China and the world are to achieve necessary 
climate change goals. What Beijing sets out to do over the next five years 
will have far greater ramifications for climate change than its immediate 
response to the COVID-19 crisis. 
The plan will also make clear whether Beijing will use the next five 
years to get a head-start on its future net-zero ambitions, or whether 
it will leave most of the hard work until after 2030. It is clear that the 
central government has committed itself to this long-term target. Now 
they will have to ensure that lower-level governments and state-owned 
enterprises follow suit. Beijing’s signalling of the new level of ambition 
may not be enough to prevent much of the current spending planned in 
fossil fuel infrastructure. 
A Fourteenth Five-Year Plan with strong renewable energy 
ambitions will do more to turn this trend. That could include a strong 
cap on coal-fire power installations, a nationwide roll-out of the carbon 
emission trading system which is currently in trial phases, power 
Beijing will use the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan period to get a head-start on its future net-zero ambitions
Source: Wikimedia
market reform to further promote the competitiveness of renewables, 
and strong research and development programs for less mature 
renewable technologies, such as concentrated solar power, energy 
storage, and using hydrogen in industrial processes for making steel or 
fertiliser. Any carbon emissions prevented now will do more to mitigate 
global warming than the same amount of emission reductions in ten 
years from now. 
The world is a step closer to limiting global warming with China’s 
pledge to reduce emissions to net-zero by 2060. In order to truly 
contribute to climate change mitigation, these long-term targets should 












































The Three Gorges Dam: A Deluge of 
Doubts 














































IN THE NORTHERN SUMMER of 2020, weeks of torrential rain 
caused a series of devastating floods 
across central and south-western 
China, killing hundreds of people and 
destroying the homes and livelihoods 
of millions. In August, during a 
tour of Anhui, one of the provinces 
ravaged by flood, President Xi Jinping 
习近平	made a speech, mouthing the 
usual platitudes:
Between ‘the Foolish Old Man Who 
Moved the Mountains’ [愚公移山] 
and ‘Yu the Great Who Harnessed 
the Flood’ [大禹治水], the Chinese 
nation has fought natural 
disasters for thousands of years, 
gaining precious experience. We 
will go on fighting.1 
Both the ‘Foolish Old Man’ and ‘Yu the 
Great’ 大禹	 are mythological figures 
frequently cited by Mao Zedong 毛
泽东	 during his mass mobilisation 
campaigns and monumental nature-
taming projects. The Foolish Old 
Man refers to the story of a ninety-
year-old man who was vexed by two 
giant mountains in front of his house 
and decided to level them, bucket by 
bucket. Told he would never succeed, 
he replied that his descendants would 
continue until they did. Yu the Great 
(c. 2200–2101 BCE) is said to have 
T H E  T H R E E  G O R G E S 
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‘controlled’ 治 the waters of China and 
went on to establish the oldest dynasty, 
the Xia (2200–1750 BCE).2 Both figures 
reflect a vision in which people must 
struggle against and conquer nature — 
a vision that Chinese environmentalists 
and engineers have been questioning 
since the 1980s. The natural disasters 
of 2020 — a record twenty-one floods 
by September, with 833 rivers rising 
above ‘warning levels’, and 267 of 
those reaching over official safety 
levels — have revived this debate and 
brought the monumental Three Gorges 
Dam under fresh scrutiny. 
‘East of Yichang! Run!’
The Three Gorges Dam, located in 
the city of Yichang, 300 kilometres 
west of Wuhan, is the world’s largest 
hydroelectric facility. It was designed 
for a maximum water level of 175 
metres. On 18 July, its water level 
reached 163.5 metres — the highest 
level recorded since the dam began 
operation in 2003.3 
Rumours of the dam’s imminent 
collapse filled the internet. One WeChat 
post warned: ‘East of Yichang! Run!’ 宜
昌以下快跑. Another post, playing on 
the literal meaning of Shanghai (‘on 
the sea’), read: ‘On the Sea Becomes 
Under the Sea’ 上海已变海上. 
State media assured the public 
that the dam was safe and had 
prevented the flooding of cities 
including Wuhan and Shanghai.4 But 
many were sceptical. Fan Xiao 范晓, 
a Chinese geologist and long-term 
critic of the dam, told the Hong Kong-
based Asia Times that, although ‘the 
dam was designed with “once-every-
A riverside pavilion on the bank of the Yangtze in Wuhan is submerged
Photo: Xiaoyijiu, xinhuanet
two-century worst-case flooding” in 
mind’, it was failing in the face of a 
deluge ‘far less severe than its worst-
case design parameters’.5
The Dream of Becoming Yu the Great
Since Yu the Great, the ability to 
harness rivers for flood control, 
irrigation and navigation has been 
upheld as an essential task for every 
ruler of China. In 1919, Sun Yat-sen 孫
中山 (1866–1925), father of the modern 
Chinese nation, envisioned a new 
and industrialised China powered 
by a great dam on the Yangtze River. 
In the 1940s, Sun’s successor, Chiang 
Kai-shek 蔣介石, invited the American 
engineer John L. Savage — designer 
of the Hoover Dam — to survey the 
region and conduct a feasibility study. 
In 1956, Mao Zedong characteristically 
announced his vision of the dam in 
a poem, rhapsodising about ‘walls 
of stone standing upstream’ and 
‘a smooth lake rising in the 
deep gorges’.6  
Many believed Mao gave up 
his dream because of the economic 
failures of the Great Leap Forward 
and the social upheaval of the Cultural 
Revolution. The truth is, according 
to Mao’s former secretary Li Rui 
李锐 (1917–2019), Mao only 
abandoned his plan on account 
of rising tensions with the Soviet 
Union, which he feared might try 
to bomb the dam.7 Mao’s second 
in command, premier Zhou Enlai 
周恩来, remained supportive of the 
dam, pushing engineers to break 
ground on the Gezhouba Dam 葛洲坝, 
thirty-eight kilometres downstream 
from the current Three Gorges Dam, 
in time for Mao’s seventy-seventh 
birthday in 1970. The project proved 
expensive, inefficient, and polluting, 
endangering both river whitefin 
dolphins and the rare Yangtze 
River sturgeon.8
In the post-1978 Reform Era, Deng 
Xiaoping 邓小平 also pushed to build 
the Three Gorges Dam, believing in its 
abilities to curb floods and generate 
energy. However, Deng faced strong 
opposition from some of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s most senior 
members, all of whom were scientists 
and engineers by training. Their 
concerns appeared in a book of essays 
titled Yangtze! Yangtze! published 
in February 1989. This book, edited 
by journalist and environmentalist 
Dai Qing 戴晴, was seen at the time 
as ‘a watershed event … the first use 














































intellectuals and public figures to 
influence the governmental decision-
making process’.9
In the aftermath of the military 
crackdown on student protesters on 
4 June 1989, Dai Qing was imprisoned 
without trial and her associates 
purged. Public debate on the Three 
Gorges Dam was effectively silenced. 
Three years later, in 1992, the Seventh 
National People’s Congress (NPC) 
passed the proposal to construct the 
Three Gorges Dam by the smallest 
margin of any vote in the history of 
the NPC: 1,767 voted in favour, 177 
against, and 664 abstained.10 
Many believed that the final push 
to build the dam came from Jiang 
Zemin 江泽民 and Li Peng 李鹏, who 
trotted out the project for their own 
political and economic gain. Ascending 
to power after 4 June 1989, Jiang’s first 
ever visit as the new Party general 
secretary and president was to inspect 
the proposed site for the Three Gorges 
Dam. In the words of Li Rui’s daughter 
Li Nanyang 李南央: ‘Jiang had just 
become the Emperor, he needed 
something to make his mark, so he 
turned to Yu the Great and sought to 
harness the water.’11 
Meanwhile, Jiang’s ally Li Peng 
(premier from 1987 to 1998) has been 
accused of reaping all the economic 
profits.12 Despite the fact that every 
electricity user in China since 1992 
has paid levies to finance the dam, 
the Yangtze Power Corporation, 
headed by Li Peng’s son Li Xiaopeng 
李小鵬, currently controls all thirty-
two turbines at the Three Gorges Dam 
and the power they generate.13 
The True Spirit of the Foolish Old 
Man 
‘Man must conquer nature’, Jiang 
Zemin proclaimed at the official cere-
mony marking the completion of the 
Three Gorges cofferdam in 1997: ‘This 
is a victory for the spirit of the Foolish 
Old Man who moved the mountains.’14 
By the time of its completion 
in 2006, the Three Gorges Dam had 
displaced 2 million people from their 
homes in 13 cities, 140 towns and 1,350 
villages — all of which were submerged, 
along with 100,000 hectares of arable 
land and innumerable cultural and 
archaeological sites. Despite ongoing 
criticism, it was not until 2011 that 
China’s State Council finally issued a 
vague statement acknowledging the 
environmental, social and geological 
concerns surrounding the Three 
Gorges Dam.15 But the damage, 
including to the river’s ecosystem, 
is irreversible. 
Many Chinese today are 
unimpressed by the idea of the Foolish 
Old Man. The question ‘Should the 
Foolish Old Man just move houses 
instead of mountains?’ has become 
a favourite topic for debating 
societies in some of China’s high 
schools.16 Students are encouraged to 
re-evaluate Maoist ideals, as well as the 
unrestrained pursuit of development 
and profit in the post-Mao era. 
The story of the Foolish Old Man 
originated from a collection of Daoist 
tales attributed to Lie Yukou 列禦寇 
(c. 400 BCE). Like many Daoist 
anecdotes, the story is in fact a 
commentary on the relativity of 
human perception. Compared with 
the two giant mountains, the efforts of 
the Foolish Old Man are insignificant 
indeed, but what are the mountains 
when they are faced with time’s 
weathering power? Big and small 
are thus relative. Depending on how 
one sees it, heaven and earth may be 
treated as a tiny grain; oceans and 
mountains merely the tip of a hair.17 
If anything, the true spirit of the 
Foolish Old Man reprimands the short-
sightedness of human ambition and 
greed. As demonstrated by this other 
story from The Book of Master Lie: 
Once there was a man from the old 
country of Qi who wanted gold. So 
he went to a shop and snatched 
some. The local magistrate caught 
him and asked, ‘Why did you take 
someone else’s gold in front of so 
many people?’ The man replied: 
‘At the time when I took it, I did 
not see the people, I only saw 
the gold.’18 
A still from Jia Zhangke’s 賈
樟柯 film Still Life 三峽好人 
(2006), an elegiac tale about 
the destruction and despair 
caused by the displacement 
of millions to make way 
for the Three Gorges Dam. 
Here, the protagonist 
gazes over Fengjie 奉節, a 






























































THE FUTURE REPEATS ITSELF: COVID-19
AND ITS HISTORICAL COMORBIDITIES
Ari Larissa Heinrich
Source: Commons Wikimedia
AS COVID-19 ESCALATED into a global pandemic 
in 2020, infecting millions and taking hundreds 
of thousands of lives, doctors noticed that it 
seemed to hit those with ‘comorbidities’ (pre-
existing conditions) hardest. But there was 
another comorbidity that the pandemic revealed 
in many societies, including Australia, the United 
States, and Europe: that of endemic and historical 
racism. People of Chinese ethnicity — along with 
anyone mistaken for Chinese — were subjected to 
incidents of violence and verbal abuse, including 
spitting, name calling, and even physical assault.1 
US President Donald Trump consciously stirred the 
pot by referring to COVID-19 as ‘the Chinese virus’, 
‘the China virus’ or ‘the Wuhan virus’ — even 
after he was told of the consequences, including 
to American citizens of Asian descent. Attempts by 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to control the 
narrative through ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ (see 
Forum, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Wolf Warriors, 
pp.33–37), censoring scientific research linking the 
origins of COVID-19 to a wet market in Wuhan and 
some early triumphal comments by President Xi 
Jinping about how the number of cases abroad had 



























































With Trump announcing that the US, which provides 15 percent of the 
funding to the World Health Organization (WHO), was withdrawing from 
the organisation because of perceived pro-China bias, he extended the 
pain to all those countries and people who rely on the WHO to help them 
combat such diseases as polio and malaria. 
The intensity of this eruption of popular anti-Asian racism in the US, 
Europe, and Australia draws on deeply entrenched stereotypes that date 
back more than 200 years. These unfairly characterise Chinese people 
as uniquely vulnerable to certain kinds of illness and as having dietary 
customs and a lack of hygiene that create a cultural predisposition 
towards disease.3 They can be traced with remarkable precision 
to politically charged exchanges as far back as the late eighteenth 
century. Understanding their evolution and circulation can help defuse 
some of the vitriol of racist attacks against Chinese and other Asian 
people today and free us to focus instead on the real common enemy 
in the fight against COVID-19: the unequal distribution of wealth and 
power that results in the disproportionate impact of the disease on 
communities disenfranchised across categories of race, class, gender, 
location, and the like. 
Responses to the surge in anti-Chinese (and anti-Asian) racism rarely 
refer to such structural issues. Rather, they tend to include pleas for 
self-reflection and civility from governments, compensatory generosity, 
and statements by Asian-Americans, Asian-Australians, and others, and 
expressions of solidarity from other people of colour or minorities. As 
early as mid-January, scholars from around the world began gathering 
and circulating articles, bibliographies, and curriculums for educators 
who wish to contextualise the eruption of pandemic-related racism in 
light of persistent anti-Asian myths of the ‘yellow peril’.4 Even before 
COVID-19, other scholars had been working to address the plight of 
Chinese international students in Australia, for instance, who face 
everyday racism, on top of other challenges including loneliness, 
alienation, and cross-cultural misunderstanding.5 (See Chapter 10, 
‘Chinese Students Abroad in the Time of Pandemic: An Australian 
View’, pp.291–303.)
While the recent outbreak of anti-Asian racism may appear to 
be specific to the situation of a pandemic with apparent origins in 
a live animal market in China, this anti-Asian sentiment and violence 
(like other racism and anti-Semitism) bubble just below the surface 
of economic instability. The COVID-19 pandemic has not caused racist 
violence; rather, it has tapped into long-established streams of anti-Asian 
aggression.6  What, then, are some of the specific historical tributaries 
that feed into these streams? From where do the perceptions of Chinese 
propensity towards pathology actually come?
Nineteenth-Century Fake News
Ancient falsehoods and modern truths relate to each other like the 
two revolutions of a single spiral.
— Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France7 
Many of the roots of current anti-Asian racism lie in late eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century misinformation about Chinese cultural practices 
that were communicated down the years in a game of transhistorical 
telephone. An archetypal and stubbornly persistent characterisation of 
Peoples of Europe, Defend 
Your Holiest Possessions, 
lithography by Hermann 
Knackfuss (1848–1915)
Source: Massachusetts  




























































Chinese people specifically and, later, Asians more generally has them 
posing a collective existential threat of ‘yellow peril’ to the West.8 The idea 
has its roots in the Chinese resistance to Western imperialism that came to 
a head with the Boxer Uprising at the turn of the twentieth century, when 
thousands of fighters stormed missionary outposts and eventually laid 
siege to Beijing’s Legation Quarter. While disease sometimes fits under the 
larger umbrella of ‘yellow peril’ in Western characterisations of ‘Asian’ 
threats, epidemics often generate their own individual stereotypes.
Take smallpox as an example — the disease that everyone loves to 
blame on someone else. Like cholera or the bubonic plague, smallpox 
has been laid variously at the door of India, Turkey, the Middle East, 
and China. From the early 1800s, many Europeans and Americans 
believed that China was the ‘cradle of smallpox’ — an idea circulated 
by numerous missionary journals, travelogues, bulletins, and official 
reports from that time onwards. For example, as travel writer Charles 
Toogood Downing stated in 1838:  
This dreadful malady is supposed to have originated among the 
Chinese, and to have spread westward in a gradual manner among the 
natives of Western Asia, until it became as prevalent with the people of 
Europe, as among those of the Centre Kingdom. The disease then ran 
its frightful course, unchecked by the ingenuity and resources of man; 
spreading dismay and horror wherever it appeared, and blighting the 
loveliness and beauty of the fairest works of the creation.9
Downing claimed that the Chinese had invented the practice of inoculation. 
He continued: 
As if in some measure to compensate the nations of the west for the 
dreadful gift which they had bestowed, the Chinese discovered, towards 
the close of the tenth century, the mitigating effects of inoculation. This 
practice, by which it was vainly hoped that the original disease might 
be entirely eradicated, followed the same course, and soon became 
common as far as the shores of the Atlantic.10
Downing got this information from a single — and singularly unreliable 
— source: an eighteenth-century essay by the French Jesuit missionary 
Father Pierre Martial Cibot called ‘De la petite vérole’ (‘On Smallpox’). 
Cibot composed the essay in Beijing in the late 1760s, but it did not reach 
Paris until 1772. It begins with a punchy proclamation that smallpox 
had existed in China for 3,000 years and claims to summarise ‘many 
very knowledgeable and very boring [Chinese] essays on the origin and 
the cause of smallpox’. Cibot dismissed unambiguously what he viewed 
as the ‘pathetic stupidity’ of Chinese medicine, described its ‘lunacy and 
inconsistency’ and declared the history of Chinese medicine to have been 
obscured by ‘clouds of idiocy’. An earlier (1726) report on smallpox by 
another French Jesuit in China, Father François Xavier D’Entrecolles,11 
had adopted a more neutral tone. Where D’Entrecolles had investigated 
Chinese inoculation practices with an eye towards finding something 
useful for Europe, Cibot reserved his most acidic critique for the practice. 
The management of smallpox and the practice of inoculation were 
actually quite advanced in China, especially compared with France 
during the same period. As early as 1622, the Manchus — a people from 
Illustration of smallpox 
from mid-twentieth 






























































north of the Great Walls who would 
soon conquer the Ming and establish 
the Qing dynasty — had already 
implemented smallpox reporting 
systems within the context of the 
‘banners’ that were the basis of social, 
political, and military organisation. 
The system required squad leaders 
to report anyone showing symptoms 
so they could be quarantined. 
Clear guidelines also ensured safe 
interactions with non-Chinese and 
Mongolian dignitaries, protected the 
emperor during audiences and applied 
to funeral rites and the stationing of 
military personnel (for example, sending officers who had acquired 
immunity to smallpox to regions where the disease was active). The 
Manchus also set up strictly maintained bidousuo 避痘所 (‘smallpox 
avoidance centres’) — quarantine centres to which the emperor might 
retreat during the seasons in which smallpox ran rampant. 
Both the Kangxi (r. 1661–1722) and Qianlong (r. 1735–1796) emperors 
were inoculated against the disease, as were other members of the 
imperial retinue. In 1739, Qianlong even sponsored the compilation of 
an imperial medical anthology that contained a special section devoted 
to smallpox diagnosis and inoculation — the very text upon which 
Cibot later claimed to base much of ‘De la petite vérole’. This imperially 
subsidised reference work not only included detailed illustrations to aid 
specific diagnoses, but also summarised existing treatises on smallpox 
and provided precise descriptions of how to prepare smallpox matter 
for inoculation, instructions for creating the optimal conditions under 
which to perform inoculation, descriptions of adverse reactions to 
inoculation, and suggestions for post-procedure care.
Portrait of the Qianlong Emperor in Court 
Dress (1791), painter unknown
Source: Royal Academy of Arts, Wikimedia
Given this advanced institutional and pragmatic response to 
smallpox and the practice of inoculation in China, why would Cibot 
choose to represent the Chinese situation so pessimistically? It came 
down to politics. When Cibot left France for Beijing in 1758, inoculation 
was becoming the subject of heated controversy between the Church 
and Enlightenment thinkers. This was because inoculation (to be 
distinguished from the later practice of vaccination) used material 
from the disease itself to stimulate an immune response. Although it 
sometimes caused full-blown smallpox, more often, it successfully 
immunised the recipient against the disease. At the time, the Church 
considered disease to be a divine plague or scourge. Voltaire was among 
the French intellectuals who favoured inoculation, but the Church 
believed it interfered with divine will and, by 1763, banned the practice. 
The controversy ended abruptly in 1774, when Louis XVI, having 
witnessed Louis XV’s gruesome and untimely death from smallpox, was 
himself inoculated. 
Based on his knowledge of the political situation in France at the 
time of his departure for China, Cibot realised that if he represented 
Chinese responses to the disease in too positive a light, he risked giving 
ammunition to Enlightenment thinkers who were arguing against the 
stance of the Church. He chose to invert the narrative by critiquing 
Chinese medical practice in general and using China’s success in 
establishing institutionalised preventive measures around smallpox 
as ‘evidence’ of Chinese vulnerability to the disease. As the meticulous 
medical archivist and plague specialist Wu Lien-teh noted in the 1930s, 
Cibot’s essay — particularly his claim that smallpox had existed in China 
for three millennia — was subsequently ‘often repeated’, including ‘in 
some quite modern compilations’, such that ‘China was even considered 
as the cradle of smallpox’.12 A reference to Cibot’s eighteenth-century 
essay made it unchallenged as the source of a footnote on China in 
Donald Hopkins’s (otherwise) definitive 2002 world history, The Greatest 




























































The narrative of smallpox in China contributed to the evolution of an 
even broader and more insidious stereotype linking Chinese identity to 
pathology: the notion that China was the ‘sick man of Asia’. According 
to this idea, China and Chinese people are uniquely susceptible to 
ailments, be they corporeal, cultural or symbolic (for example, ailments 
of the body politic). Coinciding with the development of influential 
pseudoscience about ‘race’ in the late nineteenth century, these notions 
gained momentum. By the early twentieth century, China became known 
not only as the ‘cradle of smallpox’ and the ‘sick man of Asia’, but also as 
‘the original home of the plague’, a source of cholera (‘the pestilence of 
the East’) and a place where men were constitutionally weak.13 Imperialist 
powers perceived themselves to have a ‘civilising’ mission. It helped to 
justify occupation and exploitation if the occupied and exploited were 
painted as inferior but capable of improvement through the paternalistic 
intervention of the occupier and exploiter.
In Cibot’s time, China still occupied a dominant position in the 
European psyche in relation to trade and culture. Many Europeans 
viewed China not just as a desirable trading partner, with its magnificent 
porcelain wares, teas, spices, and other goods that were highly sought 
after — even if China was not interested in anything the West had to 
offer. It was also seen by some, including Voltaire, as a potential source 
of medical knowledge and positive models of government. China’s 
status plunged after Britain and France defeated it in the Opium Wars — 
so-called because they were waged so that opium could be exported 
to China — in the middle of the nineteenth century. As European and 
American imperial powers made advancements in medical, martial, 
industrial, and agricultural technologies, they also formalised colonial 
labour practices, exploiting the global slave trade and trans-Pacific 
commerce of ‘coolie’ workers for such projects as railway building in the 
US and gold digging in Australia.14 The accumulation of wealth became 
even more explicitly enmeshed 
with the expansion of 
religious dogma and colonial 
enterprise, which in turn had 
consequences for perceptions 
of the origins of various 
pathologies. This coincidence 
of technological, economic, and 
political expansion created a 
perfect storm of conditions for 
the typecasting of Chinese and 
other non-Western groups. 
China emerged from this period 
not as a source of cures, but as a 
source of pathologies.
A particularly vivid 
example concerns the 
American medical missionary Peter Parker (1804–1888), who, in 1835, 
opened a hospital in Guangzhou. Like other missionary doctors at 
this time, Parker sought to use Western medicine to win converts. He 
found that relatively simple procedures, such as cataract removal, could 
yield results with biblical resonance — bringing sight to the blind, for 
example. To illustrate some of his more spectacular cases, Parker hired 
the respected Cantonese painter Lam Qua 關喬昌 (1801–1860) to create 
a series of full-colour portraits of more than eighty of his patients, 
including several ‘before and after’ images showing the dramatic effects 
of surgical intervention.15 The artist’s work was stunning. Compared 
with the limited images that could be produced by photography, which 
was still in its infancy, Lam Qua’s detailed, full-size portraits in oil of 
Parker’s patients were vibrant and lifelike. These portraits were as 
much sensitive portrayals of individual Chinese people as they were 
portrayals of unique medical conditions. 
Dr Peter Parker (c.1840s) by Lan Qua (1801–1860) 




























































Some of Lam Qua’s paintings were hung in the receiving room of 
the missionary-run hospital for prospective patients and their families 
to view; however, the majority accompanied Parker on a visit back 
to the US and Europe in 1840–1841, where he used them to petition 
ecclesiastical organisations and government bodies for funding to 
support his work. Parker pleaded his cause to influential people, from 
the American presidents William Henry Harrison and Martin Van 
Buren to the king and queen of France. He also exhibited Lam Qua’s 
paintings in Boston, New Haven, New York, Philadelphia, Salem, and 
Guy’s Hospital in London. Removed from their original context (and in 
the absence of equally compelling portraits of everyday healthy Chinese 
people), the striking paintings of gross pathology not only provided 
potential funders with compelling evidence of China’s need for medical 
intervention, but also conveyed a sense that Chinese people were 
disproportionately vulnerable to frightening illnesses and all the more 
in need of spiritual salvation. 
There were other, later chapters in this story, in which ‘yellow peril’ 
rhetoric blended with that of imagining Chinese people as carriers of 
disease, including during the Cold War, when communism was portrayed 
as a contagious and potentially fatal disease of the spirit.
In the age of COVID-19, such examples make the current rise of 
demagoguery, the politicisation of vaccination and the challenge of 
sorting through misinformation about the origins of the pandemic feel 
uncannily familiar. What can we learn about the economic motivations 
behind the proliferation of fake news about political opponents in 
a time of intensified trade wars? The old French adage that ‘the more 
things change, the more they stay the same’ seems to be more apt today 
than ever. It can take years or even centuries for the truth about a 
given circumstance to emerge. Before rushing to translate our anxiety 
about the latest ‘dreadful malady’ into aggression against those we 
perceive to be responsible, we should first ask who stands to benefit 
from this racialised discourse. History suggests that such rhetoric has 
serious consequences.
When a president of the US refers to COVID-19 as ‘the China virus’, 
he draws directly on a longstanding stereotype of Chinese pathology 
that has roots not in medical evidence but in old political, commercial, 
and religious rivalries. The history behind this stereotype — including 
its connection to the emergence of the ‘sick man of Asia’ stereotype 
— also helps explain why China is so deeply invested in ‘controlling 
the narrative’ of COVID-19. However, in spite of President Trump’s 
escalation of dangerous myths about Chinese pathology, at least we can 
be grateful to him for shining the spotlight on what is really behind this 
particular outbreak of anti-Asian animosity — that is, the enduring (and 































PLAN FOR  
DIFFICULTY
The Dao of Crisis  






































T AIWAN’S DIGITAL Minister Audrey Tang 唐鳳, in a 23 July 2020 
interview with WIRED, quoted the Dao 
De Jing 道德經 extensively to illustrate 
her self-described ‘Daoist approach to 
political and social action’.1 The fourth-
century BCE Daoist classic, widely 
translated abroad and often taken 
as a spiritual guide, has a separate 
tradition of being read as a guide to 
governing, albeit a highly ambiguous 
one.2 Tang had brought together 
the Taiwan government’s pandemic 
response team and ‘civic tech hackers’ 
to create a rational system of facemask 
distribution and availability mapping. 
To describe her role, she quoted from 
chapter eleven of the Dao De Jing: 
‘ “Hollowed out, clay makes a pot. 
Where the pot isn’t is where it’s useful.” 
All I did,’ she added, ‘was hollow out 
the clay to make a pot.’3
The hollow pot is one of several 
well-known metaphors for the 
Daoist theory of governance, which 
emphasises the passivity, ‘inaction’ 
无為 and even invisibility of political 
leaders. The Dao De Jing’s most famous 
and paradoxical line has it that the 
true adept, like the Dao itself, ‘does 
not make anything happen, yet there 
is nothing that does not get done’ 
无為而无不為.4 Some philosophers 
argue that Daoism is fundamentally 







































anarchistic, while others argue the 
extreme opposite — that it is a form 
of paternalistic authoritarianism. This 
is a long-running debate in the field 
of Chinese political philosophy.5 The 
answer may depend on whether one 
focuses on the empty space inside 
the pot or on the clay that shapes 
that space. Tang implicitly weighed 
in on this debate; in a later interview, 
with the global tech journal Rest of 
World, she described herself as a 
‘conservative-anarchist’ seeking to 
build a ‘radically transparent digital 
democracy’. While she did not define 
what she meant by ‘conservative’, 
she described her anarchism as a 
rejection of all ‘top-down coercion’.6 
It is a value she shares with g0v (‘gov 
zero’), a collective of civic hackers of 
which she is a member; it also accords 
with at least some interpretations of 
the Dao De Jing.
Taiwan’s success in containing 
the COVID-19 pandemic relied on an 
approach expressed in another precept 
of the Dao De Jing: ‘[P]lan for difficulty 
while it’s still easy; accomplish big 
things while they are small’ 圖難於其
易, 為大於其細.7 If you stop a pandemic 
at the airport, you deal with a few 
dozen cases rather than millions. If 
you have a solid pandemic plan that 
is deployed without hesitation at the 
first sign of trouble, you set yourself 
up for success. For Taiwan, the 
pandemic was neither unforeseen nor 
unprecedented: a 2017 article in the 
Journal of Microbiology, Immunology 
and Infection described how Taiwan’s 
Audrey Tang by Camille 
McOuat
Source: Audrey Tang, Flickr
‘collaborative’ and ‘whole of society’ 
model of pandemic preparedness was 
developed in response to successive 
threats from SARS (2003), H1N1 (2009), 
and others, and suggested that the 
island offered a valuable model of 
collaborative governance in the area of 
public health.8
Less fortunate countries have 
endured alternating waves of 
lockdowns, travel restrictions, and 
drastically changed lifestyles. Yet the 
2020 lockdown experience in many 
places ironically approaches another 
Dao De Jing ideal, the small, stable 
community that takes shape under the 
guidance of a sage ruler:
Make the people fear death and 
go not far abroad … 
They’ll savour their food, and 
beautify their clothing; 
they’ll feel secure in their own 
dwellings, and delight in their 
own customs. 
Though neighbouring states be 
within sight of each other — 
so close they can hear each 
other’s dogs and chickens — 
the people live out their old age 
without visiting back and forth.
使民重死而不遠徙 … 甘其食, 美其
服, 安其居, 樂其俗. 鄰國相望, 雞犬
之聲相聞, 民至老死, 不相往來.9
In rural areas of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), many villagers 
voluntarily, and in some cases even 
illegally, built blockades, posted 
guards, and barred outsiders from 
their communities as early as January. 
Even before government-mandated 
lockdowns, they imposed quarantines 
on their own returning residents. Some 
even destroyed the roads into their 
villages to prevent the infected from 
getting in. When asked by journalists 
whether they were worried about 
running out of food, they retorted that 
they grew their own.10 As the Dao De 
Jing counsels: ‘Block the roads, shut the 
door, and you’ll never get worn out. 
Open the roads, meddle in affairs, and 
you’ll end up incurable’ 塞其兌, 閉其門, 
終身不勤. 開其兌, 濟其事, 終身不救.11 
The PRC government’s response, 
when it did come, was muscular and 
swift, including draconian lockdowns, 
boosted funding for medical research 
and the production of needed 
equipment. These measures, together 
with fine-grained tracing techniques 
such as the Alipay Health code system,12 






































pandemic (global scepticism about 
official statistics notwithstanding), 
while advancing the government’s 
massive technology-assisted project 
for the consolidation of authoritarian 
control. It brings out the darker strand 
of Dao De Jing paternalism, expressed 
in a line that refers to ‘straw dogs’ 
芻狗 — objects of no intrinsic value, 
temporarily elevated for ceremonial 
use and unsentimentally discarded 
thereafter:13 ‘Heaven and earth are not 
humane; they treat the myriad things 
as straw dogs. Sages are not humane; 
they treat the common people as straw 
dogs’ 天地不仁, 以萬物為芻狗; 聖人不
仁, 以百姓為芻狗.14 Some rulers employ 
co-optation: they ‘empty the hearts [of 
the people], fill their bellies, weaken 
their will, and strengthen their bones’ 
虛其心, 實其腹, 弱其志, 強其骨.15 One 
way to effect non-coercive rule is to 
make resistance unthinkable.
The failures of most democratic 
societies, including the United 
States and much of the European 
Union, in response to the pandemic 
crisis undermine their critique of 
authoritarianism. Although China 
seems to be the exception here, with 
Brazil and Russia, for example, badly 
mishandling the pandemic. In this 
fraught ideological moment, Taiwan’s 
strategy of crisis management offers 
an example of robust success without 
paternalistic authoritarianism.
The Dao De Jing  
Source: Wikimedia
Globally, female leaders have 
performed exceptionally well in the 
COVID-19 crisis.16 Again, the Dao De 
Jing anticipates this development. 
Sarah Flavel and Brad Hall have 
proposed that the ancient classic’s 
political theory should be described 
as ‘maternalism’.17 They refer to the 
text’s pointed disapproval of coercive 
rule and its claim that the role of the 
ruler is to nourish the people without 
demanding recognition for so doing. 
The Dao De Jing frequently refers to the 
Dao as a mother: ‘[T]he mother of the 
state’ 國母, ‘mother of the world’ 天下
母 or even ‘a nursing mother’ 食母. The 
successful ruler deals with the people 
as the Dao does with the world’s myriad 
things: ‘It brings them up and rears 
them, completes them and matures 
them, nourishes them and protects 
them’ 長之育之; 成之熟之; 養之覆之.18
Flavel and Hall are careful to 
dissociate this maternalism from 
‘gender essentialism’; and maternalist 
techniques employed by both male and 
female leaders have enjoyed success — 
for example, by using state resources 
to ‘nourish’ sick workers so they can 
afford to quarantine themselves.
Audrey Tang’s vision brings 
out its softer maternalistic side, a 
vision of a state that nourishes its 
people and cultivates not only their 
trust, but also their trustworthiness: 
‘I trust the trustworthy. I also trust the 
untrustworthy. In this way I can get 
trust’ 信者, 吾信之; 不信者, 吾亦信之; 得
信.19 Or, as Tang told WIRED: ‘To give no 
trust is to get no trust’ 信不足, 有不信.20 
As is seen most starkly in the United 
States, where COVID-19 denialism 
and resistance to government efforts 
to control the pandemic have been 
rampant, with no trust, there is no 
access to the nurturing power of the 












































US–CHINA RELATIONS: A LINGERING 
CRISIS
Nadège Rolland
Source: Trump White House Archive
LOOKING AT RELATIONS BETWEEN Washington 
and Beijing in 2020, it would be tempting to conclude 
that the COVID-19 pandemic affects great powers’ 
relationships similarly to how the disease affects 
individuals: those with pre-existing conditions are 
the most vulnerable and the least likely to survive 
intact. The relationship between the United States 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long 
been ailing. The pandemic, rather than acting as 
the primary cause of the overall deterioration of 
the relationship, has served as an aggravating 












































Throughout 2020, US–China relations spiralled downward. Hopes that the 
‘Phase One’ trade deal signed by US President Donald Trump and Chinese 
Vice Premier Liu He 刘鹤 on 15 January would help ease tensions after 
nearly two years of trade war soon receded under a surge of virulent 
rhetoric and an exchange of retaliatory measures between the two 
countries, triggered by the COVID-19 outbreak. The vicious verbal tit-for-
tat, centred on the origins of COVID-19, lasted several months. In mid-
March, as the disease started to spread in the United States, President 
Trump and other high-ranking US officials, including Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo, started a spiteful routine of publicly calling the virus the 
‘Chinese virus’, the ‘Wuhan virus’ and ‘Kung Flu’ in a thinly veiled effort 
to deflect responsibility for rising US infection and death numbers on to 
China.1 Chinese officials countered with the public promotion of conspiracy 
theories. On 12 March, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian 
赵立坚 posted on Twitter that COVID-19 might have been brought to China 
by US military athletes who attended the seventh Military World Games 
in Wuhan in October 2019.2 In early May, Chinese official media outlets 
ramped up their verbal attacks, specifically targeting Pompeo and calling 
him ‘evil’, a ‘liar’, and the ‘common enemy of mankind’ after he blamed the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a televised interview for mishandling 
the outbreak.3 
Meanwhile, the tit-for-tat reached media organisations. On 
18 February, the Trump Administration designated five Chinese media 
outlets operating in the US (Xinhua, CGTN, China Radio International, the 
People’s Daily and China Daily) as ‘foreign missions of the PRC’, thereby 
considering them as extensions of the Chinese Government. The next day, 
Beijing revoked the press credentials of three Wall Street Journal reporters, 
ostensibly in reaction to an op-ed with the headline ‘The sick man of Asia’. 
On 2 March, the White House put a cap on the number of Chinese nationals 
allowed to work for official media outlets in the US. On 18 March, China’s 
Foreign Ministry ordered thirteen reporters from The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal to return their media passes, 
effectively expelling them from China. 
The spat also extended to diplomatic ties. On 27 July, China’s Foreign 
Ministry ordered the closure of the US Consulate in Chengdu in response to 
the US’s closing of the Chinese Consulate in Houston, Texas, a week earlier, 
over allegations that it had become a hub for spying and intellectual 
property theft. From there, it was just a short step to talk of both countries 
drifting towards a complete breakdown of relations and a ‘new Cold War’.4 
Having apparently reached a point of no return, the bilateral relationship 
was widely seen as being in crisis.
Crises to Spare
Since the US and China normalised relations in 1979, the bilateral 
relationship has faced at least three severe crises: in 1996, 1999, and 2001. In 
each case, after an initial sharp deterioration and then hitting rock bottom, 
the relationship eventually returned to an amicable status quo ante. 
Zhao Lijian suggested that COVID-19 might have been brought to China by US military athletes who attended 
the seventh Military World Games in Wuhan in October 2019 











































The first event, in March 1996, is what is now called the Third 
Taiwan Strait Crisis.5 At the time, Taiwan was getting ready to hold its 
first democratic presidential elections. Beijing suspected Lee Teng-hui 
李登輝, the candidate from the ruling Kuomintang 國民黨 (KMT, 
Nationalist Party), of harbouring a pro-independence agenda and wanted 
to send a clear signal that a formal declaration of independence would 
result in war.6 The signal came in the form of People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, simulating an amphibious 
assault and the firing of M-9 ballistic missiles that landed in the shipping 
lanes near the southern seaport of Kaohsiung and in the vicinity of the Port 
of Keelung, passing almost directly over the capital, Taipei, before landing 
thirty kilometres off the coast. For two weeks, the level of tension between 
the US and China reached extraordinary levels, with undercurrents of 
nuclear threats: high-ranking PLA officials reportedly raised questions 
with their American counterparts about whether the US was willing to 
trade ‘Los Angeles for Taipei’. The crisis was eventually defused following 
a show of military resolve by the United States, and several rounds of 
skilful diplomacy. 
During a special dinner hosted at the State Department on 7 March 
1996, defence secretary William J. Perry notified Beijing’s vice-foreign 
minister Liu Huaqiu 刘华秋, who was on a visit to the Chinese Embassy 
in Washington, DC, that there would be ‘grave consequences’ should 
Chinese weapons strike Taiwan. In an effort to send an explicit warning 
against Chinese escalation, secretary of state Warren Christopher, national 
security adviser Anthony Lake and United Nations ambassador Madeleine 
Albright all repeated the same phrase on national TV news programs over 
the following weekend.7 Words were backed by the deployment of two US 
carrier battle groups to waters off Taiwan, led by the USS Independence 
(already on station in the East China Sea, 322 kilometres north-east of 
Taiwan) and the USS Nimitz (stationed in the Persian Gulf and ordered into 
the area on 9 March by then president Bill Clinton). The two battle groups 
eventually converged to form the largest gathering of US naval firepower 
in East Asia since 1958. 
On 8 March, the US National Security Advisor spent the entire day 
with the Chinese envoy — accompanied by National Security Council 
aide Robert Suettinger and State Department officials Winston Lord and 
Jeff Bader — in the living room of the Middleburg, Virginia, country 
estate of Pamela Harriman, the US ambassador to France. Next to a lit 
fireplace, Lake and Liu engaged in tough talk, speaking at length about 
their respective national interests and red lines, while attempting to find 
a commonly acceptable middle ground. According to David Rothkopf, 
deputy under-secretary of commerce at the time, the meeting led both 
sides to sit down and say: ‘Wait a minute. This is no way to run one of the 
pivotal relationships on the planet Earth.’8 
The relationship was soon back on track. President Jiang Zemin’s 
江泽民 visit to the United States the following year — the first by a 
Chinese head of state since that of president Li Xiannian 李先念 in 1985 
— was a success. It was crowned by Jiang’s commitment to purchase fifty 
Boeing civilian airliners valued at 3 billion dollars, the establishment of 
a direct ‘hotline’ between Washington and Beijing and China’s pledge to 
cease its nuclear co-operation with Iran, opening the door for the signing 
of a US–China nuclear co-operation agreement ahead of Clinton’s visit to 
Beijing the following year.9 A formal joint statement by Jiang and Clinton 
released on 29 October 1997 stressed that the proper handling of the Taiwan 
question ‘holds the key to sound and stable growth of China–US relations’, 
and announced that the two sides would work towards a ‘constructive 
strategic partnership’.10 
Tensions flared up again in 1999 when, on 7 May, US warplanes, acting 
in support of operations by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
in Yugoslavia, accidentally dropped bombs on the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade. Three Chinese journalists died and twenty-seven staff members 
were wounded. The US Government’s official apologies and explanations, 











































until several days later by Chinese state media, which continued to portray 
the bombing as a deliberate act of aggression. Jiang Zemin did not accept 
Clinton’s attempts to discuss the incident by phone until 14 May.11 In the 
meantime, tens of thousands of Chinese protestors demonstrated outside 
the US and other NATO countries’ embassies in Beijing, throwing rocks, 
splattering paint, and inflicting other damage on buildings. The US Consul 
General’s residence in Chengdu was set ablaze and protesters attempted to 
burn the US Consulate in Guangzhou. US diplomatic personnel, including 
the ambassador, were trapped for several days in their embassy. In the 
week after the bombing, the Chinese Government suspended three formal 
bilateral dialogues (on military relations, non-proliferation, and human 
rights), and demanded formal apologies, an investigation of the bombing, 
severe punishment for those found responsible, and compensation for 
the damage done to the Chinese Embassy and loss of life and injuries 
in Belgrade.12 
With negotiations over China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) at a critical point, however, neither side wanted to 
risk a major deterioration in relations. Washington urged a focus on the 
‘compelling mutual interests’ of the two nations in advancing security 
and economic well-being in Asia.13 After several rounds of diplomatic 
exchanges conducted in both Washington and Beijing, the two sides finally 
The Chinese Embassy 
in Belgrade ten years 
after aerial bombing 
by US military aircraft
Source: Wikimedia
agreed on mutual compensation to cover the property damage both to the 
Belgrade embassy (US$28 million) and to the US diplomatic buildings in 
China (US$2.87 million). The US further agreed on 30 July 1999 to make 
an additional ‘voluntary humanitarian payment’ of US$4.5 million to the 
families of the three Chinese killed and the twenty-seven injured. The 
payment was issued to the Chinese Government on 25 August 1999.14 
The bilateral relationship returned to normal in just a couple of months. 
Although military to military contacts were frozen for a while longer, other 
activities carried on as usual, with the Chinese authorities making special 
efforts to emphasise to American businesspeople, journalists, teachers, 
and students that their presence in China was still welcome.15 
Diplomacy prevailed again during the third crisis. On 1 April 2001, 
a US Navy EP-3 ARIES reconnaissance plane and a PLA Navy F-8 fighter 
collided over the South China Sea. The Chinese fighter crashed into the 
sea and its pilot was lost. The US aircraft made an emergency landing on 
Hainan Island, where its twenty-four crew members were detained for 
eleven days by the Chinese authorities. Washington and Beijing engaged 
in a tense round of negotiations over the release of both the crew and 
the plane. The Chinese Government demanded an official apology, but 
the White House refused, maintaining that the Chinese pilot’s repeated 
dangerous manoeuvres in close proximity to the US Navy plane, which 
ended up hitting one of its propellers , had ‘put at risk the lives of 
twenty-four Americans’.16 The solution eventually came in a series of US 
statements that expressed ‘regret’ and included the words ‘very sorry’, 
which the Chinese side translated as an apology.17 Face was saved, the 
US crew members were eventually released safe and sound,18 and the 
disassembled EP-3 plane was transported back to the US in early July,19 
leaving ample time for the PLA to access the classified material that the 
crew had not had the chance to destroy before the Chinese side took 
control of the aircraft.20 
As with the previous two crises, it appears neither side believed it 











































not want to disrupt China’s impending accession to the WTO in December 
2001 or Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games, with the winner 
scheduled to be announced in July 2001. Jiang’s uncompromising public 
stance during the crisis was understood by the Americans to be primarily 
motivated by domestic politics: he had to appear strong because he needed 
the support of the Chinese military to retain his position as the chairman 
of the Central Military Commission after the Sixteenth Party Congress in 
November 2002, and needed to satisfy popular nationalistic sentiment.21 
Ultimately, in the assessment of a former national security adviser to 
president Clinton, the Chinese leadership was also keen on preserving good 
relations with the United States, which was deemed ‘critical to its future 
development’, to let the domestic nationalists and hardliners overrule 
the CCP’s ‘internationalist’ group.22 For its part, despite tough campaign 
rhetoric labelling China a ‘strategic competitor’, the newly elected Bush 
Administration proved eager to keep relations on an even keel.
These three crises have much in common. In each case, an unexpected 
event created a sharp spike in tensions that suddenly brought the two 
countries into direct confrontation. But each time, the relationship quickly 
got back on track because both sides had a strong overriding interest in 
preserving the status quo. Successive US administrations believed that a 
robust engagement policy and China’s integration within the international 
system would lead to positive changes: China would become a ‘responsible 
stakeholder’ in the existing international system, it would progressively 
liberalise economically and eventually undertake political reforms.23 The 
CCP, on the other hand, believed that China’s immediate interests were 
best served by preserving engagement, expanding trade and investment, 
and building up all the elements of the country’s national power while at 
the same time maintaining their unchallenged domestic authority. In sum, 
both parties believed that time was on their side, and neither expected an 
imminent downturn in relations. 
Along Came COVID-19 
The latest crisis was sparked by an outbreak of disease that became 
a pandemic — a natural event that was external to the bilateral relationship 
rather than triggered by a direct clash between the two countries. China’s 
initial handling of the pandemic led to increased friction, yet, in contrast 
to previous crises, the incentives for getting things back on track seemed to 
have evaporated. Instead of seeking compromise and de-escalation, both 
sides have played an aggressive and bitter blame game, with no end in sight. 
The general backdrop is also different. After a protracted deterioration 
in relations over the past decade, both countries are pessimistic about 
the overall direction of their relationship. The pandemic poured petrol 
on a smouldering fire, exposing the precariousness of what until recently 
seemed a reasonably stable equilibrium.
There are underlying forces at play. Deep-seated geopolitical 
dynamics drive relationships between established and rising powers. 
Rather predictably, like other rising powers historically, as China’s 
material power and capabilities have grown, its leaders have started 
to define the nation’s interests more expansively and to seek a greater 
degree of influence on the global stage.24 Especially since the Global 
US aircraft carrier 
transiting the South 
China Sea











































Financial Crisis, China has been displaying increased self-confidence in 
the resilience of its model and the upward trajectory of its wealth and 
power relative to that of the United States. Beijing’s desire to revise the 
regional status quo started to become apparent around 2009–2010. 
Through the use of ‘grey zone’ operations below the threshold of armed 
conflict, Beijing sought to secure gains in the East and South China seas,25 
renewing claims over contested islands and territories, building and then 
fortifying artificial islands, presenting the so-called Nine-Dash Line as the 
legitimate delineation of its maritime territory (and later on rejecting the 
2016 Hague tribunal ruling that challenged some of its claims). The scope 
of its ‘core interests’ — traditionally defined as national security, national 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity (specifically including Taiwan since 
the early 2000s and Tibet and Xinjiang since 2006) — broadened in 2010 
as Chinese officials privately told US officials that the South China Sea was 
now included.26 
Beijing has also taken steps to ensure access to markets, natural 
resources, and infrastructure, including ports and telecommunication 
networks, beyond its immediate borders. Xi Jinping’s 习近平 launch, in late 
2013, of what is now called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), clearly set out 
China’s aspiration for greater influence across Eurasia and beyond. Xi’s 
2017 affirmation that China should ‘guide’ the international community 
to ‘shape a more just and reasonable new international order’ reflects the 
Chinese leadership’s desire not only to have what they consider to be their 
rightful say in international affairs, but also to reshape the existing order 
in ways that better serve China’s interests and to alter the interpretation 
of existing norms.27 
As the power gap between China and the United States has narrowed, 
the competitive elements of the relationship have become more prominent. 
Economic competition and disputes over trade practices, intellectual 
property, state subsidies, and rules violations have marked the relationship 
for more than two decades. The current tensions are not simply the result 
of the Trump Administration’s eagerness to slap tariffs on Chinese goods, 
but also the manifestation of growing frustration in the United States and 
other market economies (including in the European Union and Australia) 
with China’s state-led, market-distorting trade and industrial policies, and 
lack of reciprocal market access. 
Sino-American military competition, which used to be largely confined 
to East Asia, has begun to expand to the entire Indo-Pacific theatre thanks 
to the establishment of a permanent PLA Navy base in Djibouti in 2017, the 
development of Chinese major surface platforms equipped with advanced 
combat management systems and extended-range surface-to-air missiles,28 
and a modernised stealthy subsurface fleet that can be deployed further 
from China’s coastline for longer periods. Technological competition 
has accelerated, too, with China making strides in cutting-edge and 
emerging technologies in which it aims to be the global leader by 2035.29 
These include, among others, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 
unmanned and fully automated systems and robotics, biotech, as well as 
next-generation information and telecommunication technologies.
In the competition for global influence and standing, the United 
States has suffered what may prove to be a temporary setback under the 
Roundtable meeting 
of leaders at a 
Belt and Road 
international forum 












































Trump Administration. Meanwhile, under Xi Jinping, China’s wolf warrior 
diplomacy and bullying behaviour have resulted in a dramatic and 
unprecedented decline in how it is perceived by the public of advanced 
economies across the world.30 This is despite (or perhaps because of) 
China’s increasingly open attempts to influence the perceptions and 
policies of other nations through the stepped-up use of its United Front 
networks and co-optation tactics in Western democracies. (For an 
overview of the United Front, see the China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared 
Destiny, Forum, ‘The United Front in an Age of Shared Destiny’, pp.128–
132.) China’s human rights record and the CCP’s repression of dissident 
voices and religious and ethnic minorities have always been a cause of 
friction in US–China relations. But the scale, scope, and inhumane nature 
of the Uyghur repression, and the merciless subjugation of freedoms in 
Hong Kong in the name of security (see Forum, ‘Hong Kong’s National 
Security Law’, pp.59–64), have sparked outrage not only in the United 
States, but also in other Western liberal democracies. 
The US–China rivalry has always been multidimensional. What has 
changed most in the past several years are the expectations of the two 
sides. Many in the United States and elsewhere have concluded that the 
policy of engagement has failed. Accumulating evidence that Beijing does 
not intend to liberalise has crushed the hope that China will eventually 
support and adhere to the existing international system, its institutions 
and the values and norms underpinning them. 
Over the course of the past four years, the Chinese leadership seems 
to have concluded that the American decline has accelerated, clearing the 
way for its own rise to predominance.31 Xi Jinping and other top-ranking 
officials evidently have these trends in mind when they refer to the 
‘profound changes unseen in a century’ 百年未有之大变局 that are taking 
place.32 For its own purposes, the Chinese leadership may want to continue 
to point to the chaotic democratic process surrounding the US presidential 
elections as an illustration of the supposed failings of democracy. On the 
other hand, reflecting the new bipartisan consensus on the challenge 
posed by China, there is every reason to expect that, even if it adopts a 
less combative tone than its predecessor, the Biden Administration will 
maintain a strong competitive stance and will attempt to work more 
closely with its allies to defend their shared interests and common values.
In contrast to previous crises, neither side seems to have any interest 
in compromise or dialling down the tensions. There is no going back to 
the 1990s. This does not mean, however, that either side wants to escalate 
the crisis further or risk an all-out conflict. What is to be expected for 
the foreseeable future, then, is an across-the-board intensification of 
geopolitical, economic, and ideological competition. Increasingly tense 

































Taiwan’s Search for a Grand Strategy  
·  WEN-TI SUNG 
Malaysia: Taking No Side but Its Own 








































ON 10 OCTOBER 2020, simmering political tensions between the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
the Republic of China (Taiwan) erupted 
in the form of a physical fight between 
their diplomats in Fiji. Two Chinese 
embassy officials had allegedly gate-
crashed a National Day reception 
hosted by the Taiwan trade office 
— Taiwan’s de facto embassy. The 
Taiwanese side claimed the Chinese 
officials were conducting intelligence-
gathering activities about the function 
and its guests and assaulted a 
Taiwanese diplomat who asked them 
to leave; the Chinese Embassy blamed 
the Taiwanese diplomat for acting 
‘provocatively’ and causing ‘injuries 
and damage to one Chinese diplomat’.1 
In any case, it was a Taiwanese official 
who ended up in hospital with a head 
injury.
This episode illustrates Taiwan’s 
increasing diplomatic isolation at the 
hands of China and the breakdown of 
mutual trust in recent years. Beijing 
has little incentive to change course, 
given the luxury of its economic 
and military strength, as well as its 
increasingly nationalistic ideology. 
This leaves Taipei searching for a new 
strategy for coping with China’s ‘wolf-
warrior diplomacy’ and escalating 
rivalry with the United States.
Beginning in the late 2000s, 
administrations of different political 
stripes in both Washington and 
Taipei pursued policies of political 
and economic engagement with 
China. The hope of some was that 
TA I WA N ’ S  S E A R C H  F O R  A 









































this would promote economic 
liberalisation in the PRC, which would 
lead also to political liberalisation, 
if not outright democratisation. The 
‘(inter)democratic peace theory’ in 
international relations, which has its 
roots in Immanuel Kant’s 1795 idea 
that people would never vote to go 
to war, holds that democracies do 
not fight democracies. By that logic, 
engagement with a liberalising China 
should also have ‘pacified’ it as a 
security concern to liberal democracies 
around the world. 
This scenario allowed China 
to, as Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 put it, 
‘hide its strength and bide its time’ 
in international affairs, creating a 
path for a peaceful rise to quasi-
superpower status. What’s more, 
to take actions they believed would 
strengthen the moderates and ‘liberals’ 
in Zhongnanhai, both Washington and 
Taipei accommodated elements of 
Chinese foreign policy that were out 
of sync with the norms of the liberal 
international order. While looking 
after the ‘big picture’ of US–China 
relations, meanwhile, policymakers 
and pundits in Washington often 
practised benign neglect of the third 
vertex of the triangle, Taiwan.
Taiwan, for its part, was largely 
content with this until 2019. Indeed, 
the population remained undecided 
about the price it was willing to pay 
for Taiwan’s political future. Opinion 
poll after opinion poll showed a 
majority of the population preferred 
to maintain the cross-strait status quo 
— either in perpetuity or at least for 
the moment.2 They were pragmatic: 
60.8 percent of Taiwanese were still 
willing to work in China or do business 
there as of 2018. The heightened 
cross-strait tensions during 2016–
2018, rather than sparking Taiwan’s 
nationalist pushback, actually resulted 
in a mild dip in Taiwanese national 
self-identification in Commonwealth 
Magazine’s annual polls.3 For example, 
between 2017 and 2018, when 
pollsters asked whether respondents 
self-identified as ‘Taiwanese’, ‘Chinese’ 
or ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’, the 
percentage who self-identified as 
‘Taiwanese’ decreased by 4 percent 
and 7.8 percent, respectively, for those 
aged 20–29 and 30–39 years.
For their part, Taiwan’s political 
elites had adopted what I describe 
as the strategic posture of ‘dual 
alignment’ or, as expressed by its most 
famous advocate, former president Ma 
Ying-jeou 馬英九, ‘stay close to America 
and on good terms with China’ 親美	
和中. Yet while the US has been 
Taipei’s primary security guarantor 
since the onset of the Korean War 
in 1950, the guarantee of protection 
has always been ill-defined. There is 
no current formal treaty codifying a 
security commitment, with the closest 
thing being America’s Taiwan Relations 
Act, which is only domestic legislation. 
It describes Chinese military action 
against Taiwan as a ‘grave concern’ to 
the United States, without obligating 
the US to make a proportional 
military response to defend the island. 
Implicitly, US support has also been 
conditional on Taipei boosting its own 
defence and not on unduly ‘provoking’ 
Beijing, even if the line for what counts 
as provocation is constantly shifting. 
A natural extension of that logic has 
been that, for Taipei to maintain good 
relations with its superpower patron, 
it has also needed to maintain cordial 
relations with Beijing. ‘Dual alignment’ 
has pushed Taipei to seek friendly 
relations or partnership with both the 
US and China.4 
A series of recent crises have 
undermined that harmonious three-
way arrangement. In Washington, 
the ever-escalating US–China trade 
war, Cold War–style rhetoric and 
sociocultural-academic decoupling 
under outgoing president Donald 
Trump have undermined and sidelined 
advocates for engagement. As for 
Taiwan, in the words of the American 
US Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar met Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in Taipei in August 
2020, the most senior US official to visit the island in decades








































international relations scholar Charles 
L. Glaser, it remains ‘a secondary, 
albeit not insignificant, US interest’.5 
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 
习近平 2019 ‘Message to Compatriots 
in Taiwan’, which called for greater 
cross-strait integration, became 
a divisive issue in Taiwan’s 2020 
presidential and legislative elections. 
The ruling Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), which is relatively 
assertive towards China, won the 
elections with 57 percent of the vote. 
The PRC greeted that development 
with military drills in the Taiwan Strait 
and renewed efforts to isolate Taiwan 
diplomatically. This pressure became 
the subject of intense international 
discussion and media coverage 
when Beijing insisted that Taiwan be 
excluded from the 2020 meeting of 
the World Health Assembly to discuss 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Many found 
this demand highly problematic given 
that Taiwan had proved a successful 
model in containing the disease 
without imposing a major lockdown 
or significantly damaging its economy.
The US State Department sent 
more senior officials to visit Taiwan in 
2020 than it had in the previous four 
decades, including undersecretary of 
state Keith Krach and health secretary 
Alex Azar. Since 2019, Washington 
has also sent US naval warships to 
sail through the South China Sea 
and Taiwan Strait on a number 
of routine ‘freedom of navigation 
operations’. These are intended 
to boost Washington’s perceived 
security commitment towards Taiwan 
and ‘a free and open Indo-Pacific’, 
according to a statement issued by the 
US Seventh Fleet.6 
Taipei is keenly aware that, with 
President Xi in power (apparently 
for the long term), and China hawks 
increasingly ascendant in Washington, 
the age of ‘dual alignment’ is over. By 
late 2018, Taiwan had to choose sides. 
It chose the US, which has no territorial 
ambitions towards the island and 
poses no existential threat. But in so 
doing, and by Taiwanese President 
Tsai Ing-Wen’s 蔡英文 own admission, 
Taiwan is now the ‘frontline state’7 in 
the emerging bipolar rivalry — if not 
a new Cold War — between the US and 
China. Should that strategic rivalry 
escalate into military conflict, Taipei 
would be vulnerable to attack by the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Dual alignment — the comfort 
blanket that freed Taipei from having 
to make tough strategic choices in the 
past — seems no longer sustainable. 
Yet Taiwan is struggling to find 
a viable alternative. It is facing a crisis 
of grand strategy.
On the one hand, Taiwan’s 
main opposition party, the relatively 
China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT), 
still largely clings to the idea of dual 
alignment. This is despite the fact that 
the strategy’s underlying foundation 
on a US–China entente no longer exists. 
The electorate, well aware of this fact, 
has punished the KMT accordingly. 
On the other hand, while the ruling 
DPP enjoys great popularity for now, 
without the capacity to communicate 
with Beijing, it is struggling to regain 
agency in the US–China–Taiwan 
relationship, leaving dependency on 
the US as the only viable option. Yet 
with dependency comes the constant 
fear of abandonment. Each piece of 
news about progress on the US–China 
trade front renews paranoia in Taipei 
about whether Washington will one 
day trade away Taiwanese security 
interests in exchange for Chinese 
concessions and abandon it to China. 
This constant fear of 
abandonment may push Taipei into 
two unintentionally self-defeating 
measures. First, Taiwan may elect 
to demonstrate greater commitment 
towards the US in the hope of eliciting 
greater US support. For example, 
Taipei may make expensive purchases 
of US defence material in the hope 
that ‘America helps those who help 
themselves’; in late 2020, the Trump 
administration approved a potential 
US$1.8 billion weapons sale to Taiwan. 
Even if this strengthens Taiwan’s 
ability to deter Chinese military 
aggression, it will mean less spending 
on domestic needs and will thus 
erode the government’s domestic 
electoral support. 
Second, it may enter into 
defence and intelligence-sharing 
arrangements with the US in the name 
of improving joint interoperability 
and strengthening deterrence 
against Chinese aggression. Yet, the 
decision about whether and when 
to enter a conflict has always been 
the prerogative of Washington, 
which would not look favourably 
on any attempt by Taipei to entrap 
or undermine American strategic 
autonomy in its own interest.
Taiwan’s conundrum may be 
unavoidable given its unique situation. 
Whether Taiwan can identify a viable 
alternative to dual alignment will 
determine its ability to survive and 
thrive as the Sinophone world’s 











































MIDWAY THROUGH MAY 2020, Malaysian Prime Minister 
Muhyiddin Yassin’s government 
quietly, and forgoing the promised 
public tender process, granted 5G 
frequency bands to five Malaysian 
telecommunications providers. These 
included four of the country’s biggest 
— Maxis, Celcom, Digi, and Telekom 
Malaysia (TM) — as well as the obscure 
Altel.1 Behind Altel is Syed Mokhtar 
Albukhary, a Malaysian billionaire 
who has been the subject of much 
public criticism due to his fistful of 
government-licensed monopolies, 
including rice distribution, motor 
vehicle inspection, postal services, 
the running of media companies and 
ports.2 A public uproar in early June 
caused the government to quickly 
reverse its decision by revoking the 
allocations of all providers. Previous 
promises of a third-quarter rollout of 
5G have been delayed until late 2022 
or early 2023, buying the Muhyiddin 
Administration more time to formulate 
an allocation process that will avoid a 
public backlash. Instead, it has decided 
to focus on optimising 4G speed and 
M A L AY S I A :  TA K I N G  N O 
S I D E  B U T  I T S  O W N
Xu Cheng Chong
The Muhyiddin Administration granted 5G frequency 
bands to five Malaysian telecommunications 
providers











































coverage under the new Jalinan Digital 
Negara Plan (JENDELA). 
The initial plan announced 
by the Mahathir Administration’s 
MCMC National 5G Task Force was to 
offer the pioneer spectrum bands of 
700MHz and 3.5GHz to a consortium 
of firms. This was justified on grounds 
of efficiency and cost, as forcing 
providers to work together prevents 
the duplication of infrastructure and 
lowers capital expenditure. After 
Mahathir was ousted, his successor, 
Muhyiddin, bypassed the previously 
announced process and allocated the 
700MHz spectrum to five providers. 
The People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) appears to be the big winner 
in Malaysia’s 5G rollout, and would 
have been so regardless of which 
plan was followed. In Malaysia since 
2001, Huawei’s deep penetration of 
its telecommunications equipment 
market has led to its dominance of 
Malaysia’s 4G infrastructure. This 
accords Huawei another advantage 
as it offers further cost savings when 
upgrading its 4G equipment to 5G. 
Maxis announced Huawei as its official 
5G equipment provider, while Celcom 
and TM signed provisional agreements 
to use Huawei’s hardware. Digi was 
exploring co-operation with ZTE, 
another Chinese equipment provider. 
All four major Malaysian providers 
essentially confirmed that they were 
obtaining 5G equipment from Chinese 
sources. Against the backdrop of a 
US–China technology war over 5G 
leadership, this might be construed as 
Malaysia choosing sides. 
Huawei, the Chinese 5G network provider 
Source: Kārlis Dambrāns, Flickr 
In 2018, Dr Mahathir Mohamad 
returned to politics for his second 
term as prime minister at the helm of 
the centrist political coalition Pakatan 
Harapan (PH), which ended the centre-
right Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition’s 
six-decades-long reign over Malaysia. 
His new parliament and cabinet saw a 
higher proportion of non-Malays than 
past administrations — a stunning 
deviation from his long-standing 
endorsement of Ketuanan Melayu 
(Malay pre-eminence as entrenched in 
the Constitution). He replaced prime 
minister Najib Razak, who by mid-
2018 was facing a twelve-year prison 
sentence for corruption. Najib’s shift 
towards China and the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) — the ‘China factor’ 
— was seen as vital to BN’s first ever 
electoral loss. Under Najib, Malaysia 
had signed on to several BRI projects, 
the most prominent being the East 
Coast Rail Link (ECRL). Mahathir’s 
campaign wove a narrative that tied 
Najib’s dealings with China to his 
problems with corruption and debt. 
Mahathir accused Najib of having 
placed self-interest before Malaysia’s 
national interests in signing on to 
these expensive infrastructural 
projects. By focusing his criticism on 
Najib, Mahathir avoided accusations of 
being anti-China and thus left open the 
option of further bilateral economic 
co-operation. However, this election 
left behind two indelible political 
legacies: future governments had 
to avoid being perceived as ceding 
any sovereignty to China and had 
to face higher standards of public 
accountability.
The latter manifested in May, 
leading to the hasty retraction of 5G 
allocations by Muhyiddin’s governing 
Perikatan Nasional alliance, which 
was elected in March with just a two-
seat majority, unseating Mahathir’s 
PH. The non-transparent allocation 
process for 5G might not have attracted 
so much criticism had it not been for 
the mysterious grant to Syed’s Altel. 
Altel had also been awarded 4G bands 
in 2012, which it promptly leased to 
other providers. This allowed Altel to 
profit without making any expensive 
infrastructural investment itself — 
a classic case of rent-seeking behaviour. 
While the backlash against Altel is not 
about China, the persistence of anti-
corruption sentiment signals that 
government decisions surrounding 
future investment need to consider the 
larger picture. If economic policies are 











































kleptocratic elite, they might invite a 
repeat of Najib’s downfall. 
The future of Malaysia’s 5G plans 
remains in flux. Mahathir had promised 
commercial 5G by the third quarter of 
2020, with a simultaneous upgrade 
of 4G capabilities. Muhyiddin’s new 
timeline, announced in September, 
proposes a staged termination of 3G 
services and a concurrent upgrade 
of 4G until 2021, after which there 
will be a transition to 5G.3 This delay 
could be attributed to the disruptions 
caused by COVID-19, with Malaysia’s 
economy expected to shrink by 
3.1 percent in 2020 according to World 
Bank estimates. Malaysia’s second 
wave of COVID-19 ended on 8 July after 
a total of 3,375 infections, but a third 
wave was sparked in September by a 
surge in domestic travel to Sabah for 
that state’s elections.
Muhyiddin’s government is 
also inclined to stand firm against 
China without taking a directly 
confrontational stance. With its 
razor-thin parliamentary majority 
and ongoing leadership challenges, 
including from Mahathir, it does not 
want to be seen as selling out to China 
on any level. 
In April, Chinese research, coast 
guard, and maritime militia vessels 
tailed a Panamanian-flagged drillship 
hired by Petronas, Malaysia’s state gas 
and oil company, in the South China 
Sea. The drillship was conducting 
activities on the outer edge of 
Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) — an area contested by China’s 
Nine-Dash Line territorial claims. 
This was regarded as part of Beijing’s 
intimidation tactics, meant to coerce 
South-East Asian littoral states into 
pursuing joint exploration of resources 
in their EEZs with China.4 (One of the 
Chinese ships had been involved 
in similar alleged harassment of 
a Vietnamese drilling ship the previous 
year.) The standoff lasted into May, 
drawing US and Australian ships to 
the vicinity, where they conducted 
presence operations. In October, 
the detention of six Chinese fishing 
boats and sixty Chinese nationals, 
whom Malaysian officials accused 
of trespassing in Malaysian waters 
was another signal to China of the 
seriousness with which Malaysia 
regards its sovereign territory in the 
South China Sea. Despite Malaysia’s 
resolve, China continued to apply 
pressure as it engaged the South-East 
Asian state in another standoff along 
the coast of Sarawak in late November.
A month earlier, in September, the 
Malaysian Government drew another 
line when it announced that it would 
not entertain extradition requests 
from China for ethnic Uyghur refugees. 
Under Mahathir’s government in 
2018, Malaysia had allowed eleven 
Uyghurs wanted for extradition by 
China to instead leave for Turkey, but 
the decision in September marked 
its first clear position on Uyghur 
extraditions. This helped Muhyiddin’s 
government satisfy two political 
objectives: to demonstrate that 
Malaysian sovereignty over domestic 
issues is absolute, and to appease the 
growing number of Uyghur advocates 
in the constitutionally secular state, 
where Islam is the official religion of 
the federation.5 
The Malaysian Government 
clearly sought to decouple its 
economic and foreign policies; its 
choice of Huawei for 5G cannot be 
regarded as choosing China’s side in 
the face of intensifying great power 
competition more generally. To reduce 
it to a simple matter of choosing sides 
would be to disregard the relevance 
of Huawei’s two decades worth of 
investment in Malaysia, as well as 
domestic exigencies like cost savings 
from upgrading existing 4G Huawei 
infrastructure. Malaysia has a clear 
incentive to deepen economic ties 
with China, yet under Muhyiddin, it 
is also willing to confront Beijing on 
issues like the South China Sea and the 
protection of Uyghurs on its soil. 
Muhyiddin is willing to confront Beijing on issues like the protection of Uyghurs on its soil




























































THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS:
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF INDIAN
NATIONALISM
Source: Presidential Press and Information Office
Andrew Chubb
ON THE AFTERNOON OF 15 JUNE 2020, several 
dozen Chinese and Indian soldiers stared each other 
down on a desolate Himalayan mountainside, more 
than 4,000 metres above sea level. Over the past 
four decades, such standoffs have been common 
along the ‘Line of Actual Control’ in the disputed 
Sino-Indian borderlands, particularly during spring 
and early summer. This is when both sides resume 
patrolling and consolidating their positions after the 
winter freeze. Sometimes standoffs have resulted 
in fistfights or stone throwing, but no personnel of 
either side had died on the border since 1975, when 
four Indian soldiers were shot and killed on a patrol 
at Tulung La, a pass in Arunachal Pradesh at the far 
eastern end of the disputed border. What happened 




























































Not surprisingly, the two sides’ official versions of events diverged sharply. 
According to Foreign Ministry spokesperson for the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) Zhao Lijian 赵立坚, Indian troops ‘violently attacked Chinese 
officers and soldiers who were there for negotiation’. India’s External 
Affairs Ministry spokesperson called it a ‘premeditated and planned 
action’ by the Chinese side. What is not in dispute is that an enormous 
brawl erupted that night, in which hundreds of soldiers wielded an array 
of crude weapons against each other, including rocks, clubs studded with 
nails and batons wrapped in barbed wire. By morning, twenty Indian 
soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers had died, and war 
between Asia’s two rising superpowers was more likely than it had been 
since the 1970s.
The disputed area is so remote and unpopulated that the two 
governments have previously been able to defuse tensions there quietly. 
The mêlée of 15 June changed all that, making the Sino-Indian border 
crisis a matter of intense and ongoing public focus in both countries and 
beyond. Yet in contrast to China’s territorial disputes in the East and 
South China seas, where Beijing has positioned itself as the aggrieved 
historical victim, here India carried the emotional burden — and 
wielded the power — of national humiliation. 
This incident sparked one of China’s most dangerous foreign 
policy crises in 2020. What happened in the Himalayas? How did the 
confrontation begin, and why did it escalate? And what role has Indian 
nationalist outrage played in its handling? 
Control and Crisis
The remote mountain-desert geography in which the crisis unfolded 
has virtually no civilian settlements. In the areas between the two sides’ 
military encampments, territorial control is exercised not by occupation 
but by administrative behaviours such as patrolling and surveillance. It 
is in these grey areas of overlapping presence, where perceptions differ 
as to where the ‘Line of Actual Control’ (LAC) lies, that the crisis unfolded.
The stage was set for the crisis in May, when thousands of PRC 
soldiers, together with trucks, tanks, and artillery, moved into territory 
at several points along the LAC that India believed it controlled, mostly 
in Ladakh, at the western end of the disputed border. According to 
defence journalist and retired Indian Army colonel Ajai Shukla, the 
Indian Army had observed a build-up of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
units throughout April, but its analysts interpreted this as preparations 
for routine drills held in the area each spring.1 
The PLA advanced several kilometres down the Galwan Valley, setting 
up a new encampment and blocking an Indian road under construction. 
Almost simultaneously, about 100 kilometres to the south, Chinese soldiers 
seized an eight-kilometre-wide stretch of territory along the northern shore 
Overview of the China–India border. Crisis erupted in 2020 along the ‘Line of Actual Control,’ at the western 




























































of Pangong Lake. This denied India access to an area it had previously 
patrolled, leading to minor scuffles when the PLA refused access to Indian 
troops. The PLA also occupied territory previously subject to overlapping 
control at several other points along the LAC, including Hot Springs and 
Depsang Plains, as well as North Sikkim, several hundred kilometres away.
PLA occupation of the Galwan Valley would have not just blocked 
India’s road construction, but also afforded the PLA sweeping views over 
a strategic Indian highway in undisputed Indian territory, the Darbuk–
Shyok–Daulat Beg Oldi Road. Known as the DSDBO Road, this recently 
upgraded artery links the Indian military’s furthest-flung border outposts, 
enabling the movement of weaponry, equipment, and supplies to the 
frontier. The prospect of PLA emplacements overlooking this lifeline 
was not a comfortable one for the Indian Army. According to China’s 
Foreign Ministry, on 15 June, Indian troops ‘demolished the tents built by 
the Chinese side’ and then violently attacked ‘Chinese army officers and 
soldiers [who] came to negotiate’.2 
The brutality of the weapons used in the brawl at Galwan paradoxically 
reflected the two sides’ adherence to a mutual agreement to refrain from 
gunfire along the border. Two months later, that norm too fell by the 
wayside. On 7 September, warning shots were fired — each side said it 
was by the other — as Chinese soldiers approached an Indian position on 
the south bank of Pangong Lake. The Indian Army had recently occupied 
several mountain peaks in the area to survey the PLA’s new positions on 
the northern shore of the lake. This was the first time shots had been fired 
on the border since the 1975 incident in Arunachal Pradesh. 
Explanations for Escalation 
In the past, at least some Sino-Indian border incidents have probably been 
the consequence of decisions made by local commanders. The seventy-
two-day standoff at Doklam in 2017, for example, may have been triggered 
by a local PLA unit’s ill-considered idea of building a road on territory 
overlooking India’s vulnerable Siliguri Corridor.3 Since India was not 
previously a claimant to the area, which was contested by the PRC and 
Bhutan, it is possible India’s tough response took the PLA by surprise. 
The crisis in 2020 was different. The scale and co-ordination of the PLA’s 
movements implied approval from the Central Military Commission 
headed by President Xi Jinping 习近平 himself. 
Observers have proposed three main explanations for China’s 
actions. One is opportunism: seeking to take advantage of the distractions 
of the COVID-19 pandemic to make territorial gains at India’s expense. 
A second line of argument is geo-strategic signalling: demonstrating to 
India the potential costs of its warming security ties with the United 
States. A third explanation is insecurity: a pre-emptive show of strength 
at a time of economic slowdown and deteriorating relations with the 
United States. 
Key flashpoints 
along the Line of 
Actual Control 
(dotted orange 
line) in 2020. 
Arrows indicate 
approximate 






























































Without access to the black box of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
decision-making, it is difficult to prove motivation, and all three factors 
could simultaneously be at play. History offers some support for the third 
explanation. It is not the first time the PRC has behaved aggressively 
on the Sino-Indian border during domestic troubles. Allen Whiting’s 
classic study The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence shows how, in 1962, 
facing severe economic, social, and political stresses in the wake of the 
Great Leap Forward, PRC leaders perceived a ‘180-degree’ arc of threat 
in which enemies from Taiwan to the US, and from India to the Soviet 
Union, were conspiring to take advantage of China’s internal turmoil.4 
A traditional Chinese political idiom holds that internal chaos often 
brings external trouble 内乱外患. 
Yet the PRC was facing relatively few external security threats in 
2020 compared with 1962. Its relations with Russia are blooming, and 
the ruling party on Taiwan could not be less interested in retaking the 
Mainland. The CCP had effectively quashed the threat of COVID-19 
through social mobilisation and public health measures backed by a 
massive propaganda campaign — and the arrests of dozens of citizen 
journalists and others who dared tell a different story about it. While 
the PRC also faced its first quarterly economic contraction since 1978, 
even its economic worries were noticeably easing by the time troops 
began moving on the Indian border in May. It is difficult, moreover, to 
identify any Indian moves along the border in early 2020 that could be 
construed as threatening. A more convincing explanation is that the PRC 
was responding to two actions India had taken the previous year. 
One was the completion of the strategic DSDBO Road in 2019, which 
greatly enhanced communications and logistics for India’s outposts along 
the LAC. The PLA’s move down the Galwan Valley appears to have been 
aimed at establishing an overlook on to this road. The second was India’s 
dissolution of the state of Jammu and Kashmir on 31 October 2019. This 
administrative act proclaimed Ladakh, together with the Chinese-held 
territory of Aksai Chin, as a new Union Territory directly administered 
by the government in New Delhi. At the time, the PRC denounced this as 
placing Chinese territory under Indian administration, accused India of 
challenging China’s sovereign rights and interests, and described the act 
as illegal, null, and void. China’s moves along the LAC the following year 
may have been what the University of Macau’s You Ji 由冀 has called ‘one-
plus retaliation’, meaning that China responds to perceived provocations 
by advancing its own position one step further than its adversary has.5
Due to its peculiar geography, activity in the disputed areas is seasonal: 
these high-altitude deserts are largely inaccessible until spring. In many 
areas, soldiers can only be deployed in large numbers and progress made 
on infrastructural projects after the winter ice has melted. The timing of 
China’s military build-up in April and its movements in early May was in 
line with this seasonal cycle. 
This is significant because it means Beijing’s decision to advance 
might have been taken many months earlier, though it could only be 
implemented with the arrival of spring. This supports the two key 
developments discussed above as the main motivations for the PRC’s move. 
Nationalism and 1962
Chinese popular nationalism has featured prominently in the unfolding 
of international crises in recent years. Commentators, including within 
China itself, have expressed concern about the potential for an agitated 
Chinese public to constrain the state from seeking diplomatic solutions to 
sensitive problems, or for rampant nationalism to drive the escalation of 
crises involving Taiwan, the South China Sea or China–Japan disputes. In 
this case, however, Indian nationalists are the ones who are claiming the 
higher moral ground as historical victims. 
From India’s perspective, China has unlawfully occupied some 
40,000 square kilometres of its land in Ladakh since the 1950s. It was 



























































liberated Tibet’) and solidified control of its western expanses by 
building a highway linking Tibet with Xinjiang via Aksai Chin, the PRC-
administered portion of the disputed territory. In those pre-satellite 
days, New Delhi only realised this when construction was already 
complete. The ensuing cycle of escalation culminated in the 1962 Sino-
Indian border war in which Mao Zedong’s 毛泽东 troops overran almost 
the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector before 
unilaterally withdrawing, as if to underline the insult; most of the war’s 
several thousand casualties were Indian.
The PLA’s decisive victories in the 1962 war not only humiliated 
the Indian Army, they also entrenched a status quo in Ladakh that was 
highly unfavourable for India, in which China controls almost all of the 
disputed territory. A nationalistic press and commentariat have kept 
1962 vivid in India’s popular consciousness. The democratic political 
system, meanwhile, rewards tough posturing on border issues. 
The Galwan Valley violence of 15 June immediately triggered 
impassioned anti-Chinese street protests across India.6 Crowds smashed 
their Chinese products, torched the PRC’s national flag, burned 
effigies and portraits of Xi Jinping, and demanded boycotts of Chinese 
Rifle-toting Indian soldiers on patrol during the brief, bloody 1962 Sino-Indian border war
Source: Photographer unknown, 1 January 1962
companies. The media provided wall-to-wall coverage of the incident 
and aftermath, and opinion leaders lined up to demand retribution for 
the deaths of the twenty Indian soldiers. 
Until 15 June, and the popular reaction that followed, the Indian 
Government had downplayed the seriousness of the confrontations. 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and government-friendly media had 
repeatedly asserted that there had been no Chinese incursions into 
India’s claimed territory. This questionable claim got little traction in 
traditional and online media, with the liberal-leaning Congress Party 
opposition lambasting the denials. The pressure mounted for Modi to at 
least appear to be doing something.
The main catchcry of this outpouring of nationalism — ‘Boycott 
China!’ — reflects widespread scepticism in India about the benefits 
of trade with China. In the Pew Research Center’s most recent global 
poll, conducted in 2019, India was the only Asian country in which 
a majority of respondents considered China’s economic growth to be 
a bad thing for their country.7 In this context, it was not surprising that 
India chose to retaliate economically. By the start of July, New Delhi 
had announced a raft of symbolic yet costly economic sanctions on the 
PRC, from bans on fifty-nine popular apps like TikTok through to the 
re-tendering of railway and highway projects involving Chinese 
companies. Indian Railways cancelled an US$129 million contract 
for signalling and telecommunications work, and the Ministry of 
Highway and Road Transport scrapped winning bids from PRC firms 
for two stretches of the 1,300 kilometre, US$150 million Delhi–Mumbai 
expressway.8 India’s road transport minister declared: ‘[W]e won’t 
entertain any Chinese player directly or indirectly’ in future highway 
projects.9
The Indian Government’s language was at times strikingly familiar 
to that frequently employed by Beijing in diplomatic altercations. In 
a speech to a national meeting of India’s political parties on 19 June, 



























































at the steps taken by China at the LAC’, according to a government 
summary posted on the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) website. ‘No 
one can even dare look towards an inch of our land.’10 In diplomatic 
exchanges, Indian foreign policy officials also tried to impress on their 
Chinese counterparts the ‘sensitivities’ of the issue.11 In November, after 
Twitter showed a map depicting Ladakh as part of China, the national 
spokesperson for Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party announced that 
the company had ‘apologised for hurting Indian sentiments and have 
sworn to correct the error’.12
Modi’s allusion to the hurt and anger of the ‘entire country’ 
acknowledged the genuine prevailing outrage in India. But the 
publication of the remark on the MEA website also suggests an intention 
to communicate to Beijing the popular pressure on the government to 
escalate the conflict in the hope that it might lead China’s leaders to 
take steps to cool the situation. But did that work, or did the nationalist 
protests and the rhetoric from New Delhi simply convince the Chinese 
leadership to prepare even more thoroughly for confrontation? 
PRC Perceptions of Indian Public Opinion
The waves of nationalism in India attracted significant attention in China, 
where they were addressed in statements by leaders of the Party-State, 
on state media and through scholarly analyses. In a 6 July telephone 
conversation with India’s National Security Adviser, PRC Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi 王毅 called on India to 
move in the same direction as the Chinese side, correctly guide public 
opinion and the people’s sentiments, safeguard and advance the two 
sides’ normal contact and co-operation, and avoid taking measures 
that enlarge or complicate the dispute, jointly safeguarding the overall 
situation of Sino-Indian relations. 
In an 11 July speech, the PRC’s ambassador in Delhi similarly noted with 
concern ‘emerging opinions in recent days which repudiate the essence of 
China–India friendship’.13
PRC leaders and media had used near-identical language following 
outbursts of anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam in 2011 and 2014. As 
a call for the other side to placate or control anti-China public opinion, it 
implies that Beijing understands nationalist sentiments to be stronger in 
India than in China. It is, in effect, an admission that the other country 
possesses what strategists call ‘escalation dominance’ — the ability 
to maintain overwhelming advantages in a given domain at any level 
of conflict — in the field of public opinion. The PRC’s call for India to 
‘correctly guide public opinion and the people’s sentiments’ was a sign 
of Beijing’s recognition of the danger and political significance of the 
rising domestic nationalist sentiments in India regarding the crisis. 
In the immediate aftermath of the deadly 15 June clash, Global 
Times chief editor Hu Xijin 胡锡进, a key opinion leader in PRC popular 
discourse on foreign affairs, argued that withholding the number of 
PLA casualties from the Galwan Valley brawl was an act of ‘goodwill’ by 
Beijing. In an English-language Twitter post, he wrote: ‘My understanding 
is the Chinese side doesn’t want the people of the two countries to 
compare the casualties number so to avoid stoking public mood.’14 In 
other crises, including the 2017 standoff at the Doklam Plateau (see the 
China Story Yearbook 2017: Prosperity, Forum, ‘Peripheral Trouble: The 
Sino-Indian Standoff’, pp.99–103), Hu’s state-run tabloid led the way in 
‘stoking the public mood’ within China.
Editorials and commentaries in the Global Times, Hu’s state-run, 
semi-commercial newspaper and web portal that voices state-approved 
popular nationalist sentiment on international affairs, put forward an 
array of interpretations of Indian public opinion during the crisis. In 
late May, even before the outbreak of hostilities, Hu had already begun 



























































which he contrasted with the Chinese side’s restraint.15 This was followed 
with a commentary cautioning against ‘extreme anti-China sentiment’ 
promoted by ‘radical media outlets and organizations in India’.16 
Following the wave of nationalist mobilisation in India in mid-June, 
the newspaper directly addressed Indian citizens with the message 
that boycotting China would harm India’s own interests.17 Other state 
publications hammered home the message about Indian public opinion 
as a dangerous escalatory force that the Indian Government needed to 
control. A 1 July article from the State Council–affiliated China News 
Service, for example, reported that ‘half a month after [the incident,] the 
Himalayan border conflict is still stimulating irrational outpourings of 
Indian domestic nationalist sentiments’.18 
Following Prime Minister Modi’s conspicuous 3 July visit to rally 
troops in Ladakh, and India’s ban on fifty-nine PRC apps announced 
four days earlier, CCTV-4 devoted its Today in Focus 今日关注 program 
to the spiralling tensions. It did not take long for Indian public opinion 
to feature in the discussion. Ministry of Foreign Affairs–affiliated 
academic Ruan Zongze 阮宗泽 argued that Modi’s military posturing 
was a response to sentiments whipped up by the Indian media and 
opposition. Ruan’s colleague Su Xiaohui 苏晓晖 warned that banning 
Chinese apps would ‘agitate’ Indian nationalism, creating additional 
barriers to de-escalation.19 
Other PRC observers recognised Modi as a nationalist leader under 
pressure to live up to his reputation. A 17 July article on Guancha.cn, 
an international affairs site popular with intellectuals co-founded by 
venture capitalist Eric X. Li 李世默, observed: 
Since the Sino-Indian confrontation, Indian domestic nationalist 
sentiments have risen rapidly. From some Indian people boycotting 
‘Made in China’ to India’s government ban on WeChat and other 
Chinese apps, the great nationalist flagbearer Modi is facing 
increasingly massive domestic pressures.20
In one of the first scholarly analyses of the crisis, published on 19 August, 
one of China’s leading India experts, Yang Siling 杨思灵 of the Yunnan 
Academy of Social Sciences, argued that Indian popular nationalism had 
contributed to an ‘increased risk of large-scale confrontation or even war’. 
Yang wrote:
Indian officials, media, and scholars’ discussion of China’s ‘invasion’ 
and distorted reports and propaganda inevitably results in a surge 
of domestic anti-China sentiments, which in turn force the Indian 
government and military to maintain a hard-line stance and even 
take things to the brink … anti-Chinese sentiments provoked by these 
kinds of words could force the Indian Government into a dead end of 
military confrontation with China.21
Besides pinning the blame on India, such an assessment also carries an 
important, though unstated, policy implication for China: Beijing needs to 
act cautiously if it wishes to avoid an accidental war with India.




























































As the Indian economic sanctions piled up in late August, the Global 
Times’s editorials blamed them on a combination of domestic pressure 
and strategic avarice. ‘Indian domestic anti-China public opinion has 
been clamorous’, an editorial observed in late August, leading India to 
‘overestimate its strength, imposing economic sanctions on China and 
increasing its links with America in an attempt to pressure China into 
backing down’.22 
The same editorial also characterised India’s management of the 
crisis as a diversionary ploy: 
India is presently beset by domestic problems, especially the seriously 
out of control coronavirus pandemic … By provoking Sino-Indian 
border tensions New Delhi intends to divert domestic attention. It’s 
international hooliganism, and a domestic political fraud. 
Indian public opinion, in this view, was pressuring the country’s leaders 
into hard-line anti-Chinese actions, while those same leaders were 
benefiting politically from driving attention towards the issue.
As the crisis escalated again in late August, the PRC’s propaganda 
organs began to emphasise that nationalist sentiments were now growing 
among the Chinese public. On 31 August, the Global Times reported that 
a poll of just under 2,000 PRC citizens had found 89 percent support 
for China to make an ‘armed self-defence counter-attack’ 武力自卫反击 
should further clashes occur on the Sino-Indian border. The report also 
said that nearly 70 percent of respondents had agreed that India’s anti-
China sentiments were ‘excessive’.  
With the news of warning shots fired on 7 September, the real-world 
dangers increased further. The Global Times’s editorial that day called 
for an end to this vicious cycle, but offered no suggestion as to how it 
might be done, besides exhorting India to take control of public opinion: 
Indian public opinion’s participation in the border issues is too deep 
and too broad, the Indian Army is clearly captive to domestic 
nationalism, and their ostentatious displays in the border area, it must 
be said, are influenced by the intense interactions of the military and 
the media. Thus, besides China and India jointly controlling the border 
disputes, India domestically should control the above-mentioned 
interactions of public opinion and the military nationalism, the 
beneficial choice for itself and its people.23
Nowhere did the Global Times admit any possibility that Beijing’s actions 
might have contributed to the situation.
For the time being, surging Indian nationalist sentiments and actions 
are making Beijing uncomfortable, but also cautious. As chair of the 
Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping is the PLA’s commander-in-chief. 
If he were to conclude that Indian nationalist sentiments are so strong 
that sooner or later a clash on the border will escalate into a war, he might 
be inclined to strike first. If such a scenario should come to pass, Indian 
nationalism would have flipped overnight from a fragile deterrent to 
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BETWEEN 2000 AND 2018, Chinese financial institutions provided 
more than US$152 billion in credit, 
loans, and grants to Africa, funding 
projects including railway lines, ports, 
stadiums, hospitals, presidential 
palaces, and digital migration 
programs.1 In recent years, there has 
been growing concern about debt 
distress in nations across the continent, 
including Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
and Djibouti. Loan repayments are 
draining badly needed public revenue 
from African nations, which in 2020 
also faced the need for increased 
investment in public health due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
Even before the devastating 
health and economic crises instigated 
by COVID-19, there were growing calls 
from the Bretton Woods institutions 
alongside African heads of state, such as 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, 
for the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) to forgive the debt owed by some 
African countries.2 In 2020, Beijing 
decided to walk a fine line between 
selectively cancelling some debts and 
postponing others, while resisting calls 
for blanket debt forgiveness.3 
Chinese lending to Africa began in 
1960, with a loan to Guinea to finance 
trade and economic projects, including 
a cigarette and match factory, followed 
C H I N E S E  L O A N S  TO 
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by one in 1963 to Algeria to buy arms 
and medical equipment and to train 
soldiers for its anti-imperial fight 
against France.4 In 1969, Chinese 
leader Mao Zedong agreed to finance 
one of Africa’s largest infrastructure 
projects, the Tanzam railway line, 
linking Zambia’s Copperbelt and the 
Port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.5 To 
Chinese officials, this aid and support 
had strong anti-colonial significance 
— in the case of the Tanzam railway, 
for example, breaking the stranglehold 
of Rhodesia and South Africa on 
landlocked Zambia’s access to ports. 
These loans were also meant to shore 
up international support against 
threats from Taiwan, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States.6 
Fast-forwarding to the 1990s, 
investment and aid from Western 
countries to Africa began to slow, 
precipitated by slowing domestic 
economies and the Asian Financial 
Crisis (which improved the 
competitiveness of Asian economies vis-
à-vis their African counterparts),7 and 
China emerged as a relatively friendly 
financier, offering flexible, rapid, and 
often large loans with promises of 
‘no strings attached’ (in contrast with 
the stringent structural adjustment 
programs that often were imposed in 
tandem with Western investments).8 To 
some African states with limited capital 
and high levels of unemployment, 
Beijing’s finance was timely. As former 
Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi 
observed in 2002 during an official visit 
to China, Chinese finance provided firm 
economic support to African countries.9 
The Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), introduced in 2013, has further 
increased China’s investments across 
the African continent, with a focus on 
infrastructure including roads, ports, 
bridges, and airports. At the Forum 
on China–Africa Co-operation in 2018, 
President Xi Jinping announced that, 
as part of the BRI, China would provide 
an additional US$60 billion over three 
years as concessional loans, grants, 
and trade and development finance to 
Africa.10 By May 2020, researchers at the 
China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) 
reported that China had disbursed 
about US$38.7 billion of this amount.11 
By then, however, debt levels 
were already becoming unsustainable. 
In 2018, 19 percent of external debt 
repayment by African governments 
went to China.12 Average debt 
repayment as a percentage of 
government revenue across the 
continent rose from 5 percent to 
11 percent between 2015 and 2018.13 
More specific to the debt distress 
problem relating to Chinese loans, 
researchers at CARI have shown that 
Chinese loans account for more than 
one-quarter of external loans for 
African countries facing high debt 
distress.14 These countries include 
Kenya (27 percent), Zimbabwe 
(25 percent), Zambia (26 percent), 
Cameroon (32 percent), and Ethiopia 
(32 percent), with the worst performers 
being the Republic of Congo 
(45 percent) and Djibouti (57 percent).15 
US government officials and 
some civil society organisations in 
Africa argue that African countries 
risk surrendering strategic assets and 
eventually their sovereignty to China 
in the event of debt default. Former US 
national security advisor John R. Bolton 
has accused the PRC of the ‘strategic use 
of debt to hold states in Africa captive 
to Beijing’s wishes and demands’.16 
Beijing, of course, denies this.17 
Indeed, Beijing acknowledged in 2020 
that Africa needs ‘the international 
community, especially developed 
countries and multilateral financial 
institutions, [to] act more forcefully on 
debt relief and suspension’ to help the 
region combat COVID-19.18 
The high levels of debt owed 
by African countries to China could 
not only undermine Africa’s own 
development but also hurt Sino-African 
relations and co-operation in other 
spheres. According to Chris Alden, these 
high debt levels have ‘the potential to 
produce the most profound change in 
relations since China became a major 
economic player on the continent’ and 





















































‘African governments and society are 
increasingly asking China to come up 
with answers to this problem’.19 
The Bretton Woods institutions 
have acknowledged the burden of debt 
repayment on developing countries, 
calling for debt forgiveness to help 
these nations respond to the financial 
distress caused by the economic 
fallout from COVID-19. In April, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank proposed the Debt 
Suspension Initiative (DSI), which was 
endorsed by G20 finance ministers. 
The DSI suspends loans, but it does not 
forgive them. While officials from both 
the IMF and the World Bank asked 
China to forgive most of the debts owed 
by African states, Beijing has resisted 
the idea of any blanket or large-scale 
debt forgiveness, instead proposing to 
work within the DSI framework and 
look at each country’s debt on a case-
by-case basis.20 
On 17 June, via video link to the 
Extraordinary China–Africa Summit 
on Solidarity against COVID-19, 
President Xi Jinping 习近平 spoke of 
fighting ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with 
African nations against the virus, 
including offering medical teams 
and supplies from China.21 He also 
stated that China would forgive all 
the interest-free government loans 
due to mature by the end of 2020 
and affirmed that China would 
work through multilateral agencies 
to provide broader solutions to 
Africa’s debt crisis, including by 
further extending the period of 
debt suspension.22 
While China was once applauded 
for providing African countries with 
a firm basis for economic growth 
and development through funding 
infrastructure, trade and industry, 
a growing controversy has emerged 
over the implications of Chinese loans 
for African economies. The decision 
to work within the multilateral 
debt servicing initiative and look at 
African debts on a case-by-case basis 
leaves room for Beijing to protect is 
diplomatic and economic interests, 
but also provides critics with fodder 
to question China’s ‘true intentions 
in Africa’. For Africans, it is unlikely 
that COVID-19 will put a brake on the 
region’s quest for Chinese finance. 
The pandemic, however, may create 
new opportunities for African leaders 
to adopt more sustainable debt 

























































ON THE SOUTHERN SLOPES of the Himalayas, in the shadow of 
Mount Everest, lies Nepal, a country 
that is remarkable for its rugged 
terrain and turbulent politics. A Hindu 
kingdom until 2008, the landlocked 
country is officially the world’s only 
secular federal parliamentary republic 
governed by a duly elected communist 
party, the Nepal Communist Party 
(NCP). In his second stint in office, 
which began in January 2018 (the first 
was in 2015–2016), Prime Minister 
Khadga Prasad ‘K.P.’ Sharma Oli forged 
an alliance with Nepali Maoists to guide 
the NCP to victory in the 23 January 
2020 national assembly elections. 
Now he serves as co-chairman of 
the Party with Maoist leader Pushpa 
Kamal Dahal, whose nom de guerre is 
Prachanda (meaning ‘fierce’). They are 
presiding over the NCP at a time when 
it commands an absolute majority 
at federal, provincial, and local 
government levels.1
However, the NCP faced numerous 
crises in 2020 that could complicate 
its ability to govern effectively during 
this term and may compromise its 
comfortable majority in the 2022 
elections. There is widespread popular 
criticism of the authoritarian, illiberal 
and hard-liner turn it took because of 
the alliance with the Maoists. It also 
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faces accusations of discrimination 
against the Madheshi (lowland Terai 
peoples of Indian origin) and Dalit 
(so-called untouchable) people. 
Geopolitical tensions with India over 
contested territories and the need to 
balance relations with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) (its principal 
source of foreign direct investment) 
and India (one of its major sources of 
remittances) have added to its woes, 
as have Oli’s bungled handling of the 
COVID-19 virus in Nepal.2 Opposition 
critics in the social-democratic Nepali 
Congress party and Hindu nationalist 
National Democratic Party have 
grabbed on to every failure. 
Even within the NCP, there are 
grumblings. Prachanda has already 
warned that the Party has grown 
distanced from the people and its 
‘communist principles’, becoming 
‘individualistic and power-centred’. In 
2019 he argued that communism could 
fail in Nepal as it did in the former 
Soviet Union.3 The NCP, in short, faces 
a crisis of legitimacy. Although many 
of its leaders identify as Maoists, they 
are almost exclusively upper-caste, 
ethnic-majority men, and they seem 
to have discarded the ideology that 
drove them during the ‘people’s war’ 
of 1996–2006.4 
Before the 2018 merger, the 
Maoist Centre, or CPN-M, was the 
more prominent of the two communist 
Nepal Communist Party Chairmen Pushpa Kamal Dahal (left) and K.P. Sharma Oli (right) 
Source: Pradip Timsina-Think Tank, Wikimedia
parties. It subscribed to Mao Zedong 
Thought 毛泽东思想, with its focus on 
applying Marxist-Leninist theory to 
concrete realities, guerrilla warfare, 
agrarian revolution, and anti-
imperialism. Its charismatic leader, 
Prachanda, had twice served as prime 
minister, from 2008 to 2009 and again 
in 2016–2017, before the merger led to 
him sharing NCP leadership with Oli.5 
The ‘Prachanda Path’ he developed 
during the war promoted ‘continuous 
revolution’ and opposed what he 
described as ‘right capitulationism and 
sectarian dogmatism’, which in the 
Nepali context indicated coexistence 
between capitalism and socialism, 
and the pervasiveness of conservative 
Hindu traditions — a compromise 
with which the NCP under Oli is 
more comfortable.6 
The CPN-M is not the only Maoist 
group outside China to have gained 
state power: the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea, or Khmer Rouge, 
which ruled Cambodia under Pol Pot 
from 1975 to 1979, also seized power 
using Maoist methods. In Nepal, as in 
Cambodia, Maoism took hold during 
China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–
1976), when Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) leaders encouraged anti-imperial 
revolutions globally through the mass 
translation and dissemination of Mao’s 
works.7 The CCP tasked its Foreign 
Languages Press with translating 
Mao’s works for a global readership, 
which were distributed to more than 
100 countries by Chinese embassy 
personnel and ‘progressive bookstores’ 
at virtually no cost.8 
In Nepal, such books as the 
Quotations of Mao Zedong, Song 
of Youth, and Bright Red Star were 
soon, as Nepali translator Khagendra 
Sangroula (b. 1946) said in an 
interview, ‘everywhere in Kathmandu: 
wide and loud’ — and outside the 
capital, too. As a child, one Nepali 
Maoist recalled visiting a library in his 
hometown of Bhaktapur: 
[I] told the librarian that I was 
interested in tales of bravery. 
They gave me a small book 
entitled The Life of Mao, through 
which I learned about Mao’s 
love of serving the people, his 
patriotism, the way he brought 
China forward.9 
A curious readership soon developed 
into radical critics of, then active agents 
fighting against, the kingdom’s status 
quo. The 1951 Nepalese revolution, 
initiated by anti-monarchist political 
























































autocratic, iron-fisted Rana dynasty 
(1846–1951 CE) and installed a brief 
constitutional democracy. But in 1960, 
the Royal House of Gorkha launched 
a coup that suspended parliament 
and banned all political parties. The 
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN, 1949–
1962) fractured into factions, including 
one that was pro-China and another 
that was pro-Soviet. 
The Nepali Maoists posited 
themselves as the ‘voice of Nepal’s 
poor and marginalised, the indigenous 
ethnic peoples, the lower castes, 
peasants, workers, students, and 
women’.10 In 1994, they formed the 
underground CPN-M, which aimed to 
topple the monarchy through ‘people’s 
war’ and to establish a ‘people’s 
republic’. They sent ‘political-cultural 
teams’ into the villages to mobilise 
the poor against oppressors such as 
landlords and police, and carried out 
land reform based on the violent Maoist 
model.11 The ‘people’s war’ began in 
earnest on 13 February 1996 after 
Nepali Prime Minister Sher Bahadur 
Deuba (b. 1946) dismissed the Maoists’ 
list of forty demands, which included 
improving workers’ wages, narrowing 
the gap between rich and poor and 
eliminating the exploitation of and 
discrimination against women and 
ethnic minorities.12 The people’s war 
itself began in the mid-western districts 
of Rolpa, Rukum, and Jajarkot, where 
the Maoists had already established 
strongholds.13 It targeted, in the words 
of Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, 
‘the most obvious signs of inequality 
in the form of local politicians, police 
posts, the judiciary, rural banks, and 
land revenue offices’.14 The CPN-M 
went from controlling three of the 
country’s seventy-five districts in 
1996 to controlling forty-five in 2003, 
establishing ‘people’s governments’ in 
twenty-one of them.15 
Although many villagers 
regarded the Maoists’ tactics as 
‘positive’ forces for change,16 their 
experience of Maoism was mixed. The 
Maoists coerced villagers into joining 
their movement through conscription 
and threats of or actual violence, and 
even abducted children to serve as 
guerrilla fighters,17 reportedly luring 
impoverished Dalit children into 
their People’s Liberation Army with 
offers of food.18 
More than 17,000 deaths later 
(nearly half of them Maoist), the 
conflict overthrew the royal autocracy 
and the CPN-M emerged as a major 
national political party of considerable 
influence.19 After party leaders signed 
the Comprehensive Peace Accord with 
the Government of Nepal in November 
2006, Nepal became a federal republic.20 
After leading three governments, the 
party merged with the NCP, which won 
government in 2018.
Before the merger, in September 
2015, the CPN-M had drafted Nepal’s 
seventh constitution. Critics claimed 
that by failing, among other things, 
to outlaw gender discrimination 
and other forms of prejudice, the 
constitution failed to deliver on the 
Maoists’ promises of equality and 
higher standards of living.21 Women 
and ethnic minorities had been among 
the Maoists’ most fervent supporters. 
Some estimates suggest as many as 
four out of every ten of its fighters 
and civilian supporters were women. 
Yet the Party’s rise to power did not 
result in women receiving promotions 
to leadership positions in the Party 
or in government; following the 2020 
elections, only one of the twenty-two 
NCP ministers was a woman.22 As long 
ago as 2003, Maoist activist Aruna 
Uprety accused the CPN-M of ‘behaving 
no differently than our “men-stream” 
political parties’.23  Women made up 
one-third of the Constituent Assembly 
in 2008, but in 2020, Uprety’s criticism 
remains a valid one — despite the 
significant achievement of the country 
electing its first female president, 
Bidya Devi Bhandari.
Similarly, the new constitution 
failed to codify protections for 
ethnic minorities and oppressed 
castes, including the sixty non-Hindu 
Tibeto-Burman–speaking peoples 
and lowland Madheshis the Maoists 
had once courted.24 An ethnic Magar 
interviewee told a researcher in 2004 
that he had joined the Nepali People’s 
Liberation Army partly because 
of ‘economic repression’ but also 
because, as an indigenous person, 
Arming our minds with Mao Zedong Thought to 
become heroic warriors of the working class
























































he had not been allowed to speak his 
language and suffered under other 
repressive policies of the Hindu 
government.25 In 2020, anti-Madheshi 
discrimination persisted and caste-
based discrimination remained 
a major problem.26 
Although Nepali politics were 
more stable than they had been for 
decades, these problems, and serious 
socio-economic inequality in general, 
remained unaddressed. As part of 
the ruling coalition, Maoists have 
abandoned more radical visions 
in favour of moderate approaches. 
This might help them stay in power, 
but in 2020, it seems increasingly 
unlikely that they will maintain 
legitimacy as the defenders of the poor 
and downtrodden. 
Maoist supporters 




































































ECONOMIC POWER AND VULNERABILITY
IN SINO-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS
Victor Ferguson and Darren J. Lim
Source: Jamie C2009, Flickr
FOR MORE THAN TWO DECADES, Australia’s 
leaders have expressed the expectation, or 
perhaps the hope, that the country’s mutually 
beneficial trading relationship with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) would flourish regardless 
of occasional political disagreements between 
Canberra and Beijing. Despite different political 
systems, divergent values, and Australia’s steadfast 
commitment to the US alliance, many inside the 
Australian government insisted that ‘cold politics’ 
































































Such public optimism was maintained 
by Canberra over the past decade, 
despite growing evidence of China’s 
willingness to use its geoeconomic 
power by leveraging trade 
relationships to resolve political 
disputes. In 2010, Norwegian salmon 
exports were suspended following 
the awarding of the Nobel Peace 
Prize to a Chinese dissident. In 2012, 
bananas from the Philippines rotted 
in Chinese ports following a maritime 
confrontation in the South China Sea. 
And in 2017, Chinese group tours to 
South Korea were banned during a dispute over a missile defence system. 
Other alleged cases of Chinese economic coercion have featured targets as 
diverse as Mongolia, Japan, and Canada. 
Until 2020, however, Australia had mostly managed to avoid such 
an experience.1 Despite a recent downward spiral in political relations 
— strained by, among other things, Australia’s 2017 foreign interference 
legislation, the 2018 exclusion of Huawei from the 5G network and 
criticism of Chinese actions in the South China Sea — bilateral trade had 
not experienced much, if any, obviously politically motivated disruption.2 
Then, on 19 April, the Morrison government called for an independent 
inquiry into the origins and spread of COVID-19. 
The Chinese government swiftly denounced Canberra’s proposal as a 
political attack. In a now infamous interview with the Australian Financial 
Review, Cheng Jingye 成竞业, China’s Ambassador to Australia, described 
Australia’s push as ‘dangerous’ and ‘irresponsible’, before speculating on 
how China might respond: 
Cheng Jingye, China’s Ambassador to Australia, 
described Australia’s push as ‘dangerous’ 
and ‘irresponsible’
Source: Sophie Paris, CTBTO Photo
The tourists may have second thoughts. Maybe the parents of the 
students would also think whether this place, which they find is not 
so friendly, even hostile, is the best place to send their kids to … And 
also, maybe the ordinary people will think why they should drink 
Australian wine or eat Australian beef?3 
The comments stirred controversy and prompted Australian Foreign 
Minister Marise Payne to publicly denounce attempts at ‘economic 
coercion’.4  They also proved to be prescient: over the coming months, 
each of the industries the ambassador identified experienced some form 
of disruption in their trade with China. 
Power and Sino-Australian Economic 
Interdependence 
Successful economic coercion relies on an asymmetry in the costs of 
forgoing a trade relationship: the lost trade must be relatively less costly for 
the party doing the coercing. For most of the past twenty years, Australia’s 
resource-heavy export mix underpinned a belief that, should China 
have any reason to coerce Australia, it would be constrained in so doing. 
Australian commodities such as iron ore and coal have been vital inputs 
into China’s manufacturing and construction industries and are not easy 
to replace with alternatives. Australia’s supposed invulnerability derived 
from the assumption that any benefits for China from disrupting this trade 
for coercive purposes would be outweighed by political problems arising 
from the damage to the Chinese economy. 
By 2020, there were three significant challenges to the status quo. 
First, the rise of trade in services — particularly education and tourism 
— meant resources were no longer the only story in Australia’s exports 
to China. In the 2018–2019 financial year, education ranked as Australia’s 
































































most important market for both sectors and major disruption to them 
could cause significant damage to the Australian economy, as the COVID-19 
border closures illustrated.
Meanwhile, a maturing Chinese economy was changing the Chinese 
government’s economic calculus. With export-led growth slowing, 
concerns about other interests, such as pollution, resource security, and 
the self-sufficiency of Chinese producers, served to lower the demand 
for various categories of foreign imports. The less essential an import 
category was to the domestic Chinese economy, the easier it was to justify 
disrupting it for coercive purposes. 
The third and perhaps most important factor was the shift in Beijing’s 
global political interests. The PRC is now a confident and assertive major 
power with an expanded set of interests that are increasingly coming into 
conflict with those of other countries, including Australia. Meanwhile, the 
authoritarian Chinese Community Party (CCP) under Xi Jinping 习近平 has 
faced growing criticism both at home and abroad. As a result, it has become 
increasingly focused on defending against threats to its political legitimacy.6 
Such threats can be perceived in international reproach of events and 
policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, or suggestions that Beijing is responsible 
for the COVID-19 pandemic. The stronger the CCP’s political interests in an 
issue, the greater economic costs it will endure to protect them. 
In the 2018–2019 financial year, tourism ranked as Australia’s sixth-largest export
Source: Rambo2100, Flickr
These three gradual changes cumulatively created the conditions in 
which Australian vulnerability to economic coercion was greater than it 
had been in the past. 
Barley
The first apparent instance of retaliation was China’s imposition of anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy tariffs on Australian barley. On 10 May, China’s 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced a determination that Australian 
barley growers had received illegal subsidies and ‘dumped’ their produce 
in China at predatory prices, undermining local competitors. Tariffs of 80.5 
percent were imposed on 18 May, to remain in place until 2025. 
Some Australian commentators argued the tariffs were coercive 
sanctions.7  MOFCOM denied this, calling them ‘a normal trade remedy’. 
The Australian government distanced itself from arguments that the 
tariffs were political, though Trade Minister Simon Birmingham said he 
could ‘understand why people draw those links’.
There is reason not to jump to conclusions. The Chinese investigation 
that led to the tariffs was launched in 2018, long before COVID-19. At 
that time, it appeared to be retaliation for Australia’s own anti-dumping 
measures on Chinese products — an issue of trade, not politics.8 
It just so happened that the eighteen-month investigation time 
limit coincided with the bilateral political row, and in the middle of the 
season for planting winter crops. Perhaps the tariffs would have been 
imposed regardless. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Beijing failed to 
understand that they would be perceived as coercive, especially after the 
ambassador’s comments and the expression of similar hypotheticals in 
Chinese state media editorials.9
The tariffs effectively cut off the barley industry’s most important 
market. Since 2014–2015, China had purchased approximately 50 percent 
































































The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
estimates that losing the China market will cost barley growers about 
AU$330 million a year, although some farmers claim that losses could 
amount to up to AU$1 billion a year.10 Growers can offset some costs 
by shifting to alternative crops and diverting exports (albeit for 
lower prices). However, the tariffs are still a significant blow to the 
Australian agricultural sector. Subsequent reports of an ‘informal 
ban’ on Australian barley and the suspension of imports from two of 
Australia’s largest grain exporters, CBH and Emerald Grain, suggest 
the market may remain inaccessible for some time regardless of the 
tariffs.11
Why was barley vulnerable? First, Australian barley is relatively 
substitutable, partly because barley can be sourced elsewhere (although 
not necessarily at the same price or volumes), and also because, as a 
livestock feed, it can be replaced with other grains. While there are 
some costs for Chinese importers, they are not so great as to disrupt 
the wider economy.12 By contrast, it is harder for Australian growers 
to find alternative export markets. Second, by framing the tariffs as 
a remedy for Australian violations of international trade rules, China 
has ‘plausible deniability’: it can plausibly claim that they are not 
coercive sanctions.13 Although China’s legal arguments may not stand 




Source: Mark Seton, Flickr
up, the process of challenging them may take years and a finding in 
Australia’s favour will not undo the interim economic damage. Finally, 
as University of Queensland agricultural economist Scott Waldron 
persuasively argues, ending imports of Australian barley may suit 
China’s domestic agricultural policy objectives relating to food security 
and import diversification.14 
Beef 
On 12 May, between announcing and imposing the barley tariffs, China 
suspended imports from four Australian abattoirs, citing ‘serious’ and 
‘repeated’ violations of Chinese customs and quarantine requirements. 
Once again, China denied the suspensions were coercive and the Australian 
Government downplayed the political angle, describing the measures 
as related to ‘highly technical’, isolated issues concerning labelling and 
health certificates.15 
Nevertheless, the suspensions raised eyebrows. This was partly due 
to the timing and partly because of China’s track record of using similar 
regulatory quibbles to disrupt trade during disputes with other countries. 
The suspensions, Perth USAsia Centre research director Jeffrey Wilson 
concluded, were ‘unquestionably political retribution’.16 
A fifth abattoir was delisted in August after Chinese customs allegedly 
detected residues of a banned antibiotic in a consignment of beef. That 
announcement came one day after Prime Minister Scott Morrison 
announced new legislation enabling the federal government to terminate 
agreements made between Australian states and foreign governments 
that are deemed by the Foreign Minister to be inconsistent with national 
foreign policy; Victoria’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) deal with Beijing 
































































David Littleproud stated that China’s concerns about the beef were ‘quite 
legitimate’, industry insiders noted that the antibiotic in question had not 
been detected in Australian beef for a decade.17 
The affected abattoirs together supply approximately one-third of 
Australia’s AU$1 billion annual beef exports to China. Exports for the first 
three quarters of 2020 were down 22 percent compared with the same 
period in 2019, and China slipped from Australia’s first to fourth-largest 
export market for beef in July.18 Yet other contributing factors to the fall 
included decreasing demand in China, Chinese regulations requiring 
COVID-19 testing of imported meat products, and the application of 
safeguard tariffs to Australian beef in early July.19 By expanding the list 
of approved suppliers from other countries, Beijing has also encouraged 
importers to shift to alternative markets. This may create future issues for 
Australian exporters. As one Chinese market analyst noted: ‘It will be hard 
for Australian beef suppliers to regain the market share once Chinese 
consumers get used to the beef from other countries.’20 
If the motivations were political, the logic of targeting beef is that it is 
relatively easy for China to substitute Australian imports and — like other 
agricultural goods — trade can be easily disrupted by opaque applications 
of technical regulatory rules. However, it is impossible to be certain. That 
some of the abattoirs had previously been suspended for label violations 
and that one of the implicated factories is wholly Chinese-owned support 
the case that there was a genuine issue. Alternatively, these same facts 
offer the cover of plausible deniability for a coercive measure undertaken 
at a time of high tension.
Tourism and Education 
In June, citing media reports about increased attacks and discrimination 
targeted towards ‘Chinese and Asian people’ in Australia, the Chinese 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism alerted citizens against travel to 
Australia. The following week, China’s Ministry of Education cited the 
same ‘discriminatory events’, warning Chinese students to be ‘cautious’ 
about choosing Australia as a study destination. In July, in what 
appeared to be direct retaliation for Australian government warnings 
about the risk of ‘arbitrary detention’ in mainland China, the Chinese 
government upgraded its travel advice to warn that ‘Australian law-
enforcement institutions arbitrarily search Chinese citizens and seize 
their assets’.21 
Were these warnings given out of genuine care about the welfare of 
Chinese travellers or were they a message to Canberra? The case for the 
latter turns on the timing, the fact that ambassador Cheng had publicly 
singled out the sectors and China’s history of using travel warnings and 
other policy instruments to deter Chinese citizens from travelling to 
specific countries during political disputes.22 
In 2019, China was Australia’s top source of short-term visitors — 
about 15 percent of the total. Chinese travellers were also the highest 
spenders, contributing about 27 percent of the AU$45 billion spent by 
foreign tourists.23 This is partly due to the large number of Chinese 
nationals studying in Australia, who continue to make up the largest 
cohort of international students at Australian universities (approximately 
38 percent),24 and were responsible for AU$12.1 billion of the total AU$37.6 
billion international education exports in 2018–2019. 
It is difficult to measure the impact of the warnings given that 
Chinese citizens were unable to travel to Australia due to the pandemic. 
Study visa lodgements by prospective Chinese students decreased by 
20 percent in the 2019–2020 financial year. Due to the general uncertainty 
stemming from COVID-19 and border closures, however, visa applications 
from other countries were also down — some by greater percentages, 
including India at 47 percent and Nepal at 61 percent.25 While there is 
some evidence that Chinese students and tourists take travel warnings 
seriously, with borders still closed, it is too early to identify the impact on 
































































What is the logic of disrupting travel to a country that had already 
closed its borders? Reports of increased racist behaviour in Australia 
gave Beijing scope to plausibly deny that the warnings were sanctions 
in disguise.27 They caused Beijing no pain to issue, either. While their 
practical impact may have been limited, the warnings signalled Chinese 
displeasure, put pressure on the Australian government and stirred debate 
about the vulnerability of the tourism and education sectors to coercion. 
Wine 
In August, MOFCOM announced new investigations into allegations 
that Australian wine exporters had been receiving illegal subsidies 
and ‘dumping’ their wares in the Chinese market at predatory prices. 
A spokesperson from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described 
the investigations as ‘normal’ and advised Australians not to draw 
‘unnecessary associations’. Within twenty-four hours of the first 
investigation being launched, however, the Australian government 
declared the allegations ‘baseless’, while winemakers and analysts derided 
the probe as a politically motivated sanction. 
Again, there are reasons to believe China has plausible legal 
complaints.28 However, the timing of the probes — coming amid 
unprecedented tensions in the bilateral relationship — suggests they are 
political. Chinese state media had been hinting for months that wine could 
be targeted, especially after Australia joined the US in denouncing China’s 
legal claim to most of the South China Sea in July.29 Wine also featured in 
ambassador Cheng’s April comments.
Investigations do not directly disrupt trade, but they flag the possibility 
of future restrictions. Such signalling can impose costs on a target country’s 
markets. The share price of Australia’s largest winemaker, Treasury Wine 
Estates, collapsed more than 28 percent over the week following Ministry 
of Commerce’s announcement. Concerns were also raised that Chinese 
importers might pre-emptively shift to alternative suppliers to hedge 
against the risk of a proposed 202 percent tariff should investigations 
conclude there had been trade violations. Australian winemakers could 
see their largest export market, worth AU$1.2 billion in 2019, shrink 
regardless of whether tariffs are ultimately imposed. Meanwhile, there is 
little the Australian government can do beyond consult with the industry, 
file formal responses, and prepare for a possible World Trade Organization 
(WTO) challenge. 
The impacts on Australian wine suppliers illustrate how 
investigations can be used as coercive sanctions while guaranteeing 
China plausible deniability.30 They are a relatively low-cost tool for China 
to ratchet pressure on Australia up or down: if political relations improve, 
they might opt to withdraw the investigations; if relations continue to 
deteriorate, they can escalate by imposing tariffs.
Wine is highly substitutable, with ready alternatives to Australian 
wines, including from France, Chile, and South Africa. The possibility of 
tariffs might upset enthusiasts of Penfolds Grange and adversely affect 
Chinese students decreased by 20 percent in the 2019–2020 financial year
































































those Chinese citizens who have invested millions in Australian wine 
businesses,31 but it will hardly disrupt the Chinese economy or lead to 
civil unrest.
Lessons on Economic Power and Vulnerability
In the final months of 2020, after this chapter had been written, Australia’s 
export industries experienced a new series of disruptions. In mid-October 
reports emerged that Beijing had issued verbal instructions for traders 
to cease importing Australian cotton and coal.32 Two weeks later, as 
exporters of those products began to see orders cancelled, the disruption 
spread. Chinese customs officers seized tonnes of Australian lobster for 
testing, citing concerns about metal content levels, and halted imports of 
Australian timber after allegedly discovering pests.33 At the same time, 
the South China Morning Post reported that traders had received new 
informal instructions about a forthcoming import ban on seven Australian 
products: timber, lobster, copper ore and concentrate, sugar, wheat, barley, 
and red wine.34 The full consequences of these new measures remain 
Australian wine sold in a liquor store
Source: Maxim75, Wikimedia
unclear, however, they and the cases described above lend themselves to 
several conclusions about the nature of power and vulnerability in the 
Sino-Australian economic relationship. 
The first regards the changing composition of Sino-Australian trade. 
As Australian exports continue to diversify away from natural resources 
into services and consumer products, they will inevitably become more 
substitutable and thus more vulnerable to coercion. This will not render 
Australia helpless — among other things, less dispensable resource 
commodities will continue to make up a large share of exports to China — 
but it does underscore the need for broader recognition that we no longer 
live in an era when the inherent qualities of Australian exports insulate 
them from any disruption. 
Second, while the range of vulnerable industries may be broadening, 
those that are actually targeted are not random. One signpost is Chinese 
domestic policy goals, which often guide the selection of targets. Barley is 
a good example of this. Chinese agricultural policy promotes food security 
through import diversification and increased domestic production — 
a goal at odds with high levels of Australian barley imports.35 A similar logic 
also appeared to underpin the disruption experienced by South Korean 
electric vehicle battery makers in 2017–2018, whose competitiveness in 
the Chinese market was at odds with Beijing’s efforts to support domestic 
firms like Contemporary Amperex Technology (CATL).36 It might also be 
relevant to the two ‘unofficial’ bans on Australian coal and cotton exports 
that were reported in October. Beijing’s apparent instructions to steel mills 
and energy providers to cease importing Australian thermal and coking 
coal are consistent with new Chinese plans to significantly slash coal 
consumption and carbon emissions. Likewise, China may be concerned 
about protecting domestic cotton producers confronted with low demand 
for textiles and a glut of foreign supply in 2020.37 
Third, even where Beijing does wish to disrupt trade, it is constrained 
by its unwillingness to acknowledge formally that disruption is related 
































































down the disruption without admitting ‘defeat’ once the other issues 
are resolved or tensions decrease. To maintain plausible deniability, 
Beijing requires both an alternative explanation — such as alleged 
breaches of customs requirements (as for beef) or international trade 
rules (as for barley and wine) — and regulatory tools such as the anti-
dumping framework or discreet mechanisms such as travel warnings. 
Yet the plausible deniability constraint may be fading; the breadth of 
the bans apparently instituted towards the end of 2020, combined with 
the ‘fourteen points’ document released to the Australian media in late 
November apparently listing Beijing’s political demands, make continued 
denial of economic retaliation extraordinarily difficult to sustain.38 This 
might suggest Beijing’s approach to the dispute has moved into a new 
phase, where it values the benefits of plausible deniability less than the 
scope to disrupt a broader range of Australian trade. Time will tell. 
Finally, economic coercion is unlikely to involve China fundamentally 
upending the bilateral trading relationship in the short to medium 
term. Beijing’s approach to geoeconomics has not involved applying 
‘maximum pressure’ on a target economy in the style of the United 
States’ comprehensive sanctions on Iran or North Korea. Instead, Chinese 
sanctions are more selective, designed to strike a careful balance between 
signalling displeasure and creating meaningful political pressure on their 
target while being (mostly) deniable, minimising the cost to China and 
facilitating domestic policy objectives. Nevertheless, the fog created by 
Chinese denials and the fact that booming iron ore exports saw overall 
trade actually increase in 2020 should not cloud the ongoing risk faced 
by Australian exporters. Moreover, longer-term Chinese planning, 
such as the “dual circulation” concept sitting at the heart of Beijing’s 
latest five-year plan, suggest that Beijing’s own efforts to diversify 
its import sources and achieve greater self-sufficiency may affect its 
trading relationships regardless of bilateral tensions.39 (See Chapter 4, 
‘The Chinese Economy: Crisis, Control, Recovery, Refocus’, pp.103–116.)
There is a clear need to deepen understanding of the nature of 
political risk in the economic relationship with China. Consideration of the 
kinds of factors discussed here, including relative substitutability and the 
relationship between disruption and domestic policy goals, could assist 
the government in identifying vulnerable industries and even individual 
companies in advance. Advance consultation with exporters could allow 
them to anticipate potential forms of disruption and take steps to minimise 
their exposure to political risk in the Chinese market.
The reality is that some industries will remain vulnerable even with 
flawless customs paperwork or impeccable sanitation standards. Reports 
that both Australia’s domestic intelligence agency, the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade are actively engaging with the private sector to ensure they are 
mindful of these risks are reassuring.40 Some industry actors also appear 
to have a growing understanding of how economic coercion works — in 
Head office of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Australia
































































particular, that it often relies on economic disruption prompting firms to 
lobby their governments to change policies to accommodate the concerns 
of the coercing state. In the words of the chief executive of the Western 
Australian Farmers Federation: ‘Squeeze a piglet, make it squeal and 
the big sow will come running … [T]he industry is getting better at not 
responding because that’s what China wants.’41 
The research from which this chapter is drawn has received grant funding support from the 
Australian Department of Defence Strategic Policy Grants Program. The views expressed in this 
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department 
of Defence.
‘Squeeze a piglet, 
make it squeal and 
the big sow will 
come running ... 
[T]he industry is 
getting better at not 
responding because 






































China and the Multilateral Trading  
System: Misunderstandings,  
Criticisms, and Options  


































































CHINA’S ROLE in the multilateral trading system established 
under the auspices of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) has been 
much debated and remains highly 
controversial. More often than not, 
however, the labelling of China as 
a ‘bad player’ in the system results 
from significant misunderstandings 
of both the WTO’s functions and 
China’s behaviour. 
Amid the rising tensions between 
the United States and China since 2017, 
the Trump Administration frequently 
and aggressively repeated the claim 
that the US, under the Clinton/Bush 
Administration in 2001, mistakenly 
supported China’s accession to the 
WTO.1 It accused China of failing to 
adhere to WTO rules and failing to 
transform into a fully fledged market 
economy. It also accused China of 
refusing to implement the rulings 
of the WTO’s dispute-settlement 
system when it lost a case. The 
Trump Administration’s argument 
also blamed the WTO for failing to 
come up with ways to tackle China-
specific problems such as these.2 
The European Union (EU) and Japan 
have shared some of these concerns.3 
However, these claims are untenable 
and misleading. 
As a global institution, the WTO 
does not mandate any particular type 
of economic and political structure or 
model of development. Its members 
are at various stages of economic 
CHINA AND THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM: 
MISUNDERSTANDINGS, 



































































development, with different economic 
structures, policy priorities and 
regulatory regimes. Nor does the 
WTO require members to change the 
structure of their markets or patterns 
of ownership. While China may not 
have a free market economy,4 it is 
not unique: state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) play a significant role in many 
economies and regulatory intervention 
in markets is widespread.5 The WTO 
and its predecessor, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(1947–1994), have admitted many 
other transitional economies, 
including Poland, Romania, and 
Hungary in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
Russia and Vietnam more recently. 
When negotiating to join, China 
insisted on its own development 
model of a ‘socialist market economy 
system’.6 It is both unreasonable 
and unrealistic to expect or demand 
that China adopt a Western model of 
market capitalism. While its accession 
commitments involved massive 
market-oriented reforms, nothing in 
those commitments required China to 
change its economic model. 
To join the WTO, China made 
unparalleled commitments. Then 
US Trade Representative (USTR) 
Charlene Barshefsky observed that the 
concessions it made ‘far exceeded what 
anyone would have expected’.7 To date, 
China’s obligations remain the most 
extensive and onerous among all WTO 
members, and many go far beyond 
those demanded of the most developed 
nations.8 To implement these 
obligations, China made tremendous 
efforts, including amending numerous 
laws and regulations, significantly 
reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
opening up a range of service sectors 
Signing ceremony for China’s 
Accession to the WTO
Source: World Trade Organization 
and achieving outstanding and well-
documented successes along the 
way.9 The USTR report on China’s 
WTO compliance in 2007, the year 
immediately after China was required 
to complete implementation of most 
of its WTO concessions, acknowledged 
that ‘China has taken many impressive 
steps to reform its economy, making 
progress in implementing a set of 
sweeping commitments’. It also noted 
that China’s WTO membership had 
delivered ‘substantial ongoing benefits 
to the United States’.10 Thus the claim 
that China failed to observe its WTO 
commitments is misleading. 
This is not to say that China has 
never breached WTO rules. However, 
whether a member has breached a 
rule must be assessed through the 
WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism 
(DSM), based on evidence and detailed 
legal examination rather than through 
unsubstantiated allegations.
Having been involved in many 
WTO disputes both as a complainant 
and as a respondent, China has 
become an experienced and 
sophisticated player in the DSM.11 
When it was less experienced in the 
early years of its membership, China 
settled most of the disputes in which 
it was a respondent by amending or 
removing the challenged policies, 
laws and practices without going 
through the adjudication process. In 
the past decade, China has changed 
its approach to vigorously pursuing 
or defending selected cases.12 In 
almost all of the cases it has lost, China 
has implemented the findings and 
recommendations of WTO tribunals. It 
has done so in a way that delivers the 
minimum level of compliance required 
while maintaining its own interests, 
showing full comprehension of the 
limits of the rulings. Overall, China’s 
record of compliance compares 
favourably with those of the other key 
players in the system, and particularly 
the US. China has never been subject 
to any demand for retaliation (the 
final and most serious consequence 
that a member can face in the DSM). 
Yet the US has been a major target of 
retaliation, the most recent being a 
WTO-authorised retaliation worth 
US$4 billion by the EU due to its failure 
to remove subsidies to Boeing that are 
illegal under WTO rules — a dispute 
that has lasted for sixteen years.13 
This is not to suggest that China 
poses no challenges to the multilateral 
trading system. Industrial policies 
and subsidies, the role of SOEs in the 


































































government on private enterprises 
and insufficient protections for 
intellectual property rights are 
prominent and long-standing issues. 
Although similar situations persist in 
other member states, China has been 
at the centre of academic and policy 
debate given the scale and impact 
of its policies and practices. In this 
regard, the global community has 
been overwhelmed by allegations that 
WTO rules are inadequate to cope with 
China. However, to determine whether 
the rules are in fact insufficient, one 
would have to undertake a meticulous 
study of the Chinese laws and practices 
in dispute and all the applicable rules 
including those specifically tailored 
to China. Contrary to the allegations 
of the Trump Administration, one 
such study has found that ‘the WTO’s 
existing rules on subsidies, coupled 
with the China-specific obligations, 
provide sufficient defence against the 
encroachment of Chinese SOEs beyond 
their own shores’.14 Therefore, the 
issue is perhaps not the lack of rules 
but the lack of utilisation of the rules.
WTO rules rely, of course, on 
enforcement. The DSM has managed 
nearly 600 trade disputes since 
commencing operations in 1995.15 It 
has been largely effective in enforcing 
compliance and influencing domestic 
policy-making,16 including in China, 
where its decisions have prompted 
gradual and systematic adjustments 
to the country’s complex regulatory 
regime. However, the ongoing crisis 
in the DSM — the result of the US 
under President Trump blocking the 
appointment of judges to the WTO’s 
Appellate Body (its appellate court) 
— has weakened the effectiveness of 
the system as a whole. In the absence 
of a functional Appellate Body, 
a losing party may abuse the right of 
appeal to avoid adverse decisions of 
WTO panels (the WTO’s lower court) 
and implementing their decisions,17 
as several members have done in 
recent cases. As the most frequent 
abuser to date, the US, in two recent 
cases, ‘appealed into the void’ a panel 
ruling against the trade war tariffs 
it imposed on China,18 and another 
panel ruling against its anti-subsidy 
tariffs on softwood lumber originated 
in Canada — both in breach of WTO 
rules.19 Such abuse of the right of 
appeal will only further damage the 
DSM and encourage similar actions, 
furthering the crisis and generating 
more tensions and uncertainties in 
international trade.
The unilateral and 
confrontational approach of the 
US has in any case proven to be 
counterproductive in dealing with 
China. As China’s economic power 
and influence grow, its foreign policy 
is becoming more assertive, as is 
evident in its (relatively moderate) 
response to the US’s trade war tariffs 
and its ongoing trade sanctions 
against Australia.20 With China 
asserting that it is a staunch defender 
of the multilateral trading system,21 
a co-operative approach would be 
more effective. But this would need 
to entail adopting an objective and 
country-neutral stance on China. 
As flagged above, the so-called 
China problems of industrial policies, 
subsidies and SOEs are also issues in 
many other member nations of the 
WTO. The COVID-19 outbreak has led 
many governments to resort to such 
policies as export restrictions, stimulus 
packages and subsidies to maintain 
domestic economic resilience and 
stimulate recovery.22 Global problems 
require global solutions based on 
collective efforts and actions that 
target the problems themselves. 
The WTO provides a unique forum 
for multilateral solutions: when 
a government suspects that China has 
not played by the rules, it should resort 
to the DSM to push China to change its 
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)


































































behaviour. This approach has worked 
very well in the past, though it may not 
be as effective today given the impasse 
over the Appellate Body caused by 
Washington. If the WTO is to function 
properly, with regard to China or 
any other member state, it needs 
a functioning Appellate Body and 
rules that are based on multilateral 
negotiations and that reflect the shared 
interests of all nations involved. 
The recent completion of the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), the world’s 
largest free-trade agreement to 
date, embracing 30 percent of global 
output,23 has shown the strong political 
will for international co-operation 
of the fifteen member countries, 
including China, even in times of 
crisis, populism, and anti-globalism. 
While the US’s trade policy agenda 
remains to be uncovered, there are 
some positive signs of moves towards 
a more co-operative approach to China 
and the WTO under the incoming 
Biden Administration.24 This approach 
will offer greater hope for working 
with China on the challenges faced 

























































CHINESE STUDENTS ABROAD IN THE TIME
OF PANDEMIC: AN AUSTRALIAN VIEW
Source: ANU Image Library, Flickr
Yu Tao
MANY COUNTRIES CLOSED their borders in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. For 
the 1.5 million or so students from the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) enrolled in overseas 
education institutions, these unprecedented 
border closures led to multiple crises. Many were 
forced to reconsider and renegotiate their plans 
for life and study, their expectations of both their 
host and their home countries, as well as their 






















































Australia provides an ideal case study for an examination of the 
behaviour and decision-making of Chinese students overseas during a 
period of global crisis. International education was Australia’s fourth-
largest export in the 2019–2020 financial year. According to data from the 
Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment, the number 
of international students in Australia increased from 153,372 in 2000 to 
876,399 in 2019.1 That year, Australian universities earned more than 
AU$10 billion in international student tuition fees — a record 27 percent of 
their revenue.2 As Professor Andrew Norton from The Australian National 
University summarised, international students ‘filled the gap’ during the 
previous two decades, as Commonwealth funding for higher education 
continuously dropped.3 In the 2019 calendar year alone, international 
education contributed over $40 billion to the Australian economy.4 During 
their study in Australia, many international students are also consumers 
and tourists.5 They also make valuable intangible contributions, by 
increasing ethnic, social, and cultural diversity within and beyond 
Australian university campuses.
Chinese students make up more than one-quarter of the country’s 
international student population. According to Department of Education, 
Skills and Employment data, there were 653,539 international students 
Students on the ANU campus 
Source: ANU Photos, PhotoShelter
enrolled in Australian education institutions between January 
and July 2020. Among these, 176,397 students, or approximately 
27 percent, came from mainland China.6 Before the pandemic, Chinese 
international students contributed about $10 billion to Australia’s 
economy annually through tuition fees and spending. These vast 
numbers have shaped Australian campuses in ways that have become 
controversial in recent years (see China Story Yearbook: China Dreams, 
Chapter 9, ‘Campus Conundrums: Clashes and Collaborations’, 
pp.255–267). However, they have also brought benefits, including 
strengthening people-to-people links between the two countries, which 
are maintained by various means including through China-based 
alumni associations.7 
Prior to the pandemic, Australia was closely linked with China 
through strong economic ties and extensive flows of people in both 
directions. China is Australia’s largest two-way trading partner in goods 
and services, accounting for more than one-quarter of Australia’s trade 
with the world; before the pandemic, China was Australia’s largest 
inbound market in terms of visitor arrivals and total visitor spend.8 
However, Australia’s close political and military relationship with the 
United States and growing political frictions with China have complicated 
the social circumstances of Chinese students in the country. On top of 
the challenges posed by substantial differences in language, culture, 
values, governance, and politics, these students have also suffered from 
a regrettable rise in racist abuse in Australia. After the pandemic, for 
many of these students the situation become even worse.
Before the Pandemic
Despite the rapid development of the Internet and other technologies 
for distance learning, the experience of studying abroad means much 






















































them to observe, understand, and reflect on different values, opinions, 
and lifestyles first-hand. For students from China, studying in Western 
countries like Australia, it also means they can obtain free access to 
information and resources unavailable or censored in their home 
country. To some students, these opportunities to access new perspectives 
help them broaden their horizon and enrich their understanding of 
the world and themselves. As China has become more prosperous, 
foreign universities have courted fee-paying Chinese students, while the 
Chinese government has simplified procedures for its citizens to study 
abroad. In 1999, there were already more Chinese students studying 
abroad than from any other country. In 2013 alone, China sent 712,157 
students to study overseas — almost four times as many as India, the 
world’s second-biggest source country for international students in that 
year.9 The growth in the number of Chinese international students has 
been decelerating since 2013, along with the slowdown of the Chinese 
economy, although China remains the world’s biggest source country for 
international students by a significant margin. In 2018, 662,100 students 
left China to study abroad — 8.8 percent more than in 2017.10 As of 2018, 
in Australia, almost two of every five international students enrolled in 
an institution of higher education were from China.11 
Although there are criticisms of various aspects of quality control 
in Australia’s international education,12 empirical studies reveal the 
experience of studying in Australia has long-term benefits for Chinese 
international students. For example, according to a 2016 study focusing 
on a leading Australian university, the majority of highly skilled 
returned graduates from the English-speaking environment ‘retain 
an advantage in China’s crowded graduate labour market’ even if the 
situation has grown significantly more competitive than it was in former 
times, when graduates of well-regarded foreign universities could 
quickly gain access to prestigious positions.13 Intercultural competence 
and the diversification of social networks are of value back in China 
more generally.14 For many, studying abroad is also a means of pursuing 
what Vanessa Fong describes as ‘social, cultural, and sometimes legal 
citizenship in the developed world’.15
The Re-Bordered World
In an effort to prevent the spread of COVID-19, on 1 February, Australia 
introduced strict travel bans prohibiting the arrival of non-citizens 
and non-residents travelling from anywhere in China. This expanded 
a previous ban on travel from Hubei province, the epicentre of the 
COVID-19 outbreak at that time. Approximately two-thirds of Australia’s 
Chinese students were now ‘stuck at home’.16 In early March, I surveyed 
approximately 150 Chinese international students who were enrolled 
in a unit that I was teaching. Sixty-three students reported that they 
were physically in Australia, while fifteen students were on their way to 
Australia via a third country; before the 20 March closure, it was legal for 
them to enter if they stayed fourteen or more days in a third country. Most 
of the remaining students were still in 
mainland China.17 Australia’s travel 
ban was extended to other countries, 
including Iran, South Korea, and Italy, 
and then, on 20 March, to all non-
citizens and non-residents regardless 
of their place of departure. In October, 
the Australian government indicated 
that the border closures might remain 
in place through to the end of 2021.18 
On 24 August, 27 percent of 
the 307,038 student visa–holders 
enrolled in Australian higher 
education institutions remained 
Graduates from English-speaking countries 
‘retain an advantage in China’s crowded 
graduate labour market’






















































outside Australia.19 As of 1 November, just over half of the 85,612 
Chinese international students enrolled in Australian universities and 
schools remained offshore.20 Although many of these students continued 
their study through remote learning, they lost access to many of the 
opportunities associated with studying abroad, which, under normal 
circumstances, would have been indispensable components of their 
international education. The indefinite nature of the travel bans imposed 
extensive uncertainty on them as well. It added mental, physical, and 
financial pressures on those Chinese (and other international) students 
caught outside the country, as well as those trapped in Australia, who 
suffered reduced opportunities for part-time employment and were 
separated from their families. Many Chinese international students 
experienced three crises simultaneously. 
Crises of Study, Life, and Direction 
Beginning in late February, the world that was once closely connected 
by transnational and transcontinental flights fragmented into fortified 
national islands. Travel restrictions, quarantine requirements, and the 
grounding of most commercial passenger flights meant that most people 
were stuck where they were when the new rules were put in place. After 
Australia closed its borders, many Chinese international students had to 
make a painful choice between flying back to Australia via a third country 
or staying in China until further notice. Entering via a third country, such 
as Malaysia or Thailand, made the journey expensive and stressful. Some 
of my students who eventually made it back to Australia under those 
circumstances felt that having to layover in another country put them at 
significantly higher risk of catching COVID-19 in these third countries than 
if they had been allowed to fly directly to Australia from areas in China 
that were mostly free of COVID-19. Indeed, in early March 2020, a Chinese 
international student at the University 
of Queensland tested positive for the 
virus shortly after arriving in Brisbane 
following a two-week stay in Dubai.21 
The stress and fear were such 
that many of these students geared up 
with personal protective equipment 
including masks and, in some cases, 
full hazmat suits on both legs of their 
journey. One student told me that he 
and many other Chinese international 
students on the same plane refused 
any drink or food, despite the flight 
lasting for ten hours. In addition, these 
students could not be sure that Australia’s border control measures 
would not change while they were in a third country, where they 
typically had no contacts or social support. Some of my students learned 
the Australian government had shut the border entirely on 20 March 
from reading the news online in their Malaysian hotel rooms. One told 
me over the phone: ‘It’s a shame; I totally lost with this gamble.’
After the border closure, the Australian higher education sector 
successfully lobbied China to relax its Internet restrictions to allow the 
100,000-odd students stranded at home to study online more smoothly.22 
Australian universities also provided online support for their students 
and allowed those in China to suspend their degree courses until the 
border reopened. Despite these efforts, many students who were not 
able to make it back to Australia experienced considerable pressure 
and anxiety due to the lack of familiarity with teaching methods such 
as ‘Zoom classes’ and the uncertainty around the policy development 
regarding border restrictions.23 Learning purely online was a novel 
experience for Chinese international students; many felt the loss 
of community keenly and complained that the quality of teaching 
Many Chinese international students made 
the choice of flying back to Australia via a 
third country, such as Malaysia or Thailand. 





















































IS and learning was not the same.24 Some offshore students could not 
keep their cameras on during classes due to insufficient bandwidth 
and hence had limited chances to participate in class discussion. 
Academics and their professional associations in Western countries 
have also raised concerns over the security issues of teaching certain 
China-related topics online, fearing that data generated from Zoom 
and other online teaching software may be vulnerable to surveillance 
by the Chinese state.25 For many of them, online classes did not feel 
like value for money, given the much more expensive tuition fees they 
have to pay in comparison with domestic students.26 
Take the tuition fee for an undergraduate course in social sciences 
at the University of Melbourne, for example. In 2020, a domestic student 
typically paid AU$6,684 for a full-time academic year,27 whereas an 
international student had to pay AU$33,824 for the same educational 
opportunities.28 Nor could online teaching provide students the kind 
of cultural competencies that come from ordinary experiences like 
visiting weekend markets or making friends with Australian students 
— experiences that Zhichen Ye, a master’s student at the University 
of Melbourne, noted in her study of student experiences during the 
pandemic.29 One student interviewed by Ye remarked that the Internet 
‘always fails to reflect a more intangible and diverse side of Australian 
life’.30 Her friend, who attended classes via Zoom from China, felt a sense 
To many Chinese international 
students, online classes did not feel 
like value for money
Source: Chris Montgomery, Unsplash
of loss due to the ‘lack of personal experiences’ in Australian society.31 
Some of Australia’s most prominent educators have also acknowledged 
that, although remote learning can keep some international students 
enrolled, it is ‘a stopgap, not a solution’, as it is unable to give students 
‘the full experience’.32 
For the many Chinese international students stuck at home, the 
future was full of uncertainty. Without knowing when it would be 
possible to return to Australia, they found it challenging to make 
meaningful plans for their study or life more generally.33
A Crisis of Expectation 
Even for those students who managed to enter Australia before the border 
closure on 20 March, life was not easy. Far from home and amid new 
challenges, many reported feeling anxious, depressed, and lonely. Some 
struggled to understand the ever-evolving official advice and regulations 
related to the pandemic and lacked the information or linguistic confidence 
to access counselling services.34 Worse, neither their host nor their home 
countries considered them a priority for financial help or other support. 
Although international students in Australia are often perceived as 
wealthy, many have to rely on part-time jobs to subsidise their living 
expenses.35 Far from their support networks and relatively unfamiliar 
with the Australian legal system, international students have long 
been vulnerable to underpayment, sexual harassment, and other types 
of employer exploitation.36 The pandemic significantly exacerbated 
existing and chronic problems.37 What’s more, according to the results 
of a comprehensive survey of 6,000 international students and other 
temporary visa-holders in Australia conducted in mid-2020, 70 percent 
of respondents, most of whom worked in heavily casualised industries 























































As temporary visa-holders, international students in Australia 
were denied access to federal government support packages such as 
JobSeeker and JobKeeper. Prime Minister Scott Morrison explicitly told 
international students who were facing economic hardship during the 
pandemic to ‘return to their home countries’, even though this was 
not always a realistic or feasible option.39 The lack of support from 
the Australian government left many international students feeling 
abandoned.40 As a result of their experience, almost three of every five 
participants in the comprehensive survey cited above reported they were 
less likely than before to recommend Australia as a study destination.41 
Many Chinese students were determined to continue living and 
studying in Australia despite the pandemic because they had already 
made substantial non-refundable investments in the experience. Even 
those who wanted to return home had limited options. The Civil Aviation 
Administration of China (CAAC) implemented strict regulations on the 
frequency of international flights departing from and arriving in China. 
Beginning on 29 March, each Chinese airline could maintain only one 
route to any specific country with no more than one flight per week. 
Foreign airlines were similarly limited to one route to China with no 
more than one weekly flight. In the case of Australia and also beginning 
in late March, the CAAC allowed only three direct routes to operate all 
departing from Sydney.42 Chinese students in Australia who wanted to 
return home faced costly airfares, and limited seats meant many could 
not get a ticket at all.43 Some students and their parents, influenced by 
popular Chinese films like Wolf Warrior 2 and Operation Red Sea that 
focused on the Chinese government’s extraction of citizens from crises 
abroad, firmly expected their government would bring them home 
— especially given that flying students home would be considerably 
less challenging than plucking kidnapped citizens from the clutches 
of terrorists in the middle of a war zone.44 On 16 March, the parents 
of 166 Chinese international students enrolled in British primary and 
secondary schools collectively petitioned the PRC Embassy in London 
to arrange chartered flights to bring their kids home.45 Two weeks later, 
the parents of 200 students in the New York area wrote an open letter 
to the Chinese Ambassador to the United States with a similar request.46 
The Chinese government did arrange chartered flights to repatriate 
some 180 secondary school students from the UK who were not living 
with their parents;47 however, many other students felt abandoned by 
the ‘motherland’ when the Chinese government failed to meet their 
expectations. This reportedly came as a particular shock to those who 
had fervently and vocally supported the Chinese Communist Party in 
the face of public criticism while overseas.48 
A Crisis of Belonging 
Many Chinese international students, regardless of their individual 
political views, were put in awkward situations created by increasing 
diplomatic tensions between China and a range of countries, including the 
US and Australia, in 2020. These tensions existed before the pandemic but 
escalated during the year (see Chapter 7, ‘US–China Relations: A Lingering 
Chinese films like Wolf Warrior 2 focused on the Chinese government’s extraction of citizens 























































Crisis’, pp.191–203; and Chapter 8, ‘The Sino-Indian Border Crisis: Chinese 
Perceptions of Indian Nationalism’, pp.223–237). The Chinese government 
accused Australia of ‘hurting the feelings of the Chinese people’ by calling 
unilaterally for a ‘weapons inspection–style’ investigation into the origins 
of the virus.49 The Chinese Ministry of Education issued to Chinese students 
who were considering studying or continuing their studies in Australia an 
official alert about COVID-19-related health risks and racism.50 As tensions 
escalated, Beijing increasingly accused Canberra of anti-China sentiment 
and actions.51 
Coinciding with the diplomatic tit-for-tat was a ‘growing public 
polarisation about the presence of international students in local 
communities’ in popular host countries.52 According to a survey 
conducted by Universities UK, almost one in every five people 
in the UK wished universities had fewer international students. 
A survey conducted by The Australian National University showed that 
46 percent of the public felt that ‘universities should be educating 
fewer foreign students and more domestic students’.53 Australia’s initial 
travel ban, which was China-specific, also contributed to a sense that its 
response to the pandemic was tinged with racism.54 Like many Chinese 
Australians and others of East Asian appearance, more than half of the 
Chinese students who stayed in Australia during the pandemic reported 
experiencing direct and explicit racial discrimination, including verbal 
and physical abuse.55 (See Chapter 6, ‘The Future Repeats Itself: COVID-19 
and Its Historical Comorbidities’, pp.167–177, for a historical overview 
of pandemics and anti-Chinese racism.) Although some Chinese 
international students defended Australia as a safe destination for 
education,56 many became disillusioned because of the racism, the lack 
of government support and a sense of exploitation, with one respondent 
in the survey saying she felt Australia had treated her like a ‘cash cow’.57 
Yet many Chinese students who managed to return home also 
found themselves unwelcome there. On Chinese social media, some 
commentators accused them of being unpatriotic for paying taxes to 
other countries and not making contributions to China’s development.58 
Others viewed them as threats to China’s success in controlling the 
spread of COVID-19, despite the strict quarantine regime.59 Influential 
media, such as China Youth Daily, criticised these unfair comments while 
highlighting the efforts that Chinese embassies and consulates had made 
to support Chinese students in host countries.60 However, according to 
Zhaoyin Feng, writing for the BBC about the 360,000 Chinese students in 
the US, many Chinese international students felt they were ‘unwanted’ 
at home and were ‘getting the short end of the stick’ from both their host 
country and China.61 
Conclusion
Prior to 2020, Chinese international students in Western countries such 
as Australia were at the core of international education mobility. Their 
experience shows how Chinese citizens overseas are under increasing 
pressure to pick a side between their home and host countries, as 
diplomatic clashes and economic conflicts between China and the 
West become more frequent and fierce. By treating these students 
better — integrating them into virtual communities, helping with 
cross-border travel and embracing inclusivity and multiculturalism — 
Australia should be able to attract and retain large numbers of Chinese 
international students in a post-COVID world.60 However, the uncertainty 
and negative experiences of overseas Chinese citizens during a year 
of crisis, combined with political tensions, may destroy not only the 
capability but also the aspiration for international education mobility 























C H R O N O L O G Y
2019 
30 December: Wuhan doctor Li 
Wenliang 李文亮	 alerts colleagues 
about a new disease with apparent 
similarities to the SARS coronavirus; 
days later, the police warn him to stop 
‘spreading rumours’.
2020 
11 January: Taiwan president Tsai 
Ing-wen 蔡英文, leader of the 
Democratic Progressive Party and 
an opponent of unification with the 
mainland, re-elected by a landslide.
15 January: US and China sign ‘Phase 
One’ trade deal. 
23 January: Wuhan goes into 
lockdown to contain the spread of 
COVID-19.
30 January: The World Health 
Organization (WHO) declares 
COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern.
7 February: Whistleblower Li 
Wenliang dies of COVID-19.
11 March:  WHO declares COVID-19 a 
pandemic.
13 March: A Chinese Red Cross plane 
delivers PPE and medical equipment 
to Rome in the first major expression 
of China’s ‘Mask Diplomacy’. 
2 April: COVID-19 cases surpass 1 
million worldwide.
8 April: Wuhan lockdown ends.
19 April: The Australian Government 
calls for China to co-operate in a 
global investigation into the origins of 
COVID-19.
























21 April: Beijing takes the first of 
a number of seemingly punitive 
actions against imports of Australian 
barley, beef, wine, and coal. 
14 May: The US Senate passes the 
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 
2020, angering Beijing. 
20 May: The CCP warns its members 
not to deviate from the party line even 
in private conversation. 
23 May: The People's Republic of China 
(PRC) announces it has no new cases 
of COVID-19 for first time since the 
beginning of the pandemic. 
15 June: Deadly skirmish on the Sino-
Indian border sparks continuing, low-
level hostilities.
19 June: Hong Kong’s popular political 
satire show Headliner, apparently 
cancelled under political pressure 
from Beijing, airs its final episode. 
26 June: Human Rights Watch and 300 
other groups call on the UN to monitor 
the human rights situation in China. 
30 June: The National Security Law 
for Hong Kong, which criminalises 
‘secession’, ‘subversion’, ‘terrorism’, 
and ‘foreign interference’, comes into 
effect. 
8 July: The CCP Central Committee 
launches a new ‘political rectification 
movement’ for political-legal 
institutions including the police and 
judiciary to eliminate corruption and 
enforce political loyalty. 
18 July: Water levels at the Three 
Gorges Dam reach historic highs. 
Catastrophic floods across twenty-six 
provinces result in hundreds of deaths, 
displace millions, and cause hundreds 
of billions of yuan worth of economic 
damage.  
22 July: The US closes the PRC’s 
Houston consulate; the PRC retaliates 
by closing the US Chengdu consulate.
23 July: US Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo says engagement with China 
has failed and calls on ‘freedom-
loving nations’ to make their mission 
‘changing the CCP’s behaviour’.
5 August: US Secretary of Health and 
Human Services Alex Azar travels to 
Taiwan, the highest-level US official 
to visit the island in forty years, 
infuriating Beijing.
22 September: Xi Jinping 习近平
announces to the UN that China will 
reach ‘peak carbon’ by 2030 and 
achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.
6 October: A survey by Pew Research 
Center reveals unfavourable views 
of China at historic highs around 
the globe, with Beijing’s lack of 
transparency around the coronavirus 
outbreak a major factor. 
10 October: Taiwan president Tsai 
Ing-wen invites the PRC to engage in 
‘peaceful dialogue’; Beijing announces 
live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait.
13 Ocober: The PRC is re-elected to the 
Human Rights Council of the UN, amid 
controversy over ongoing repression 
in Xinjiang and arrests of human 
rights activists.  
14 October: Shenzhen celebrates 
the fortieth anniversary of its 
establishment as a Special Economic 
Zone.
12 November: Hong Kong pro-
democracy lawmakers resign en 
masse after government disqualifies 
four of them. There have already been 
multiple arrests under the National 
Security Law.
15 November: China, Australia, and 
thirteen other Asia-Pacific countries 
sign the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership agreement, the 
world’s largest free-trade bloc. 
18 November: China reveals fourteen 
grievances with Australia, warning: ‘If 
you make China the enemy, China will 
be the enemy.’
19 November: The foreign ministers 
of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the 
secretary of state of the US call on the 
PRC to ‘stop undermining rights’ in 
Hong Kong. 
2 December: Hong Kong democracy 
advocates Joshua Wong Chi-fung 黃之
鋒, Agnes Chow Ting 周庭, and Ivan 
Lam 林朗彥 jailed for their role in the 
2019 protests.
2 December: Landmark sexual 
harassment case against the TV host 
Zhu Jun 朱军 by Zhou Xiaoxuan 周晓
璇, aka Xianzi 弦子, an advocate for 
women’s, LGBTQ, and trans rights, 
begins court hearings in Beijing. 
3 December: Xi Jinping declares 
victory in China’s fight against poverty.
17 December: UNESCO names Tai Chi 
part of the world's ‘intangible cultural 
heritage’.
26 December: The UK's Centre for 
Economics and Business Research 
predicts the Chinese economy will 
become the world's largest in 2033.
31 December: According to John 
Hopkins Coronavirus Research Center, 
confirmed global COVID-19 cases reach 
83,146,810 million, with more than 
1,812,645 million deaths. The US has 
the world's highest number of cases 
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INTRODUCTION — The Year of Crisis
1.  In the Yearbook, we use traditional characters when writing about classical texts and 
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PREVIOUS CHINA STORY 
YEARBOOKS
2019: China Dreams
The year 2019 marked a number of significant 
anniversaries for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
each representing different ‘Chinese dreams’. There was 
the centennial of the May Fourth Movement — a dream 
of patriotism and cultural renewal. The PRC celebrated 
its seventieth anniversary — a dream of revolution 
and national strength. It was also thirty years since 
the student-led Protest Movement of 1989 — dreams of 
democracy and free expression crushed by government 
dreams of unity and stability. Many of these ‘dreams’ 
recurred in new guises in 2019. President Xi Jinping 
tightened his grip on power at home while calling for all 
citizens to ‘defend China’s honour abroad’. Escalating 
violence in Hong Kong, the ongoing suppression of 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang and deteriorating Sino-US relations 
dominated the headlines. Alongside stories about 
China’s advances in artificial intelligence and genetically 
modified babies, and its ambitions in the Antarctic and 
outer space, these issues fuelled discussion about what 
Xi’s own ‘China Dream’ of national rejuvenation means 



















‘More cosmopolitan, more lively, more global’ is how the 
China Daily summed up the year 2016 in China.
It was also a year of more control. The Chinese 
Communist Party laid down strict new rules of conduct 
for its members, continued to assert its dominance over 
everything from the Internet to the South China Sea and 
announced a new Five-Year Plan that Greenpeace called 
‘quite possibly the most important document in the 
world in setting the pace of acting on climate change’.
2017: Prosperity
A ‘moderately prosperous society’ with no Chinese 
individual left behind — that’s the vision for China set out 
by Chinese President Xi Jinping in a number of important 
speeches in 2017. ‘Moderate’ prosperity may seem like 
a modest goal for a country with more billionaires 
(609 at last count) than the US. But the ‘China Story’ is 
a complex one. The China Story Yearbook 2017: Prosperity 
surveys the important events, pronouncements, and 
personalities that defined 2017. It also presents a range 
of perspectives, from the global to the individual, the 
official to the unofficial, from mainland China to Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. Together, the stories present a richly 
textured portrait of a nation that in just forty years 
has lifted itself from universal poverty to (unequally 
distributed) wealth, changing itself and the world in 
the process.
2018: Power
In 2018, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was, by 
most measures, more powerful than at any other time 
in its history and had become one of the most powerful 
countries in the world. Its economy faced serious 
challenges, including from the ongoing ‘trade war’ with 
the US, but still ranked as the world’s second largest. 
Its Belt and Road Initiative, meanwhile, continued to 
carve paths of influence and economic integration 
across several continents. A deft combination of policy, 
investment, and entrepreneurship has also turned the 
PRC into a global ‘techno-power’. It aims, with a good 
chance of success, at becoming a global science and 
technology leader by 2049 — one hundred years from 

















The People’s Republic of China under the leadership 
of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping, has 
declared that it shares in the destiny of the countries of 
the Asia and Pacific region, as well as of nations that are 
part of an intertwined national self-interest. The China 
Story Yearbook 2014 takes the theme of Shared Destiny 
共同命运 and considers it in the context of China’s 
current and future potential.
2015: Pollution
This Yearbook explores the broader ramifications of 
pollution in the People’s Republic for culture, society 
law and social activism, as well as the Internet, language, 
thought, and approaches to history. It looks at how it 
affects economic and political developments, urban 
change, and China’s regional and global posture. The 
Chinese Communist Party, led by ‘Chairman of Everything’ 
Xi Jinping, meanwhile, has subjected mainland society to 
increasingly repressive control in its new determination 
to rid the country of Western ‘spiritual pollutants’ while 
achieving cultural purification through ‘propaganda and 
ideological work’.
2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse
The authors of Red Rising, Red Eclipse survey China’s 
regional posture, urban change, social activism and 
law, human rights and economics, the Internet, history, 
and thought. This inaugural China Story Yearbook offers 
an informed perspective on recent developments in 
China and provides a context for understanding ongoing 
issues that will resonate far beyond the Dragon Year of 
2012–2013. 
2013: Civilising China
As China becomes wealthier and more confident on 
the global stage, it also expects to be respected and 
accommodated as a major global force — and as 
a formidable civilisation. Through a survey and analysis 
of China’s regional posture, urban change, social activism 
and law, mores, the Internet, history, and thought — in 
which the concept of ‘civilising’ plays a prominent role 
— China Story Yearbook 2013 offers insights into the 
country today and its dreams for the future.

